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ABSTRACT 
This paper presents empirical findings on the impact of capital structure (leverage) on 
performance of quoted firms in Nigeria. The main objective of this study is to determine the 
overall effect of capital structure on corporate performance of Nigerian quoted firms by 
establishing the relationship that exists between the capital structure choices of firms in 
Nigeria and their return on assets, return on equity and tobin’s Q (a market performance 
measure). The effect of institutional factors such as size, tax and industry on firms’ 
performance was also established. The study employed panel data analysis by using Fixed-
effect estimation, Random-effect estimation and Pooled Regression Model. The usual 
identification tests and the Hausman’s Chi-square statistics for testing whether the Fixed 
Effects model estimator is an appropriate alternative to the Random Effects model were also 
computed for each model. The empirical results based on 2003 to 2007 accounting and 
marketing data for 101 quoted firms in Nigeria lend some support to the pecking order and 
static tradeoff theories of capital structure. A firm’s leverage was found to have a significant 
negative impact on the firm’s accounting performance measure (ROA).  An interesting finding 
is that all the leverage measures have a positive and highly significant relationship with the 
market performance measure (Tobin’s Q). It was also established that the maturity structure 
of debts affect the performance of firms significantly and the size of the firm has a significant 
positive effect on the performance of firms in Nigeria The study further reveals a salient fact 
that Nigerian firms are either majorly financed by equity capital or a mix of equity capital 
and short term financing. It is therefore suggested that Nigerian firms should try to match 
their high market performance with real activities that can help make the market performance 
reflect on their internal growth and accounting performance.   
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CHAPTER ONE 
INTRODUCTION 
 
1.1 Background to the Study 
Capital structure is one of the finance topics among the studies of researchers and scholars. Its 
importance derives from the fact that capital structure is tightly related to the ability of firms 
to fulfil the needs of various stakeholders. Capital structure represents the major claims to a 
corporation‟s assets. This includes the different types of equities and liabilities (Riahi-
Belkaoni, 1999). The debt-equity mix can take any of the following forms: 100% equity: 0% 
debt, 0% equity: 100% debt and X% equity: Y% debt. From these three alternatives, option 
one is that of the unlevered firm, that is, the firm shuns the advantage of leverage (if any). 
Option two is that of a firm that has no equity capital. This option may not actually be realistic 
or possible in the real life economic situation, because no provider of funds will invest his 
money in a firm without equity capital. This partially explains the term “trading on equity”, 
that is, it is the equity element that is present in the firm‟s capital structure that encourages the 
debt providers to give their scarce resources to the business. Option three is the most realistic 
one in that, it combines both a certain percentage of debt and equity in the capital structure 
and thus, the advantages of leverage (if any) is exploited. This mix of debt and equity has long 
been the subject of debate concerning its determination, evaluation and accounting.  
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Research on the theory of capital structure was pioneered by the seminal work of Modigliani 
and Miller (1958). Significant empirical and theoretical extensions followed and the broad 
consensus paradigm, at least until recently, is that firms choose an appropriate (optimal) level 
of debt, based on a tradeoff between benefits and cost of debt (Krishnan and Moyer, 1997). It 
has also been argued that profitable firms were less likely to depend on debt in the capital 
structure than less profitable ones and that firms with high growth rates have high debt to 
equity ratios (see Harris and Raviv,1991, Krishnan and Moyer, 1997, Tian and Zeitun, 2007). 
There is no doubt that benefits abound in the use of debt in the capital structure of the firms. 
The main benefit of debt financing is the tax-deductibility of interest charges, which results in 
lower cost of capital (Krishnan and Moyer, 1997). Does it then mean that a firm should go on 
increasing the debt proportion in its capital structure? If every increase in debt financing were 
going to increase the earnings for the shareholders, then every firm would have been 100% 
debt financed. However, there are certain costs associated with debt financing. So, between 
the two extremes of whole equity financing and whole debt financing, a particular debt-equity 
mix is to be decided. Any attempt by a firm to design its capital structure therefore, should be 
undertaken in the light of two propositions: first that the capital structure be designed in such 
a way as to lead to the objective of maximizing shareholders wealth, second, that, though the 
exact optimal capital structure may be impossible, efforts must be made to achieve the best 
approximation to the optimal capital structure. 
 
In practice, firms differ from one another in respect of size, nature, earnings, cost of funds, 
competitive conditions, market expectations and risk.  Therefore, the theories of capital 
structure may provide only a broad theoretical framework for analyzing the relationship 
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between leverage and cost of capital and value of the firm. A financial manager however, 
should go beyond these considerations as no empirical model may be able to incorporate all 
these subjective features. There are in fact, a whole lot of factors, qualitative, quantitative and 
subjective, which should be considered and factored in the process of planning and designing 
a capital structure for a firm. Besides, these considerations, care should be taken to ensure that 
the capital structure is evaluated in its totality and a finance manager should find out as to 
which capital structure is most advantageous to the firm. The firm should also suitably take 
care of the interest of the shareholders, debt holders and management. Above all, the legal 
provisions (if any) regarding the capital structure should also be considered. 
 
A list of factors relative to capital structure decisions such as profitability, growth of the firm, 
size of the firm, debt maturity, debt ratio, tax and tangibility have been identified; however, 
considerations affecting the capital structure decisions can be studied in the light of 
minimization of risk. A firm's capital structure must be developed with an eye towards risk 
because it has a direct link with the value (Krishnan and Moyer, 1997). Risk may be factored 
for two considerations: (1) that capital structure must be consistent with the firm‟s business 
risk, and (2) that capital structure results in a certain level of financial risk. 
 
Business risk may be defined as the relationship between the firm's sales and its earnings 
before interest and taxes (EBIT). In general, the greater the firm's operating leverage-the use 
of fixed operating cost- the higher its business risk. Although operating leverage is an 
important factor affecting business risk, two other factors also affect it-revenue stability and 
cost stability. Revenue stability refers to the relative variability of the firm's sales revenues. 
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This behaviour depends on both the stability of demand and the price of the firm's products. 
Firms with reasonably stable levels of demand, and products with stable prices have stable 
revenues that result in low levels of fixed costs. Firms with highly volatile demand, products 
and prices have unstable revenues that result in high levels of business risk.  
 Cost stability is concerned with the relative predictability of input price. The more 
predictable and stable these input prices are, the lower is the business risk, and vice-versa. 
Business risk varies among firms, regardless of the line of business, and is not affected by 
capital structure decisions (Krishnan and Moyer, 1997). Thus, the level of business risk must 
be taken as given. The higher a firm's business risk, the more cautious the firm must be in 
establishing its capital structure. Firms with high business risk therefore tend toward less 
levered capital structure, and vice-versa (Stohs and Mauer, 1996). 
 
The firm's capital structure directly affects its financial risk, which may be described as the  
risk resulting from the use of financial leverage. Financial leverage is concerned with the 
relationship between earnings before interest and taxes (EBIT) and earnings before tax (EBT). 
The more fixed-cost financing, i.e. debt (including financial leases) and preferred stock, a firm 
has in its capital structure, the greater its financial risk. Since the level of this risk and the 
associated level of returns are key inputs to the valuation process, the firm must estimate the 
potential impact of alternative capital structures on these factors and ultimately on value in 
order to select the best capital structure. 
 
From the foregoing, a capital structure is said to be efficient, if it keeps the total risk of the 
firm to the minimum level. The long term solvency and financial risk of a firm is usually 
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assessed for a given capital structure. Since increase in debt financing affects the solvency as 
well as the financial risk of the firm, the excessive use of debt financing is generally avoided. 
It may be noted that the balancing of both the financial and business risk is implied so that the 
total risk of the firm is kept within desirable limits. A firm having higher business risk usually 
keeps the financial risk to the minimum level; otherwise the firm becomes a high-risk 
proposition resulting to higher cost of capital.   
 
After over half a century of studies on this great topic, economists and financial experts have 
not reached an agreement on how and to which extent firms‟ capital structure impacts the 
value of firms, their performance and governance. However, the studies and empirical 
findings of the last decades have at least demonstrated that capital structure has more 
importance than was found with the pioneering Miller-Modigliani model. We might probably 
be far from the ideal combination between equity and debt, but the efforts of fifty years of 
studies have provided the evidence that capital structure does affect firms‟ value and future 
performance. This study is an attempt to contribute to the empirical studies on how capital 
structure affects firm‟s performance in the Nigerian context. 
 
1.2 Statement of Research Problem 
The financing decision mix of debt and equity represents a fundamental issue faced by 
financial managers of firms. The actual impact of capital structure on corporate performance 
in Nigeria has been a major problem among researchers that has not been resolved. Hitherto, 
there is still no conclusive empirical evidence in the literature about how capital structure 
influences corporate performance of firms in Nigeria. According to Kochar (1997), poor 
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capital structure decisions may lead to a possible reduction/loss in the value derived from 
strategic assets. Hence, the capability of a firm in managing its financial policies is import ant, 
if the firm is to realize gains from its specialized resources. The raising of appropriate fund in 
an organization will aid the firm in its operation; hence, it is important for firms in Nigeria to 
know the debt-equity mix that gives effective and efficient performance, after a good analysis 
of business operations and obligations. 
 
From our preliminary observation of the financial reports of firms considered in this study, 
debt financing for quoted companies in Nigeria corresponds mainly to short term debts. Also, 
external finance for Nigerian listed firms as observed from their annual reports often far 
exceed investments for most of the firms. However, using excessive amounts of external 
financing can result in the overleveraging of a company, which means the business has 
extensive obligations to institutional and individual investors who can disrupt the company‟s 
operations and financial returns. 
 
Debt financing affects a company‟s performance because companies will usually agree to 
fixed repayments for a specific period. These repayments occur regardless of the firm‟s 
performance. Although equity financing typically avoids these repayments, it requires 
companies to give an ownership stake in the company to venture capitalist or investors. Thus, 
the choice of capital structure is fundamentally a financing decision problem which becomes 
even more difficult in times when the economic environment in which the company operates 
presents a high degree of instability like the case of Nigeria. Hence, making ap propriate 
capital structure decision becomes crucial for Nigerian firms. 
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In Nigeria, investors and stakeholders appear not to look in detail the effect of capital 
structure in measuring their firm‟s performance as they may assume that attributions of capital 
structure are not related to their firms‟ value. Indeed, a well attribution of capital structure will 
lead to the success of firms; hence the issues of capital structure which may influence the 
corporate performance of Nigerian firms have to be resolved. Also, the capital structure 
choice of a firm can lead to bankruptcy and have an adverse effect on the performance of the 
firm if not properly utilized. The research problem therefore is to find an appropriate mix of 
debts and stocks through which a firm can increase its financial performance more efficiently 
and effectively. 
 
 
1.3 Objectives of the Study 
The main objective of this study is to determine the effect of capital structure on corporate 
performance of Nigerian quoted firms. The specific objectives derived from the major 
objective are: 
i. To establish the relationship between the capital structures of the firms in Nigeria and 
their return on assets; 
ii. To determine the effect of capital structures of the firms in Nigeria on their return on 
equity; 
iii. To ascertain the effect capital structures of firms in Nigeria have on their Tobin‟s Q as 
a market performance measure;  
iv. To examine how Nigerian firms‟ sizes impact their performance. 
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v. To establish the effect of tax on corporate performance; and  
vi. To ascertain the effect of the industrial sector on the performance of firms in Nigeria. 
 
 
1.4 Research Questions 
1. What is the relationship between the capital structures of firms in Nigeria and their 
performance measured by their return on assets, return on equity and Tobin‟s Q?  
2. How does the capital structure of a firm affect its performance? 
3. To what extent does maturity structure of debts affect the performance of firms in 
Nigeria? 
4. What is the effect of the size of a firm on the performance of firms in Nigeria? 
5. What is the effect of tax on the performance of Nigerian firms? 
6. How does the industrial sector affect the performance of Nigerian firms?  
   
  
1.5 Research Hypotheses 
From literature, there is evidence that a firm‟s performance is affected by the capital structure 
(Tian & Zeitun, 2007, Salawu, 2007, Kim et al 1998, Krisnnan & Moyer, 1997, Rajan & 
Zingales, 1995, Blaine, 1994). If capital structure does affect a firm‟s performance and value, 
then a strong correlation between firm‟s performance and capital structure is expected. This 
study therefore argues that a firm‟s debt ratio affects its performance negatively. Hence, 
hypothesis 1 and 2 can be stated as follows: 
     1.   H0: A firm‟s capital structure does not have significant influence on its accounting      
                  performance  as measured by the return on assets and return on equity. 
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            H1: A firm‟s capital structure has a significant influence on its accounting performance    
                   measured by the return on assets and return on equity. 
 
 
2.   H0: A firm‟s capital structure does not have significant influence on its market  
             performance as measured by Tobin‟s Q. 
       H1: A firm‟s capital structure has a significant influence on its market performance as   
             measured by Tobin‟s Q. 
 
It has been further argued that short term debt influences a firm‟s performance negatively 
because short term debt exposes firms to the risk of refinancing (Tian & Zeitun, 2007, 
Pandey, 2001, Kim et al., 1998, Stohs and Mauer, 1996). It is therefore expected that the debt 
maturity ratio (short term debt) will have a significant impact on corporate performance 
because of banking credit policy. Thus, the third hypothesis; 
 
3.         H0: Short term debt does not significantly affect firm performance 
            H1: Short term debt significantly affects firm performance 
           
From past empirical studies, the firm‟s size which is measured as log of sales or turnover has 
been hypothesized to be positively related to the firm‟s performance, as bankruptcy costs 
decrease with size. It has also been suggested that firm size should be positively related to 
borrowing capacity, because potential bankruptcy costs make up a smaller portion of value for 
larger firms. In addition, there are economies of scale in transactions costs associated with 
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long-term debt that are not available to smaller firms (Krishnan and Moyer, 1997).   Tian & 
Zeitun (2007) and Gleason et al. (2000) found that firm‟s size has a positive and significant 
effect on firm‟s performance – return on asset (ROA) while in contrast, other researchers such 
as Tzelepis & Skuras (2004), Durand & Coeuderoy (2001), Lauterbach & Vaninsky (1999), 
and Mudambi & Nicosia (1998) found an insignificant effect of firm‟s size on firm‟s 
performance. Based on the discussion above, the fourth hypothesis is thus stated as:  
                  
   4.   H0: A firm‟s size does not have a significant influence on a firm‟s performance. 
         H1: A firm‟s size does have a significant influence on a firm‟s performance 
 
Modigliani and Miller 1963 work incorporated corporate taxes and concluded that with 
corporate income taxes, leverage will increase a firm‟s value. This occurs because interest is a 
tax-deductible expense; hence more of a levered firm‟s operating income flows through to 
investors. DeAngelo and Masulis (1980) present a trade-off model of optimal capital structure 
that incorporates the impact of debt and non-debt corporate tax shields. They argue that 
deductions for depreciation and tax-loss carry forwards are substitutes for the tax benefits of 
debt financing. Their model suggests that firms with large tax benefits relative to assets 
should also include less debt in their capital structure. According to Kahle and Shastri (2005), 
ignoring the effect of these tax benefits can potentially impact our understanding of firm 
profitability and capital structure.  However, in the case of companies with large tax benefits 
from option exercise, operating earnings can increase even if the profitability of the 
company‟s basic business has not changed .  Hence we state the following hypothesis:   
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     5.    H0: A firm‟s tax does not have a significant influence on a firm‟s performance. 
             H1: A firm‟s tax has a significant influence on a firm‟s performance 
 
The capital structure for firms varies from one sector to another and so do their optimal 
capital structures (see Bradley, Jarrell and Kim, 1984). Also, a firm's growth and business 
cycle varies from one industry to another. Since capital structure, risk, growth, business cycle, 
and a firm‟s access to external sources of funds, and the sensitivity to external stocks, vary 
across industries, the corporate profitability could be affected by the industrial sectors (Tian 
and Zeitun, 2007). Therefore, the industrial sector is expected to have an impact on corporate 
performance. Based on this discussion, Hypothesis 6 can be stated as 
 
     6.   H0: Industrial sectors have no effect on corporate performance of Nigerian firms 
           H1: Industrial sectors have effect on corporate performance of Nigerian firms. 
 
 
1.6 Scope and Coverage of the Study 
This study is limited in scope to only quoted firms in Nigeria given that comparison with 
quoted companies in advance countries will be practically impossible. This is attributable to 
the differences in reporting standard and the size of the market. The attitude of companies to 
debt also differs across countries. This study also covers only the non-financial quoted 
companies. All companies whose business are financial in nature are excluded as they exhibit 
different characteristics from non-financial quoted companies since their debt-like liabilities 
are not strictly comparable to the debt issued by non-financial firms. This study is also limited 
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in temporal scope to 5 years i.e. the period from 2003 to 2007. This is done to reduce 
estimation bias and noises which could be generated as a direct corollary of the global 
economic downturn in 2008 and 2009. 
1.7 Significance of the Study 
An appropriate capital structure is a critical decision for any business organization. The 
decision is important not only because of the need to maximize returns to various 
organizational constituencies, but also because of the impact such a decision has on an 
organization‟s ability to deal with its competitive environment. A company can finance 
investment decision by debt and/or equity. This is known as financing decision which could 
affect the debt- equity mix of firms. The debt-equity mix has an overall implication for the 
shareholders earnings and risk which will in turn affect the cost of capital and market value of 
the company. It is therefore imperative for financial managers of firms to determine the 
proportion of equity capital and debt capital (capital structure) to obtain the debt financing 
mix that will optimize the value of the firm.  
 
The prediction of the Modigliani and Miller Model that in a perfect capital market the value 
of the firm is independent of its capital structure, and hence debt and equity are perfect 
substitutes for each other, is widely accepted. However, once the assumption of perfect capital 
markets is relaxed, the choice of capital structure becomes an important value-determining 
factor. This paved the way for the development of alternative theories of capital structure 
decision and their empirical analysis. Although it is now recognized that the choice between 
debt and equity depends on firm-specific characteristics, the empirical evidence is mixed and 
often difficult to interpret. Moreover, very little is still understood about the determinants of 
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firms‟ financing mix outside the US and other major developed markets with only a few 
papers analyzing data from developing countries. 
 
Inter-country comparative studies highlighting differences in capital structure started to 
appear only during the last two decades i.e. 1990 to 2010. An early investigation of seven 
advanced industrialized countries (G7) was performed by Rajan and Zingales (1995) where 
they argued that although common firm-specific factors significantly influence the capital 
structure of firms across the countries, several country-specific factors also play an important 
role. This led to further studies on developing versus developed economies. 
 
Dirmirguc-Kunt and Maksimovic (1999) compared capital structure of firms from 19 
developed countries and 11 developing countries. They found that institutional differences 
between developed and developing countries explained a large portion of the variation in the 
use of long term debt. They also observed that some institutional factors such as the stock 
market size, the financing structure etc. in developing countries influence the leverage of large 
and small firms differently. 
 
In an analysis of ten developing countries, Booth, Aivaziam, Demirguc-Kunt and 
Maksimovic, (2001) found that capital structure decisions of firms in these countries were 
affected by the same firm-specific factors as in developed countries. They assessed whether 
existing capital structure theories applied across countries with different structures in firms in 
ten developing countries and the G7 countries between 1980 and1991 and found consistent 
relations in both the pooled data results between firm‟s profitability, asset tangibility, growth 
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option and leverage. However, they found out that there are differences in the way leverage is 
affected by country-specific factors such as GDP growth and capital market development.  
They therefore concluded that more research needs to be done to understand the impact of 
institutional factors on firms‟ capital structure choices in different countries. 
 
This study, therefore, has contributed to the literature by examining firm-specific factors that 
influence the performance of Nigerian firms from the view point of their capital structure 
choices. This has helped us to understand the impact of institutional factors on Nigerian firms‟ 
capital structure choices and how it affects their performance. It has also helped us to 
establish that the western capital structure models exhibit robustness for companies in the 
Nigerian market to a large extent. 
  
This study also differs from other studies conducted so far in the country based on the fact 
that the study employs a larger number of quoted firms (a total of 101 quoted firms yielding 
505 observation); employs Tobin‟s Q as a market performance measure in the study of capital 
structure and performance of Nigerian firms; increases the number of estimation 
parameters/measurement variables based on the theories of capital structure; and employs five 
year averages in the analysis to avoid problems of short term measurement instability and to 
reduce estimation bias and noises. Therefore, the study is also contributing to methodological 
discourse as the study employed both pooled, cross-section and time series data in a panel 
data framework. In effect, this study has improved on previous studies in terms of techniques 
used in the analysis of the data of Nigerian firms, by employing the use of panel data 
estimation model. Consequently, the  results obtained from the study has led to the 
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recommendation of some policies and guidelines that will help in decision making and 
directions of the capital structure of firms in Nigeria in order to improve their performance. 
Hence, scholars, CEOs of firms and finance managers in Nigeria would find the output of this 
study a useful database and resource material. 
 
1.8 Structure of Study 
This study is divided into five parts. Chapter one introduces the background to the study, the 
objectives of study, the statement of problem, research questions, the hypotheses to be tested, 
the significance of the study, the scope and limitation of study and definition of terms. 
Chapter two reviews the existing literature on capital structure and performance of firms both 
in the developed countries and developing countries, the theories of capital structure and past 
empirical studies on the effect of capital structure on corporate performance.  Chapter three 
examines the theoretical framework and methodology adopted for the study in terms of the 
model specification, methods of estimation, data collection and instrument, data description 
and instrument, study population and sample size. Chapter four examines the data analysis 
and interpretation of results. The descriptive analysis results, the correlation matrix and the 
regression results were presented in qualitative form and fully discussed so that meaningful 
conclusions were drawn. The analyses were used to test the formulated hypotheses to 
establish the relationship which exists among the variables expressed. Chapter five which is 
the last part deals with the summary of the study, conclusion and policy recommendations. 
 
1.9 Definition of Terms 
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Capital Structure: Capital structure represents the major claim to a corporation‟s assets. This 
includes the different types of both equities and debt liabilities a firm employs in its business 
operations. 
Optimal Capital Structure: This is the appropriate mix of equity and debt at which the value 
of a firm is maximized. 
Long Term Debts: These are liabilities of a firm whose repayment exceed one year. 
Short Term Debts: These are liabilities of a firm whose repayment is within a year. 
Equity: Ownership interest in a corporation in the form of common stocks or preferred stocks. 
It can also be referred to as shares. 
Leverage: This refers to the use of fixed charges source of funds such as debt, bond, and 
debenture capital along with the owners‟ equity in the capital structure. Leverage provides a 
good avenue of measuring risk. It could also be defined as a relative change in profit due to a 
change in sales. It can be further divided into operating leverage, financial leverage and 
combined leverage. 
Risk: The possibility of suffering damage or loss in the face of uncertainty about the outcome 
of an action, future events or circumstances. It is the deviation of an actual outcome from the 
expected outcome in the presence of uncertainty. 
Financial Risk: This is the increased risk of equity holders due to financial gearing. It is due 
solely to the capital structure of a firm or the level of gearing. 
Business Risk: This is the variability in earnings before interest and tax (EBIT) associated 
with a company‟s normal operation. 
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Weighted Average Cost of Capital (WACC): This is the composite cost of capital 
representing the aggregate of the various sources of finance in use. It is used as a discount rate 
in the appraisal of new investment. 
Corporate Income Tax: Corporate income tax is a tax based on the income made by a 
corporation. The corporation begins with Federal Taxable Income from the federal tax return. 
Corporate income tax is paid after the end of the taxable year based on the income made 
during the year. Company income subject to tax is often determined much like taxable income 
for individuals. Generally, the tax is imposed on taxable profits. 
Corporate Performance Management:  It entails reviewing overall business performance and 
determining how the business can better reach its goals. This requires the alignment of 
strategic and operational objectives and the business' set of activities in order to manage 
performance. 
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CHAPTER TWO 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
2.1 Introduction 
Harries and Raviv (1991) affirm that the dynamic use of debt has received little attention in 
the vast theoretical literature on capital structure. It is a fact that a firm financial policy cannot 
be taken lightly because of its ultimate effect on the value of the firm. Undoubtedly, various 
financial policies have their own peculiar risk patterns or characteristics of financial risks. 
Also, rapid development in the business world has led to series of debates, arguments and 
controversies, yet most of the questions asked had remained unanswered. This chapter begins 
with the review of theoretical literature on corporate capital structure and performance and 
related studies. It presents the overview of the background information on the subject of 
capital structure and corporate performance. It further reviews literature on corporate capital 
structure in developing countries and reflects on the Nigerian market and institutional 
environment. The last section reviews past empirical studies on capital structure and 
performance. 
    
2.2 Review of Theoretical Literature  
If there has been any area of finance theory that has attracted the greatest attention and caused 
the highest controversy, it is definitely the theory of capital structure and leverage and how 
they affect firms‟ performance. Modigliani and Miller (1958) were the first to raise the 
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question of the relevance of capital structure for a firm. They argue that under certain 
conditions, the choice between debt and equity does not affect firm value, and, hence the 
capital structure decision is „irrelevant‟. The conditions under which the irrelevance 
proposition holds includes, among other assumptions, a situation where there are no taxes, no 
transaction costs in the capital market, and no information asymmetries among various market 
players. Financial theorists have however since provided several possible explanations for the 
financing decisions of firms. Major hypotheses include tax effects, signaling effects, 
bankruptcy effects, agency issues and industry effects (see Harris and Raviv, 1991; Myers, 
1984).   
 
According to Murphy et al. (1996), research on firm performance can be traced to 
organisation theory and strategic management. Performance measures are either financial or 
organisational. Financial performance such as profit maximization, maximising profit on 
assets and maximising shareholders‟ benefits are at the core of firm‟s effectiveness 
(Chakravarthy,1986, Tian and Zeitun, 2007).  Tian and Zeitun (2007) say that “in practice, 
firms‟ managers who are able to identify the optimal capital structure are rewarded by 
minimizing the firm‟s cost of finance thereby maximizing the firm‟s revenue.” This is 
because the firm financing policy is a crucial aspect of their survival and efficient corporate 
performance.  
 
Capital structure has been defined as the proportionate mix of debt and equity. Brealey and 
Myers (2003) are of the opinion that in terms of the proportionate mix, one cannot say more 
debt is always better or more equity is the better, debt may be better than equity in some cases 
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and worse in others. The Modigliani and Miller (1958) study lays out the foundation of 
modern theory of capital structure. They hold the stance that there is independence of 
investment and financing decisions.  They develop a defense of the net operating income 
approach to the effect of leverage on the cost of capital and the value of the firm which holds 
that the firm‟s value and overall cost of capital are independent of the firm‟s capital structure. 
Their theory is based on the behavioural proposition that investors would use arbitrage to 
keep the weighted average cost of capital (WACC) constant when changes in firm‟s earnings 
occur. Since then, there have been enormous efforts to study firms‟ capital structure choices 
and their implications. Popular models include the tradeoff models, the pecking order models, 
and the market-timing models, among others. In the tradeoff models firms balance the costs of 
equity financing and debt financing, and choose the optimal leverage level where the marginal 
cost of debt equals that of equity.  
 
Classic models include agency models of Jensen and Meckling (1976) and Jensen (1986) who 
models the agency costs of equity (conflicts between managers and shareholders) and agency 
costs of debt (conflicts between shareholders and debt holders). Myers (1984) and Myers and 
Majluf (1984) develop the pecking-order theory of capital structure which postulates that 
companies prefer internal to external financing, although, they would embrace the latter if 
necessary to finance real investment with positive net present values. They allege the 
existence of asymmetric information. Given the information asymmetry between the firms 
and the investors, firms prefer to finance new projects in the order of retained earnings, 
followed by risk less debt
1
, then risky debt, and then equity. 
                                                 
1
 Most government financial instruments such as government bonds and debentures are regarded as risk less 
debts. 
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Undoubtedly, various financial policies have their own peculiar risk patterns or 
characteristics. Also, rapid development in the business world has led to series of debates, 
arguments and controversies, yet most of the questions asked had remained unanswered. 
Harries and Raviv (1991), affirm that the dynamic use of debt has received little attention in 
the vast theoretical literature on capital structure.  According to Pandey (1999), capital 
structure is the proportionate relationship between long-term debt and equity. It describes the 
mix of debenture, long-term debt, preference share and equity share capital.  
 
From literature, it is predicted that high-growth firms typically with large financing needs, 
will end up with high debt ratios because of a manager‟s reluctance to issue equity (Harris and 
Raviv,1991). Smith and Watts (1992) and Barclay et al. (2006) however suggested contrary. 
They found out that high-growth firms consistently use less debt in their capital structure. 
Myers (2001) also found out that in general, industry debt ratios are low or negative when 
profitability and business risk are high. In contrast to what is often suggested according to the 
pecking order theory, Frank and Goyal (2003) found out that internal financing is not 
sufficient to cover investment spending on average for U.S. firms. External financing was 
heavily used and debt financing did not dominate equity financing in magnitude. 
  
There is no doubt that benefits abound by the use of debt in the capital structure of the firms. 
The main benefit of debt financing is its interest tax-deductibility, which results in relatively 
higher profits for the shareholders. Does it then mean that a firm should go on increasing the 
debt proportion in its capital structure indefinitely? If every increase in debt financing were 
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going to increase the earnings for the shareholders, then every firm would have been wholly 
debt financed. However, there are certain costs associated with the debt financing. So, 
between the two extremes of whole equity financing and whole debt financing, a particular 
debt-equity mix is to be decided (Pandey, 2001).  
 
Current financial theory argues that in the absence of bankruptcy costs, the appropriate capital 
structure for a firm would be composed almost entirely of debt (see, e.g., Brigham and 
Gapenski, 1996). However, in the presence of bankruptcy costs, diminishing returns are 
associated with further use of debt in the capital structure (Kwansa and Cho, 1995). Thus, 
there is some appropriate capital structure beyond which increases in bankruptcy costs are 
higher than the marginal tax-shield benefits associated with further substitution of debt for 
equity in the capital structure. Managers who are willing to recognize and maintain this 
appropriate capital structure minimize financing costs and maximize firm performance 
(Gleason et al., 2000). According to the free cash flow theory, very high debt levels will 
increase a firm‟s value, despite the threat of financial distress, when the firm‟s operating cash 
flow significantly exceeds its profitable investment opportunities (Myers 2001). 
 
It has been theorized in the literature that firms may actually have more debt in their capital 
structure than is appropriate, for two reasons. First, higher levels of debt align the interests of 
managers and shareholders (Harris and Raviv, 1991). Second, managers may underestimate 
the costs of bankruptcy, reorganization or liquidation (Gleason et al., 2000). Both of these 
factors suggest higher than appropriate amounts of debt in the capital structure. If this is the 
case, then higher than appropriate levels of debt in the capital structure though may increase 
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firms‟ value in the short run, could result in greater exposure to financial distress in the long 
run. 
  
Graham and Harvey (2001) find that firms issue equity rather than debt when their stock 
prices are high. Baker and Wurgler (2002) also find out that the level of a firm‟s stock price is 
a major determinant of which security to issue and Welch (2004) establishes that firms let 
their capital structure change with their stock prices rather than issuing securities to counter 
the mechanical effect of stock returns on capital structure. 
   
The theory of capital structure is closely related to the firm‟s cost of capital. The debate 
concerns whether or not there is an existence of optimal capital structure and the effect of the 
capital structure on the overall cost of capital on one hand and the value of the firm on the 
other hand. This view has been a major source of controversy among famous scholars in the 
field of finance. Those who assert the existence of an optimal capital structure are said to take 
to the traditional approach, while those who do not believe in optimal capital structure 
existence are referred to as supporters of the Modigliani and Miller (MM) hypothesis on 
capital structure. 
 
The Net Income Approach Theory affirms that the use of debt will positively affect the value 
of the firm indefinitely, that is, the overall cost of capital or weighted cost can be increased or 
reduced through the changes in the financial mix or capital structure of the firm. According to 
Olowe (1998), the net income approach takes the view that leverage or capital structure can 
affect the value of the firm or its cost of capital. If a firm increases the debt in its capital 
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structure, the value of the firm will increase while the overall cost of capital will be reduced. 
This approach is termed the dependent hypothesis, since the cost of capital value of the firm 
depends on the use of debt. This hypothesis assumes that the cost of debt is less than the cost 
of equity and that corporate income tax does exist (Pandey, 1999). This hypothesis simply 
calls for one hundred percent debt finance. Brigham (1999) criticizes this on the ground that it 
is artificial and incomplete, because there is no firm in the real world that operates on 100% 
debt finance. 
 
                         
Fig. 2.1: Financial leverage and cost of capital under the Net Income Approach 
Source: Brigham, E.F. & Daves, P.R. (2007), Intermediate Financial Management 
 
From Fig. 2.1, as debt in the capital structure is increased, the weighted average cost of capital 
(Ko) decreases and approaches the cost of debt (Kd) since debt is posited to be a cheaper 
source of finance while the cost of equity (Ke) remains constant. An optimum capital structure 
will occur at the point where the value of the firm is at its maximum and the weighted average 
cost of capital is at its minimum. An optimum capital structure will occur at the point when 
the firm is 100% debt financed. 
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On the other hand, the Net Operating Income Approach Theory posits that the weighted 
average cost of capital and the total value of the firm are independent of one another. It 
implies that no matter how modest or excessive the firm‟s use of debt is in financing, the 
common stock price will not be affected. Riahi-Belkaoni (1999) however states that financial 
risk is placed on the common stockholders as a result of the decision to use debt financing or 
financial leverage in the capital structure.  
 
                                    
         Fig. 2.2: Financial leverage and cost of capital under the net operating income approach  
            Source: Brigham, E.F. & Daves, P.R. (2007), Intermediate Financial Management 
                                   
From Fig. 2.2 above, the overall cost of capital (Ko) and Cost of debt (Kd) are constant while 
the cost of equity (Ke) increases linearly with leverage. As the cost of capital is constant at 
any level of leverage, there is no unique optimum capital structure in this approach. 
 
Pandey (1999) identifies the underlying assumptions of the net income theory as (a) the 
market capitalizes on the value of the firm as a whole thus, the split between debt and equity 
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is not important; (b) the market uses an overall capitalisation rate to capitalise the net 
operating income depending on the business risk. Hence, if business risk is assumed to be 
unchanged, cost of capital is constant; (c) the use of less costly debt increases the risk to 
shareholders. This causes the equity capitalisation rate to increase, thus; the advantage of debt 
is offset exactly by the increase in the equity capitalisation rate; (d) the debt capitalisation rate 
is constant; and (e) corporate income tax does not exist. The theory concludes that every 
capital structure is optimal, regardless of the composition of debt and equity used. 
 
The two positions identified above were criticized on the ground of unrealistic assumptions 
and this brought about the formulation of a more informed view of the possible situation. This 
approach is known as the traditional theory and is often referred to as the intermediate or 
moderate position. The traditional approach is a modification to the net income approach. 
Olowe (1998) affirms that it is regarded as a middle of the road position between the net 
income approach and the net operating income approach. This theory assumes that there is an 
optimal capital structure at the point where the weighted average cost of capital is at a 
minimum. This is the optimal level of gearing and at this point the shareholders‟ wealth is 
maximized. The various views on the traditional position are based on the following 
underlying assumptions: (a) The weighted average cost of capital does not remain constant 
but rather, falls initially as the proportion of debt increases in the firm finance mix; (b) as the 
level of gearing increases, the cost of debt remains constant up to a certain level of gearing, 
beyond this significant level the cost of debt will increase; and (c) the cost of equity is 
assumed to rise at an increasing rate of leverage. The traditional approach can be depicted 
graphically as in figure 2.3 below. 
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Fig. 2.3: Leverage and the cost of capital under the traditional approach 
Source: Brigham, E.F. & Daves, P.R. (2007), Intermediate Financial Management 
 
In Fig. 2.3 above, the cost of capital first decreases with leverage and later increases with 
leverage. The range Q1 and Q2 is the point of optimum capital structure (Modigliani and 
Miller, 1958). According to Owualah (1998), the debate on optimal capital structure has 
shifted from whether it exists or not to determining the optimal for any particular company as 
well as understanding the underlying influences. These underlying influences affect firms‟ 
performance and vary from country to country. Hence, there is a need to establish how capital 
structure factors affect performance of Nigerian firms and to what degree.  
 
2.3  Corporate Capital Structure in Developing Countries 
Singh and Hamid (1992) and Singh (1995) pioneered research into corporate capital structure 
in developing countries. Singh (1995) observes that firms in developing countries finance 
their activities differently which is attributable to the differences in their financial 
environment. He examines financing patterns of top 100 corporations in ten developing 
countries in the 1980s. The basic conclusions are that first, the determinants of capital 
structure of corporations in developing countries follow an inverse pecking order theorem as 
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the corporations rely heavily on external financing, bulk of which is short term finance. 
Secondly, top corporations in developing countries rely more heavily on equity issues than 
corporations in developed economies. In most developed economies, large issues of stocks by 
corporations are only done in periods of high takeover activity, while the developing 
corporations use the proceeds from equity to finance their regular investments. The study 
further reveals that government play substantial role in stock market formation and 
development in developing countries. The government pursues pro-equity financing policies 
and limit debt and equity of firms. In addition, according to the study, existence of global 
international markets gives a boost to stock market in less developed countries (LDCs). 
 
Omet and Mashharawe (2002) examined the nature and determinants of capital structure 
choice of quoted non-financial firms in Jordan, Kuwait, Omani and Saudi from the period 
1996 to 2001. The results show that firms in these countries have quite low leverage ratios. 
The authors therefore conclude that the empirical results indicate that the financing decision 
of the firms studied can be explained by the determinants suggested by the mainstream 
corporate finance models. 
 
Booth et al. (2001) examined data from 10 developing countries to assess whether capital 
structure theories are portable across countries with different institutional structures. The 
study investigates whether the stylized facts, which were observed from the studies of 
developed countries, could apply only to these markets or whether they have more general 
applicability. The results are somewhat skeptical of this premise. They provide evidence that 
firms‟ capital structure choices in developing countries are affected by the same variables as 
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they are in developed countries. Nevertheless, there are persistence differences of institutional 
structure across countries indicating that specific country factors are at work. Their findings 
suggest that although some of the insights from modern finance theory are portable across 
countries, much remains to be done to understand the impact of different institutional choices. 
 
2.4 Review of Empirical Studies 
This study will not be complete without taking a critical look at some past empirical studies in 
terms of the purpose of the studies, the methodology that was adopted and the findings of the 
studies as are related to this current study. This is necessary in order to enable the researcher 
to see the gaps that might have been left or to get a glimpse of some recommendations for 
further studies that might have been reported in these previous studies.  
 
Krishnan and Moyer (1997) carried out an empirical study on the corporate performance and 
capital structure of large enterprises from four emerging market economies in Asia namely 
Hong Kong, Malaysia, Singapore and Korea. The study also tries to investigate the influence 
of country of origin on both financial performance and capital structure of the corporations 
studied. The study uses Analysis of Variance to test for differences based on country of origin 
and estimated factor model regression models to capture the effect of expressed variables on 
performance. They use four different measures of corporate performance viz-a-viz the return 
on equity (ROE), the return on invested capital (ROIC), the pretax operating profit margin 
(PTM) and the market return on stock (RETURN) and two measure of leverage namely the 
ratio of total debts to the market value of equity (TD/Equity) and the ratio of long-term debt to 
the market value of equity (LTD/Equity). The study corrects for problems of short term 
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measurement instability and bias by taking the five year average of the variables. The study 
finds a negative and significant impact of total debt to total equity (TD/TE) on return equity 
(ROE) of Asian corporations comprising of 81 companies. The study also finds out that both 
profitability performance and capital structure were influenced by the country of origin. The 
Hong Kong corporations have significantly higher returns on equity and invested capital 
while performance differences among firms from the other countries were not statistically 
significant. The stock market return model was not significant which suggests that expected 
differences in accounting performance across the countries were rapidly incorporated in their 
stock prices. Overall, the evidence from the study only lends limited support to the extant 
capital structure theories in these emerging market economies.  
 
Tian and Zeitun (2007) investigated the effect of capital structure on corporate performance of 
corporations in Jordan using a panel data sample representing 167 companies during the 
period 1989 to 2003. The study used panel data models to estimate different measures of 
corporate performance such as the return on assets (ROA), return on equity (ROE), earnings 
before interest and tax plus depreciation to total assets (PROF) as accounting performance‟s 
measurements and Tobin‟s Q, market value of equity to book value of equity (MBVR), 
price/earnings (P/E) ratio and market value of equity plus book value of liabilities divided by 
book value of equity (MBVE) as market performance‟s measurements. The study also 
analyzed the variables using descriptive statistics and correlation matrix. The empirical results 
show that a firm‟s capital structure has a significant negative impact on the firms‟ 
performance using both the accounting and market measurements. The study finds that the 
short term debt to total assets (STDTA) as a leverage measure has a significantly positive 
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effect on the market performance measure (Tobin‟s Q) contrary to other measures of leverage 
such as the total debt to assets and long term debt to total assets. 
 
Salawu (2007) carried out an empirical analysis of the capital structure of 50 selected non-
financial quoted companies in Nigeria between the period 1990 and 2004. The study 
investigates the main determinants of the capital structure of the selected quoted firms in 
Nigeria. The study employs two different analytical techniques namely the descriptive 
statistics and the inferential statistics (panel data econometrics techniques) in analyzing 
secondary data obtained from the annual reports of the selected companies and reports of the 
Nigerian Stock Exchange. The descriptive analysis used in evaluating the selected variables 
are the mean, mode, median, range and standard deviation. The pooled ordinary least square 
(OLS) model, Fixed Effects model and Random Effects model are used in the analysis of 
data. The study also excludes the financial quoted companies. The empirical results show that 
debt financing for listed companies in Nigeria for the period studied corresponds mainly to a 
short term debt nature. Leverage is found to be negatively correlated with profitability. The 
size of the firms is however found to be positively correlated with total debts which according 
to the author, suggests that large firms can better support higher debt ratios than small firms. 
 
Berger and Bonaccorsi di Patti (2002) propose a new approach to testing the agency theory of 
capital structure on the U.S. banking industry using profit efficiency or how close a firm‟s 
profits are to the benchmark of a best-practice firm facing the same exogenous conditions. 
The study employs the use of two-equation simultaneous equations and econometric 
techniques to account for reverse causality from performance to capital structure, using annual 
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information on 695 U.S. commercial banks to test for agency theory on U.S. firms data  from 
1990 – 1995. Averages for each bank are used in order to reduce the effects of temporary 
shocks on the measurement of efficiency and to examine equilibrium relationships in the data 
used. The study finds that there is reverse causality from performance to capital structure and 
that data on the U.S. banking industry are consistent with the agency theory of capital 
structure. The results are statistically and economically significant. 
 
Kochhar (1997) investigated the relationship between the financial management capability of 
a firm and its competitive advantage. The paper specifically argues that the capital structure 
decisions of firms are important in realizing the gains from their valuable and idiosyncratic 
resources. The paper explores the role of financial management in generating superior 
performance for a firm and concludes that the financial policies of a firm should be in 
harmony with its source of economic rents. Sound financial management provides firms with 
the capability to obtain the economic rents present in their strategic assets. 
 
Delcoure (2007) investigated whether capital structure determinants in emerging Central and 
Eastern European (CEE) countries support traditional capital structure theories developed to 
explain western economies. The study uses panel data sample consisting of an unbalanced 
panel of 22 Czech, 61 Polish, 33 Russia and 13 Slovak publicly traded companies from the 
period 1996 – 2002.  The data are analyzed using the pooled ordinary least square regression 
method, the fixed effects and random effects model for individual country and for the whole 
sample, the use of panel data provided a greater number of data points and thus additional 
degrees of freedom which made the result more reliable. The empirical findings suggest that 
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there is a difference in the determinants of capital structure choices of companies in CEE 
countries as compared to companies in developed countries. Firms in CEE countries tend to 
rely more heavily on short term debt in their capital structure than is typical of companies in 
developed markets. The pecking order, tradeoff and agency theories partially explain to an 
extent, the corporate capital structure choices in these countries. The empirical evidence 
however demonstrates the presence of a „modified pecking order‟ theory in explaining capital 
structure choices for firms in CEE countries i.e. retained earnings, equity, bank and market 
debt.     
 
 De Jong, Kabir and Nguyen (2008) analyzed the importance of firm- specific and country-
specific factors in the capital structure choice of firms from 42 countries around the world. 
The study employs data sourced from Compustat Global database and World Bank database 
for the period 1997 to 2007. The data are analyzed using the firm-level Ordinary Least Square 
(OLS) regression method with leverage as the dependent variable and the simple Pooled OLS 
regression method. The authors also test the null hypothesis formulated in the paper using an 
unrestricted regression model and seven restricted models which are related to the joint test of 
significance of regression coefficients. The study finds that the firm-specific determinants of 
leverage differ across countries and shows an indirect impact of country-specific factors on 
the capital structure of firms. Overall the empirical results indicate that the conventional 
theories on capital structure developed using listed firms in the United States as a role model, 
work well in similar economies with developed legal environment and high level of economic 
development. 
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Chowdhury and Chowdhury (2010) examined the impact of capital structure on the value of 
shares of Bangladesh quoted firms. The study aims to provide a status on the extent to which 
a firm‟s capital structure may differ and how the value of firm changes as a result. The study 
analyzes 77 companies from the four most dominant sectors of Bangladesh capital market. 
Cross sectional and time series fixed effect model is used to analyze available data to find out 
the impact of capital structure on the firm value (expressed by the share price in the market). 
Cross sectional regression analysis measures the observations at the same point in time or 
over the same period but differ along another dimension. Time series analysis identifies the 
nature of phenomenon represented by the sequence of observation and forecast the future and 
observes a trend. The model used put value of the firm (share price) as dependent variable; 
firm size, profitability, public ownership in capital structure, dividend payout, asset and 
operating efficiency, growth rate, liquidity and business risk were taken as independent 
variables. Firm size is represented by share capital, profitability is measured through EPS, 
public ownership is in percentage, capital structure is represented by the ratio of long term 
debt to total assets, dividend payout at actual, efficiency is measured through fixed asset 
turnover, growth rate is noted through sales growth rate, liquidity is measured by current ratio, 
and business risk is represented by operating leverage. All the variables used as independent 
variables are considered as proxy for the capital structure decision of respective firm. They 
establish from the empirical findings that there is a strong positive correlation between the 
firms‟ capital structure and value expressed by their share prices in the market. 
 
Deesomsak, paudyal and Pescetto (2004) investigated the determinants of firms operating in 
the Asia pacific Region, in four countries with different legal, financial and institutional 
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environments namely Thailand, Malaysia, Singapore and Australia. The study use data 
obtained from Datastream database covering the period from 1993 to 2001. The sample 
included all quoted non-financial firms. The data are analyzed using the Ordinary Least 
Square (OLS) regression method to estimate the relationship of the firm-specific determinants 
while the Fixed Effect model and Pooled OLS are used in analyzing the country-specific 
determinants. The overall results support the existing evidence with respect to the firm-
specific determinants but also suggest that capital structure decisions of firms is also 
influenced by the environment in which they operate such as the corporate governance, legal 
framework and institutional environment of the country. 
 
Huang and Song (2006) examined the determinants of capital structure in Chinese listed 
companies in order to investigate whether firms in the largest developing and transition 
economy of the world entertain any unique characteristics in their capital structure choice. 
The paper employs a new database containing both market and accounting data of 1216 
Chinese quoted companies from 1994 to 2003.  Six measures of leverage are used in the study 
such as book long term debt (LD) ratio, book total debt (TD) ratio, book total liabilities (TL) 
ratio, market long term debt (MLD) ratio, market total debt (MTD) ratio and market total 
liabilities (MTL) ratio together with expressed capital structure determinants such as ROA, 
Size, tangibility, tax, growth, ownership structure and volatility. The data are analyzed using 
the Ordinary Least Square (OLS) regression method and the Tobit model. The empirical 
results show that as in other countries, leverage in Chinese listed firms increase with firm size 
and fixed assets and decreases with profitability, non debt tax shields, growth opportunity and 
managers shareholdings. The study also reveals that state ownership or institutional 
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ownership has no significant impact on capital structure of Chinese companies. However, 
Chinese firms tend to have much lower long-term debt as compared to those in developed 
economies. 
 
De Miguel and Pindado (2001) analyzed the firm characteristics which are determinants of 
capital structure according to different explanatory theories and how institutional 
characteristics affect capital structure choices in Spanish companies. The study also develops 
a target adjustment model in studying the debt of Spanish firms in terms of adjusting to their 
target debt level which was confirmed by the empirical evidence of the study. The study use 
panel data from non-financial quoted Spanish companies obtained from the database of the 
CNMV (Spanish Security Exchange Commission) between the period from 1990 and 1997. 
The econometric analysis used involves the estimation of the dynamic model with 
predetermined variables using a two-step Generalized Method of Moments (GMM). The 
model is estimated using the Dynamic Panel Data (DPD) program. The empirical results are 
consistent with tax and financial distress theories and with the interdependence between 
investment and financing decisions. The results also provide additional evidence on the 
pecking order and free cash flow theories. The empirical evidences corroborate the proposed 
model. The result also shows that Spanish firms bear considerable transaction costs when they 
decide to adjust their debt ratio in the previous period to their target level in the current 
period, though these transaction costs according to the authors are inferior to those borne by 
U.S. firms. 
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Bauer (2004) examined the determinants of capital structure in transition economy of Czech 
Republic to establish if there are any differences from the proposals of existing theories on 
capital structure choices. The study employs data collected from financial reports of listed 
companies in Czech within the period from 2000 and 2001. The data are analyzed using the 
Ordinary Least Square regression method. The variables examined are size, return on asset 
(ROA), tangibility, growth opportunity, tax rate, non-debt tax shield and volatility. Four 
measures of leverage are also used namely book total liabilities ratio (TL), book total debt 
ratio (TD), market total liabilities ratio (MTL) and market total debt ratio (MTD) and a 
comparative analysis is also carried out. According to the empirical results, listed firms in 
Czech exhibit lower leverage than firms in the G7 countries and firms in the majority of 
developing countries when measured by book total liabilities ratio. Czech quoted firms‟ 
leverage is positively correlated with size, tax and negatively correlated with profitability, 
tangibility and growth opportunities. The negative relationship between leverage and 
profitability makes the findings consistent with the pecking order hypothesis rather than the 
static tradeoff models. 
 
Chen (2004) developed a preliminary study to explore the determinants of capital structure of 
Chinese-listed companies using firm-level panel data. The study uses data from the annual 
reports of 88 Chinese publicly listed companies for the period 1995 to 2000. The selected 
variables such as overall leverage, long term leverage, profitability, size, growth 
opportunities, asset structure, cost of financial distress and tax shield effects are analyzed 
using three estimation techniques namely the fixed effect method, random effects method and 
the pooled OLS regression method. The empirical results show that some of the insights from 
 54 
modern finance theory of capital structure are portable to China in that certain firm-specific 
factors that are relevant for explaining capital structure in developed economies are also 
relevant in China. However, neither the trade off model nor the pecking order hypothesis 
derived from the western setting provides convincing explanations for the capital structure of 
the Chinese firms. The capital structure of the Chinese companies seems to follow a „new 
pecking order‟- retained profit, equity and long term debt. 
 
Adaramola, Sulaimon and Fapetu (2005) aimed at establishing a realistic relationship between 
the capital structure and corporate performance of selected quoted firms in Nigeria. The study 
use panel data from fifty quoted firms for the year 2002. The data are further built into three 
different panels. Panel one comprised of data from both banking and non-banking firms, panel 
two has data from 25 non-banking firms while panel three has data from 25 banking firms. 
The study employs the ordinary least square (OLS) regression method of estimation to 
analyze the variables used i.e. Earnings per share (EPS) on leverage ratio, weighted average 
cost of capital and business risk. The study reveals that capital structure has no significant 
impact on the value of non-banking firms as all explanatory variables used in the panel for 
non-banking firms were not statistically significant from zero. On the other hand, the result 
shows that the value of the banking firms is positively affected by its capital structure. 
According to the authors, this result suggests that the concept of optimal capital structure is 
not applicable to the Nigerian banking institutions. 
 
David and Olorunfemi (2010) investigated the relationship that exists between earnings per 
share and leverage ratio on one hand and dividend per share and leverage ratio on the other 
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hand in the Nigerian petroleum industry. The earnings per share and dividend per share are 
used as performance measures. The study employs panel data analysis using Pooled 
regression estimation, Fixed-effect estimation, Random-effect estimation and Maximum 
likelihood estimation. They find that there is positive relationship between earnings per share 
and leverage ratio on one hand and positive relationship between dividend per share and 
leverage ratio on the other hand. 
 
Gleason, Mathur and Mathur (2000) show that culture influences the choice of capital 
structure and that with culture as an additional explanatory variable, the choice of capital 
structure affects corporate performance. The study uses data for 198 European Community 
retailers from 14 countries for the year 1994. The data are obtained from 1995 
Disclosure/Worldscope database. The 14 European countries are further divided into four 
cultural clusters to show the influence of culture as a control variable. The variables are 
analyzed using the Ordinary Least Square (OLS) regression method of estimation. Four 
performance measures are used namely return on assets (ROA), pretax income to sales 
(PTAX), sales per employee (SL/EMP) and percentage growth in sales (GSALES). The 
results show that capital structures for retailers in Europe vary by cultural clusters. Using both 
financial and operational measures of performance, the result also shows that capital structure 
influences financial performance. A negative relationship between capital structure and 
performance is established which suggests that agency issues  may lead to use of higher than 
appropriate levels of debt in the capital structure thereby producing lower performance. 
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Rajan and Zingales (1995) investigated the determinants of capital structure by analyzing the 
financial decisions of public firms in the major industrialized countries to establish whether 
their leverage is similar across the G-7 countries. The study computes leverage for each 
country after implementing the necessary accounting adjustments. The study also undertakes 
a comparative study of the cross-sectional determinants of capital structure choices in the G-7 
countries. The study employs data obtained from the Global Vantage database on 
international corporations from the period 1987 to 1991. The sample used covered between 
30% and 70% of the companies listed in every country which represents more than 50% of 
the market capitalization in each country. All the companies are further sorted into deciles 
according to the market value of their assets (in U.S. dollars) at the end of 1991. The study 
finds that at an aggregate level, firm leverage is fairly similar across the G-7 countries. The 
study further shows that factors identified by previous studies as correlated in the cross-
section with firm leverage in the U.S., are similarly correlated in other countries as well. 
However, according to the authors, a deeper examination of the U.S. and foreign evidence 
suggests that the theoretical underpinnings of the observed correlation are still largely 
unresolved. 
 
Following the review of past empirical studies, the table below presents a summary of the 
implications of capital structure theories and empirical evidences on the relationship of capital 
structure and corporate performance. The expected outcome would be drawn from the signs 
and magnitude of the explanatory variables that would be obtained from the data analyses. 
From table 2.1 below, it is expected that capital structure will have a negative influence on the 
accounting performance of Nigerian firms i.e. higher level of leverage would lead to lower 
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returns on asset and equity. It is also expected that highly profitable Nigerian firms will 
require less debt finance. It is further expected that Nigerian firm size is positively related to 
its borrowing capacity because potential bankruptcy costs make up a smaller portion for most 
large firms. Corporate tax rate to earnings is also expected to have a positive impact on 
performance. 
 
Table 2.1: Theories and Expected Relation between Corporate Performance and Firm    
                  Leverage and Empirical Evidences  
Variables Predicted signs by the theories 
(expected relation) 
Mostly Reported in 
empirical literatures 
Some Empirical Evidence 
ROA - (pecking order)  
 
+ (trade-off, signalling)   
     - 
 
      
Shyam-sunder &Myers (1999), 
Fama & French (2002) 
Graham & Harvey (2001) 
ROE - (pecking order)  
 
+ (trade-off, signalling)   
     - 
 
     
Chen (2004), Krishnan & 
Moyer (1997), Tian & Zeitun 
(2007) 
Size - (pecking order)  
 
+ (trade-off, signalling)   
     + 
 
     
Rajan & Zingales (1995), Tian 
& Zeitun (2007), Gleason et al. 
(2000). 
Tax - (pecking order) 
+ (trade-off, signalling)  
      + Krishnan & Moyer (1997), 
Tian & Zeitun (2007) 
Source: Theoretical extractions by the researcher 
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CHAPTER THREE 
THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK AND RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
3.1 Introduction 
In this section, the theoretical framework showing the different underlying theories of capital 
structure and corporate performance is enunciated. The methods adopted in analysing the 
relationship between capital structure of firms and their performance vis-à-vis the population, 
sample size and research design is presented. The empirical model for the study of Nigerian 
firms‟ capital structure and performance is also formulated. This empirically linked the 
performance of quoted Nigerian firms (both their accounting and market performance) to their 
capital structure. This section further shows the data description; discusses the techniques of 
estimation adopted for the model as well as the sources of data.  
 
3.2 Theoretical Framework 
3.2.1 Modigliani and Miller Proposition (No Taxes) 
Modigliani and Miller challenge the traditional view as to the effect of leverage on the cost of 
capital. They develop a behavioral justification support for the net operating income 
approach. Without taxes, the cost of capital and market value of the firm remain constant 
throughout all degrees of leverage (Modigliani and Miller, 1958).The Modigliani and Miller 
(MM) theory proves that under a very restrictive set of conditions, a firms value is unaffected 
by its capital structure which implies that the financing choice of firms is irrelevant. 
Modigliani and Miller come to this conclusion under the following assumptions: 
 Firms with the same degree of business risk are in a homogenous risk class 
 Investors have homogenous expectations about earnings and risks 
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 There is an existence of perfect capital markets 
 Interest rate on debt is the risk-free rate and  
 All cash flows are perpetuities 
The MM theorem further states that the expected return on equity is positively related to 
leverage because the risk of equity increases with leverage. 
 
3.2.2 Capital Structure and Corporate Taxes 
Miller and Modigliani (1963) correct their earlier proposition on capital structure with the 
inclusion of corporate taxes. The theory proposes that the value of the firm is equal to the 
value of the firm‟s cashflow with no debt tax shield (value of an all equity firm) plus the 
present value of tax shield in the case of perpetual cash flows.  According to Givoly, Hayn, 
Ofer & Sarig (1992), the relation between capital structure and taxes has been the subject of 
extensive theoretical analysis, which has led to testable hypotheses. These hypotheses specify 
particular relations among the optimal capital structure, corporate tax rates and non-debt tax 
shields. Previous empirical tests concerning the relation between leverage and corporate tax 
attributes have produced inconclusive results. Some studies [see, e.g., Bradley, Jarrell, and 
Kim (1984), and Titman and Wessels (1988)] find no evidence to support theoretical 
predictions that leverage levels are related to firms' non-debt tax shields. Scholes, Wilson, and 
Wolfson (1990), however, find that there is a relationship between marginal tax rates and 
financing decisions for commercial banks. 
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3.2.3 Corporate and Personal Taxes Model 
The MM model with the corporate taxes is extended by Miller to include personal taxes 
(Miller, 1977). Miller introduces a model where leverage affects the firm‟s value when both 
corporate and personal taxes are taken into account. It shows that under certain conditions the 
tax advantage of debt financing at the firm level is exactly offset by the tax disadvantage of 
debt at the personal level. There has developed, a burgeoning theoretical literature attempting 
to reconcile Miller's model with the balancing theory of optimal capital structure [see e.g., 
DeAngelo and Masulis (1980), and Modigliani (1982)]. According to Bradley, Jarell and Kim 
(1984), “if the income from equity is untaxed, then the marginal bondholder's tax rate will be 
less than the corporate rate and there will be a positive net tax advantage to corporate debt 
financing. The firm's optimal capital structure will involve the trade-off between the tax 
advantage of debt and various leverage-related costs”. Thus, the offshoot of the extensions of 
Miller's model is the recognition that the existence of an optimal capital structure is 
essentially an empirical issue as to whether or not the various leverage-related costs are 
economically significant enough to influence the costs of corporate borrowing. 
 
3.2.4 Financial Distress and Bankruptcy Costs Theory 
According to this theory, financial distress is generated by the presence of debt in the capital 
structure which could lead to bankruptcy. It states that the larger the fixed interest charges 
created by the use of leverage, the greater the probability of decline in earnings and greater 
the probability of incurrence of costs of financial distress. (Harris and Raviv, 1991; Riahi-
Belkaoni, 1999). Costs of financial distress include the legal and administrative costs of 
bankruptcy as well as the subtler agency, moral hazard, monitoring and contracting costs 
which could erode firm value even if formal default is avoided (Myers, 1984). 
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Zeitun and Tian (2007) are of the opinion that since bankruptcy costs exist, deteriorating 
returns occur with further use of debt in order to get the benefits of tax deduction. It is 
therefore believed that there is an appropriate capital structure beyond which increases in 
bankruptcy costs are higher than the marginal tax-sheltering benefits associated with 
additional substitution of debt for equity. 
 
Harris and Raviv (1991) argue that capital structure is related to the trade-off between costs of 
liquidation and the gain from liquidation to both shareholders and managers. Zeitun and Tian 
(2007) however state that underestimating the bankruptcy costs of liquidation or 
reorganization, or the aligned interest of both managers and shareholders, may lead firms to 
have more debt in their capital structure than they should ( see Riahi-Belkaoni, 1999).  
 
Francis and Cho (1995) in their study of ten U.S. bankrupt restaurant between 1980 -1992, 
show that the tradeoff between tax savings and bankruptcy cost can be utilized by the firm to 
serve as a signal for imminent insolvency. The stronger the signal becomes the closer the firm 
is to the bankruptcy year and the higher the bankruptcy probability levels. Their findings also 
confirm the fact that the forgone profits represent a sizable proportion of a firm‟s value and 
that the size of the indirect bankruptcy cost outweighs the size of the tax savings from debt. 
The higher the debt used the closer a firm is to filing for bankruptcy. Therefore, the tradeoff 
between tax savings and indirect bankruptcy cost can be used as an appropriate signal for 
gauging the onset of financial distress. 
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Kwansa and Cho (1995) conclude that targeting an optimal capital structure is beneficial to a 
firm because the indirect costs of financial distress is significant, making the appropriate 
balancing of tax savings and indirect cost of financial distress necessary.  
 
3.2.5 Agency Costs (Free Cashflow) Theory      
Under this model, an optimal capital structure can be obtained by trading off the agency cost 
of debt against the benefit of debt (Riahi-Belkaoni, 1999).  Agency costs are costs due to 
conflicts of interest. Two types of conflicts are identified by Jensen and Meckling (1976):  
first is the conflicts between shareholders and managers arising from the situation of 
managers holding less than 100% of the residual claim and second is the conflict between 
debt holders and equity holders arising from the debt contract that make equity holders invest 
sub-optimally. 
 
Gleason, Mathur, and Mathur (2000) are of the opinion that a negative relationship between 
capital structure and performance suggests that agency issues may lead to use of higher than 
appropriate levels of debts in the capital structure, thereby producing lower performances. 
 
According to Berger and Bonaccorsi di Patti (2006), greater financial leverage may affect 
managers and reduce agency costs through the threat of liquidation which causes personal 
losses to managers of  salaries, reputation and perquisites and higher leverage can mitigate 
conflicts between shareholders and managers concerning the choice of investment (Myers, 
1977)  and the amount of risk to undertake (Jensen and Meckling, 1976), the conditions under 
which the firm is liquidated (Harris and Raviv, 1990) and dividend policy. 
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Using profit efficiency as an indicator of firm performance to measure agency costs, a two-
equation structural model to take into account reverse causality from firm performance to 
capital structure and include measures of ownership has findings that are consistent with the 
agency costs hypothesis. Berger and Bonaccorsi di Patti (2006) find out that higher leverage 
or a lower equity capital ratio is associated with higher profit efficiency. They also find that 
profit efficiency is responsive to the ownership structure of firms consistent with agency 
theory and that profit efficiency embeds agency costs. 
 
Harris and Raviv (1991) also find results that are consistent with the agency models. Their 
findings show that leverage is positively associated with firm value, default probability and 
liquidation value and negatively associated with interest coverage, the cost of investigating 
firm prospects and the probability of reorganization following default. 
  
3.2.6 The Pecking Order Theory (Asymmetric Information Model) 
This model considers the possibility of asymmetric information whereby firm managers are 
assumed to know more about the characteristics of the firm‟s return stream or investment 
opportunities (Harris and Raviv, 1991; Riahi-Belkaoni, 1999). The choice of capital structure 
by management therefore signals to outside investors some insider information. This 
asymmetry of information influences the choice between internal and external financing and 
between new issues of debt and equity securities. This choice is based on the „pecking order‟ 
hypothesis (Baskin, 1989). 
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 The pecking order theory of capital structure was first presented by Myers and Majluf (1984), 
and relies heavily on information cost to explain corporate behaviour.  They show in their 
pioneering work that, if investors are less well-informed than current firm insiders about the 
value of the firm‟s assets, then equity may be mispriced by the market. If firms are required to 
finance new projects by issuing equity, underpricing may be so severe that new investors 
capture more than the NPV of the new project, resulting in a net loss to existing shareholders.  
 
Myers (1984), challenges the notion of an optimal capital structure based purely on the 
tradeoff of debt-related benefits and costs in a world of information asymmetry between 
corporate managers and investors. He further observes that corporate financing practice does 
not conform to a simple trade off model and he suggests the existence of a pecking order 
among the financing sources used by firm. According to this theory, internally generated cash 
is at the top of the order, followed by external debt financing while external equity financing 
is used only as a last resort. 
 
Shyam-Sunder and Myers (1999) also find support for the pecking order theory among U.S. 
firms. They claim that the tradeoff model can be rejected since the pecking order model has 
much greater time-series explanatory power than the tradeoff model after testing the statistical 
power of alternative hypothesis. They opine that changes in debt ratios are driven by the need 
for external funds, not by any attempt to reach an optimal capital structure. 
 
Allen (1991) investigates the financial managers‟ perceptions of the broad determinants of 
capital structure decisions of listed Australian companies and finds out that the companies 
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appear to follow a pecking order with respect to funding sources. His study provides a 
practical explanation of why debt level and company profitability might be inversely related.  
 
Fama and French (2002) in their study agree that the negative effects of profitability on 
leverage is consistent with the pecking order model, but also find that there is an offsetting 
response of leverage to changes in earnings, implying that the profitability effects are in part 
due to transitory changes in leverage rather than changes in the target. 
 
Baner (2004) examines the capital structure of listed companies in Visegrad countries (Czech 
Republic, Hungary, Poland and Slovak Republic) during the period from 2000 to 2001 and 
find that leverage of listed firms in these countries is negatively correlated with profitability 
but positively correlated with size. This finding is consistent with the pecking order 
hypothesis. 
 
Chen (2004) using panel data, explores the determinants of capital structure of Chinese listed 
companies for the period 1995-2000 applying the tradeoff and pecking order models. The 
author concludes that the capital structure choices of Chinese companies follow a „New 
Pecking Order” model – retained earnings, followed by equity before long term debt- due to 
the unique institutional, legal and financial constraints in the Chinese banking sector. He finds 
that Chinese companies rely heavily on short term financing, and managers prefer equity to 
debt financing. De Miguel and Pindado‟s (2001) examination of the determinants of capital 
structure of Spanish companies also supports the pecking order theory. 
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3.2.7 The Static Trade-off Theory  
This theory postulates that the tax-deductibility of interest payment induces a company to 
borrow up to the margin where the present value of interest tax shield is just offset by the 
value loss due to agency cost from issuing risky debt as well as the cost of possible liquidation 
or re-organization.  This hypothesis by Miller (1977) is based on the proposition that the 
optimal leverage ratio of the firm is determined by the tradeoff between current tax shield 
benefits of debt and higher bankruptcy costs implied by the higher degree of corporate 
indebtedness. It assumes that firms balance the marginal present values of interest tax shields 
against the costs of financial distress. 
 
According to the static trade off models, the optimal capital structure does exist. A firm is 
regarded as setting a target debt level and gradually moving towards it. The firm‟s optimal 
capital structure will involve the tradeoff among the effect of corporate and personal taxes, 
bankruptcy costs and agency costs. Both tax-based and agency-based theories belong to the 
static tradeoff theory. (Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Chang, 1999; Harris and Raviv, 1991). 
 
It has been established that the tax advantage is most important for large, regulated and 
dividend-paying firms – companies that probably have high corporate tax rates and therefore 
large tax incentives to use debt (Desai, 1998; Graham and Harvey, 2001). 
 
Graham and Harvey (2001) survey of 392 CFOs on their capital structure provide moderate 
support for the static trade-off theory. The study reveals that 44% of the CFOs responded to 
have a somewhat tight target or strict target debt ratio, 55% of which are very large firms. 
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This finding shows that most large firms have target debt ratios and are more common among 
investment grade and regulated firms. 
 
Myers (1984) says “the firm is portrayed as balancing the value of interest tax shields against 
various costs of bankruptcy of financial embarrassment though there is controversy about how 
valuable the tax shields are, and which, if any, of the costs of financial embarrassment are 
material”. According to the literature, the firm is supposed to substitute debt for equity or 
equity for debt until the value of the firm is maximized.     
 
3.2.8 The Organizational Theory  
This theory focuses on internal finances because it believes that external finances no matter its 
sources, signals to the market that, internal sources are inadequate. Rooted in this belief is that 
companies also do pursue the objectives of conserving and when possible enhance corporate 
wealth. The theory suggests that when a company issues debt to replace equity, a decrease in 
corporate wealth occurs. However, this is regarded as good news for shareholders because a 
new debt issue enables a company to afford itself of the associated tax advantage of debt 
financing.  
 
Filbeck et al. (1996) test Patel et al. (1991) hypothesis that firms have a tendency to keep their 
capital structure in line with the industry and find results that are contrary. They however, 
found a weak support for this hypothesis and conclude that firms act rationally with respect to 
financing decisions. 
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3.2.9 The Bargaining Based Theory  
This theory of capital structure is pioneered by Hart and Moore (1989), and an extension 
followed by Bolton and Scharf Stein (1991). According to this theory, the firm‟s capital 
structure influences potential future negotiations between the firm and its investors, and the 
anticipation of such negotiations, in turn, influences financial decisions. It has been 
established in literature that debt strengthens the bargaining position of equity holders in 
dealing with input suppliers. Sarig (1988) argues that bondholders bear a large share of the 
costs of bargaining failure but get only a small share of the gains to successful bargaining. 
That is, bondholders insure stockholders to some extent against failure of negotiations with 
suppliers. Increases in leverage increase the extent of this insurance and therefore increase the 
equity holders' threat point in negotiating with suppliers. As a result, debt can increase firm 
value. This implies that a firm should have more debt for greater bargaining power and/or the 
market alternatives of its suppliers. Thus, Sarig predicts that highly unionized firms and/or 
firms that employ workers with highly transferable skills will have more debt, ceteris paribus. 
 
3.3 Model Specification  
From the literature a firm‟s performance could be affected by the capital structure choice and 
by the structure of debt maturity as debt maturity affects a firm‟s investment options. So, 
investigating the impact of capital structure variables on a firm‟s performance will provide 
evidence of the effect of capital structure on firms‟ performance. Following the hypotheses 
earlier formulated, a regression model is formulated to capture the effect of capital structure 
(measures of leverage) on performance. This model will help in testing the stated hypotheses 
of the study and in achieving the objectives earlier stated.  
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Tian and Zeitun (2007) states that the usefulness of a measure of performance may be affected 
by the objective of a firm which could in turn affect its choice of performance measure and 
the development of the stock market. For example, if the stock market is not highly developed 
and active, then the market performance measures may not provide a good result. The most 
common performance measure proxies that have been used by many authors are return on 
assets (ROA), return on equity (ROE) and/or return on investment (ROI) [see Gorton and 
Rosen (1995), Mehran (1995), Krishnan and Moyer (1997), Ang, Cole and Lin (2000) and 
Tian and Zeitun (2007)]. However, the ROA is widely regarded as the most useful measure to 
test firm performance (Abdel Shahid (2003), Tian and Zeitun (2007). Other measures of 
performance called market performance measures  are price per share to the earnings per 
share (P/E) (Abdel Shahid ,2003) and Tobin‟s Q which mixes market value with accounting 
value and has been used to measure the firm‟s value in many studies [see McConnel and 
Serveas (1990), Zhou (2001) and Tian and Zeitun (2007)]. 
 
In this study, three measures of corporate performance were used – ROA, ROE and Tobin‟s 
Q. The researcher used the proxies (ROA and ROE) as accounting performance measures and 
the (Tobin‟s Q) as a market performance measure. More than one proxy for performance were 
used in this study in order to investigate whether the independent variables explain the 
performance measures (accounting and stock market) at the same level or not.  Three 
measures of leverage
2
 were also used in the study: 
                                                 
2
 As Harris and Raviv (1991) argued, the choice of measures for both performance and leverage as explanatory 
variable is crucial, as it may affect the interpretation of the results. Rajan and Zingales (1995) also showed that 
the determinants of capital structure are sensitive to the measure of leverage. Thus different measures of 
performance as dependent variable and leverage (independent variables) were used. 
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1. The ratio of total debt to total assets (TD/TA); 
2. The ratio of long term debt to total assets (LTD/TA); and  
3. The ratio of short term debt to total assets (STD/TA). 
 
The short term debt to total assets (STD/TA) and the long term debt to total assets    
(LTD/TA) are used to examine the third hypothesis (H3) to establish the effect of debt 
maturity ratio on performance.  All are measured as five year averages ending in 2007 to 
avoid problems of short-term measurement instability and bias (Krishnan and Moyer, 1997). 
The accounting and market measures used in this study are similar to the variables used by 
Blaine (1994), Krishnan and Moyer (1997) and Tian and Zeitun (2007). Blaine however did 
not use a market performance measure and Krishnan and Moyer did not employ Tobin‟s Q as 
their market proxy.  However, to the best of our knowledge, this study is the first to employ 
(Tobin‟s Q), as a market performance measure, in the study of capital structure and 
performance of Nigerian firms. 
 
Accordingly, a functional relationship between firms‟ performance (PER) and the chosen 
explanatory variables (different measures of leverage, size and tax) is shown below:  
                              
                              PER = f (LEV, S, Tax)                                                                      (1) 
with: 
           (PER)
ʹ
 = (ROA, ROE, Tobin‟s Q) ʹ 
            (LEV)
 ʹ
 = (Lev1, Lev2, Lev3)
 ʹ 
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PER represents the different measures of performance (ROA, ROE and Tobin‟s Q) and LEV 
shows the different measures of leverage (Lev1, Lev2, Lev3), S connotes the size of the firms 
and Tax represents the corporate tax of the firms. 
 
Where: 
     ROA = Return on asset and is measured by earnings before interest and tax (EBIT) divided   
                      by total assets 
     ROE = Return on equity, measured by earnings before interest and tax (EBIT) Preference  
                     Dividend), all divided by equity 
      Tobin‟s Q = Market value of equity plus total debt to total asset [(E+TD)/TA] 
       Lev1 = the ratio of total debt to total asset (TD/TA) 
       Lev2 = the ratio of long term debt to total asset (LD/TA) 
       Lev3 = the ratio of short term debt to total asset (STD/TA) 
       S = Size of the firm measured by log of turnover 
       T = Tax measured as total corporate tax to earnings before interest and tax 
 
The relationships between the components of PER and the different independent variables can 
be re-written implicitly as follows: 
 
           ROA it = f(Lev1it, Lev2it, Lev3it, S, Tax, uit)                                                        (2) 
           ROE it =  f(Lev1it, Lev2it, Lev3it, S, Tax, µit)                                                       (3) 
           Tob Q it = f(Lev1it, Lev2it, Lev3it, S, Tax, vit)                                                      (4) 
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with:   
i = 1,…….,N  
 t = 1, …….,T  and 
uit, µit, and vit = Error terms (the time-varying disturbance term is serially uncorrelated with 
mean zero and constant variance).   
 
Hence:        uit   iid N (0,  
2
u) 
                         iid N (0,  2µ) 
                    vit  iid N (0,  
2
v) 
 
Equations 2 – 4 depict short panel models with few time series and large cross sections 
(individual companies). Using this panel method in estimation of the data obtained will enable 
us obtain estimates that are unbiased and efficient since it avoids loss of degree of freedom. 
Hence, the analytical panel data model tested in this study consists of three different equations 
which are structured as follows: 
 
    Setting:   yit = PERit  and 
                    xit = LEVit 
 
    Then: 
                               yit = αi+ βij xit + µit                                                                        (5)   
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Where:    
          yit = vector of dependent variables, such that (yit)
 ʹ = (ROA, ROE, Tobin‟s Q) ʹ 
          xit = vector of the explanatory variables, such that (xit)
 ʹ
= (Lev1, Lev2, Lev3)
 ʹ
 
            i =1,---------,101 
            j = 1, --------- ,5 
             t =  2003 - 2007      
 
The vector of dependent variables (yit) are the firms accounting and market performance 
indicators to be determined, while (xit) is vector of the explanatory variables i.e. factors that 
can influence firms‟ performance. The parameters (βij) are the various coefficients of the 
explanatory variables that were obtained when the model was fitted into the data. The 
constant term (αi) represents the intercept of the equations while the (µit) are the error terms 
that captures variables not included and expected to be identically distributed with zero mean 
and constant variance. Apriori expectation: Theoretically, there is an expectation of a 
significant negative relationship between the performance indicators and all measures of 
leverage but a significant positive relationship between size and performance and tax and 
performance i.e. β1, β2, β3 < 0, β4, β5 > 0.  
 
To control for the effect of industrial sectors on a firm‟s performance, 26 dummy variables 
are used. Sector 1 (Agric/Agro-Allied), Sector 2 (Airline Services), Sector 3 (Automobiles 
and Tyre), Sector 4 (Breweries), Sector 5 (Building Materials), Sector 6 (Chemical and 
paints), Sector 7 (Commercial/Services), Sector 8 (Computer and Office Equipment), Sector 9 
(Conglomerate), Sector 10 (Construction), Sector 11 (Emerging Markets), Sector 12 
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(Engineering Technology), Sector 13 (Food/Beverages and Tobacco), Sector 14 (Healthcare), 
Sector 15 (Hotel and Tourism), Sector 16 (Industrial/Domestic Products), Sector 17 
(Information Communication and Telecommunication), Sector 18 (Machinery), Sector 19 
(Maritime), Sector 20 (Media), Sector 21 (Packaging), Sector 22 (Petroleum), Sector 23 
(Printing and Publishing), Sector 24 (Real Estate), Sector 25 (Road Transportation) and 
Sector 26 (Textiles)  . The dummy variable takes the value 1 if the firm is in that sector; 
otherwise it takes the value 0. Another model showing the effect of the industrial sector is 
therefore structured as follows: 
               yit = βo+ β1Levit + β2Sizeit + β2Taxit + INDUSTit + εi + µit                               (6) 
 
This second regression model takes the form of the Random Effects Model. The Random 
Effects model is better suited for this second data set, since we need to control for the effect of 
the industrial sectors on firm performance and the Fixed Effects Model does not allow us to 
control for the effect of the industrial sectors. The reason is that the industrial dummies do not 
change over time and, so, are not being reported in the Fixed Effects Model. 
 
3.4 Methods of Estimation 
The data used in this study is presented in ratios. Two different analytical techniques are 
employed in this study. They include the use of descriptive statistics and an econometric 
technique of Panel Data
3
 method.  Descriptive statistics involve the use of mean, median, 
maximum and minimum value to evaluate the selected variables. Other measures of 
                                                 
 
3
Panel data is more useful to this study because panel data, unlike cross-sectional data, allows controlling   for 
unobservable heterogeneity through individual firm effect. 
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descriptive estimates like the standard deviation and variance were also employed so as to see 
the degree of variability of these estimates. The regression model took the form of the Fixed 
Effects Model, Random Effects Model and the Pooled Ordinary Least Square (OLS) model in 
order to establish the most appropriate regression with the highest explanatory power, that is 
better suited to the data set  employed in the study i.e. a balanced panel (Greene, 2003; Chen, 
2004; Salawu, 2007). We used the Pooled Ordinary Least Square (POLS) in the first instance. 
However, in view of the weaknesses associated with it, we used the Fixed Effects Model 
(FEM) and Random Effect Model (REM) to capture the performance of the firms considered 
in the study. The usual identification tests and the Hausman‟s Chi-square statistics for testing 
whether the Fixed Effects model estimator is an appropriate alternative to the Random Effects 
model is also computed for each model (Judge et al., 2007; Tian and Zeitun, 2007).  
 
3.4.1 Panel Regression Analysis: Panel regression analysis is a regression that involves the 
combination of time series and cross sectional data: panel data. Panel data are said to be 
repeated observations on the same cross section, typically of individual variables that are 
observed for several time periods (Pesaran, Shin and Smith, 2000; Wooldridge, 2003). Panel 
data is an important method of longitudinal data analysis because it allows for a number of 
regression analyses in both spatial (units) and temporal (time) dimensions. The spatial aspect 
refers to a number of cross-sectional units of observation, which could be countries, states, 
firms (as used in this study), commodities, and so on while the temporal aspect refers to 
regular episodic observations of a set of variables in the cross-section units over a particular 
period of time (i.e. 2003 – 2007). Panel data also provides a major means to analyse data 
longitudinally especially when the data are from various sources and the time series are rather 
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short for separate time series analysis. Even in a situation when the observations are long 
enough for separate analyses, panel data analysis gives a number of techniques that can help 
examine changes over time common to a particular type of cross sectional unit. 
 
 The combination of time series with cross-section data made possible by the use of panel data 
regression technique, usually improve the degree of freedom and quantity of data which may 
not be possible when using only one of them (Gujarati, 2003). Other advantages of using 
panel data techniques according to the same author include the following: 
i. It gives more informative data, more variability, less-co-linearity among variables, more 
degree of freedom, and more efficiency because of its combination of cross-section and 
time series observations; 
ii. It can detect and measure effects that are not commonly observed when using only cross-
sectional or time series data; 
iii. It minimises the bias that might result from aggregation of individual units into broad 
aggregates. This is due to the fact that data are made available for several units in a panel 
data setting; 
iv. It helps in handling more complicated behavioural models such as technological change, 
which may not be easy with only cross-sectional or time series data; 
v. It helps to take off heterogeneity in the estimation process because it allows for individual 
specific variables; 
vi. It is better suited when a study is dealing with the dynamics of change such as turnover 
because it involves the repeated cross section of observations. 
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The advantages of using panel data notwithstanding, there are some estimation and inference 
problems. Since panel data involve cross-section and time series dimensions, the problems 
that are associated with cross-sectional and time series data such as the issues of 
heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation respectively, are encountered. Other possible problems 
usually faced when dealing with panel data is the issue of cross-correlation in individual units 
at the same point in time. 
 
A balanced panel data framework (i.e. when there are no missing values) as used in this very 
study, is usually structured in a particular manner. Basically, a linear model for panel data 
enables the intercept (the constant term) and slope coefficients to vary over both individual 
unit and over time, which is presented as follows: 
               yit = αit + βit xit + µit                                                                                              (7)   
 
Where: 
yit: is a vector of dependent variable, 
αit: vector of constant parameter, 
βit: vector of coefficients, 
xit:  is a K x 1 vector of independent variables 
µit: is a scalar disturbance term, 
i: represents individual unit (e.g. a firm) in a cross section, 
t: represents time dimension. 
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Equation (7) above however appears too general and not estimable because there are more 
parameters to be estimated than observations. Therefore, restrictions usually have to be placed 
on the extent to which αit and βit vary with i and t, as well as the behaviour of µit. This task of 
specifying and estimating a more restrictive model calls for the need to make an informed 
choice from among three possibilities of: Pooled Regression Model, Fixed Effect Model, and 
the Random Effects Model. These three are commonly used in empirical studies (Pesaran, 
Shin and Smith, 2000; Greene, 2003; Chen, 2004; Salawu, 2007; Judge et al., 2007; Tian and 
Zeitun, 2007). 
 
3.4.2 Pooled Regression Model (PRM): The Pooled Regression Model is also known as the 
Constant Coefficient Model (CCM). It is the simplest among the three models in panel data 
analysis. However, it disregards the space and the time dimensions of pooled data. In a 
situation where there is neither significant cross-section unit (e.g. company) nor significant 
temporal effects, one could pool all the data and run an ordinary least square (OLS) regression 
model. Since there are situations where neither company (unit) nor temporal effects are 
statistically significant, equation (7) is restructured thus: 
 
              yit = α + βit xit + µit                                                                                                (8) 
 
Hence, the PRM is the most restrictive of the three models in panel data framework and if it is 
correctly specified and the regressors are uncorrelated with µit, then the PRM could be 
estimated using the Pooled Ordinary Least Square (POLS) method.  
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3.4.3 Fixed Effects Model (FEM): In the FEM, the intercept in the regression model is 
allowed to vary across space (individual company) as a result of the fact that each cross-
sectional unit may have some special characteristics. The FEM is very suitable in cases where 
individual specific intercept may be correlated with one or more regressors (independent 
variables). In order to take into cognisance the different intercepts, the mean differencing or 
dummy method are usually employed based on which is found more suitable. It is also known 
as the Least Square Dummy Variable (LSDV) model in cases where dummy variables are 
used. This is another way of calculating the within estimator most especially when the number 
of observations (N) is not relatively large. A disadvantage of LSDV model is that it 
significantly reduces the degrees of freedom when the number of cross-sectional units, N, is 
very large. In this case, N number of dummies is introduced, which will help to reduce the 
common intercept term. Thus, equation (7) will then be based on the assumptions made on α, 
βit, and µit i.e. the intercept, the slope coefficients, and the error term respectively. Under this 
method, some possibilities exist where each case introduces increasing complexity in 
estimating panel data models. Two of them are considered relevant for this study, which are 
as stated below:  
a). The slope coefficients, βit, are constant but the intercept, α varies across space. Thus, 
equation (7) can be re-written as: 
                      yit = α + β
I
xit + µit    
    or more compactly as:            
                             N 
                     yit = ∑α j djit + βxit                                                                                      (9)        
                             j=1                                      
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The uit = µit + Vit . µit shows the individual-specific effect and Vit shows the time-invariant effect 
i.e. the components are independent of each other and are assumed to be independently and 
identically distributed (iid) over the cross-sectional units (i) and time dimension (t). The 
above is a more parsimonious („economical‟) technique of relating equation (1) with (N-1) 
dummies included in order to avoid the dummy variable error that has to do with perfect 
collinearity. The constant term, αi are random that help to capture unobserved heterogeneity. 
The assumption of strict exogeneity (a case where the variables are not explained by other 
factors in the model) is usually made under this approach. Therefore, the mean of the error 
term can be stated as: 
 
             E[µit | αi, xi1, …, xiT] = 0            where t = 1, …, T                                         (10) 
 
The error term, µit is assumed to have mean zero with regards to past, current, and future 
values of the regressors (variables). This assumption of strict exogeneity is not usually 
applicable to models that have lagged dependent variables or models with endogenous 
variables as regressors. If fixed effects are present and correlated with the regressors, xit, then 
many estimators such as pooled OLS would be inconsistent. In this case, estimation method 
that eliminates the constant term, αi can be used as an alternative scheme in order to ensure 
consistent estimation of the coefficients, β in a short panel. 
 
b). The slope coefficients are constant but the intercept varies across units (i) and time (t). 
Thus equation (7) can be re-written as: 
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                 yit = αi + yt + βit + µit 
                        or more compactly as   
                        N                 T 
                 y
k
it =∑αj djit + ∑ ys ds.it + βxit + µit                                                                (11)  
                        j=1             s=2  
 
The number N of individual dummies, djit equal one if i = j and equal zero otherwise, while 
the time dummies (T - 1), ds.it equal one if t = s and zero otherwise. It is equally assumed that 
xit does not include an intercept. When an intercept is added there will be a loss of one degree 
of freedom, because one of the N individual dummies would have to be dropped. This model 
has N + (T – 1) + dim [X] parameters that can be consistently estimated if both N → ∞ and T 
→ ∞. In short panels where N → ∞ but T does not, the ys can be consistently estimated, so the 
(T – 1) time dummies are simply incorporated into the regressors, xit. The problem thus lies in 
estimating the parameters, β controlling for the N individual intercepts, αi. To resolve this 
problem, one can have dummies for groups of observations like industry. 
 
3.4.4 Random Effect Model (REM): The REM also known as the Error Components Model 
(ECM) is an alternative to FEM. The individual intercept is expressed as a deviation from this 
constant mean value. One major merit of the REM over the FEM is that it is economical 
(parsimonious) in degrees of freedom. This is because one does not have to estimate N cross-
sectional intercepts but just only the mean value of the intercept and its variance. The REM is 
suitable in cases where the (random) intercept of each cross-sectional unit is uncorrelated with 
the regressors. The REM is stated thus: 
            yit = β1i + β2i x2it + β3 x3it + µit                                                                               (12)    
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Rather than assuming β1i as fixed, it is taken that it is a random variable with a mean value of 
β1. The intercept value for an individual cross-section unit (e.g. company) is then stated as: 
                     β1t = β1 + εi                                                                                                                                                      (13)                         
where i = 1, 2,…, N                                               
 
The εi is a random error term with a mean value of zero and variance of σ
2
ε. Thus, re-writing 
equation (12) by incorporating equation (13), would result in equation (14) below: 
              yit = β1 + β2i x2it + β3 x3it + πit                                                                                 (14) 
where πit =  εi +  µit                                         
 
The πit (composite error term) is made up of two components: εi, which is the cross-section, or 
individual-specific error component, and µit, which is the combined time series and cross-
section error component. 
 
3.4.5 Method of Testing Model Selection in Panel Data Analysis 
Following the various methods of panel data analysis, the question of which is the most 
appropriate or suitable methods arises. Therefore, some means of selecting the most suitable 
method among the different approaches especially between the FEM and REM is needed. In 
literature, a basic test that has been employed by most empirical studies to choose the most 
appropriate method is the Hausman Chi-square (see, Judge et al., 2007; Tian and Zeitun, 
2007; Salawu, 2007). The Hausman (1978) specification test is the conventional test of 
whether the fixed or random effects model should be used. The question is whether there is 
significant correlation between the unobserved unit of observation specific random effects and 
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the regressors. If no such correlation exists, then the Random Effects Model (REM) may be 
more appropriate. But when such a correlation exists, the Fixed Effects Model (FEM) would 
be more suitable because the REM model would be inconsistently estimated. 
 
 
3.5 Data Description and Measurement 
3.5.1 Introduction 
The study employed secondary data from the reports of the Nigerian Stock Exchange and 
individual quoted firms. The researcher first picked all the publicly quoted firms comprising 
of 226 firms in total from 32 subsectors, then proceeded to eliminate firms which are 
categorized as financial institutions or whose businesses are financial in nature (92 firms) and 
firms whose data were not up to date (33 in all) . This exercise resulted in 101 firms that are 
purposively selected. 
 
3.5.2 Study Population and Sample Size 
From the population of 226 firms from 32 subsectors listed on the Nigerian Stock Exchange 
(NSE) market, a sample of 101 non-financial quoted companies from 26 subsectors were 
purposively selected for analysis. The study excludes companies from the financial and 
securities sector as their financial characteristics and use of leverage are substantially different 
from other companies. First, their leverage is strongly influenced by explicit investor 
insurance scheme such as deposit insurance and regulations such as the minimum capital 
requirements may directly affect their capital structure. Secondly, their debt-like liabilities are 
not strictly comparable to the debt issued by non-financial firms. Moreover, the balance sheets 
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of the firms in the financial sectors (banks, insurance companies, mortgage companies, 
leasing, unit trust and funds, real estate, investment trust and other financial institutions) have 
a strikingly different structure from those of non-financial companies. Other companies 
whose financial reports were not up to date and that are no longer in existence as at 2007 (e.g. 
companies in the Aviation Sector) were also excluded. As a result, the final sample set 
consists of a balanced panel of 101 firms from 26 subsectors over a period of five years. 
The structure and distribution of the sample are shown in tables 1 - 3 below: 
 
 
Table 3.1: Sample Selection by Sector Categorization  
Population of Nigerian Quoted Firms    226 
Firms in the Financial Sector      92 
Actual Workable Population    134 
Firms with Data irregularities      33 
Total Sample selected    101     (75.4%) 
Source: Author‟s computation from the Nigerian Stock Exchange (NSE) Factbook (2008) 
 
 
 
 
Table 3.2: Structure of the Sample used in the study 
Number of annual observation per 
company Number of companies Number of observations 
  5       101   505   
Source: Author‟s computation from the Nigerian Stock Exchange (NSE) Factbook (2008) 
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Table 3.3: Sample Distribution by Subsector Classification 
S/N           Sub-sectors                    
No of 
Companies 
% 
Companies 
1 Agric/Agro-Allied  6 5.94 
2 Airline Services 2 1.98 
3 Automobiles and Tyre  3 2.97 
4 Breweries 4 3.96 
5 Building Materials 6 5.94 
6 Chemical and Paints 6 5.94 
7 Commercial/Services 3 2.97 
8 Computer and Office Equipment 4 3.96 
9 Conglomerate 7 6.93 
10 Construction 4 3.96 
11 Emerging Markets 4 3.96 
12 Engineering Technology 2 1.98 
13 Food/Beverages and Tobacco 10 9.90 
14 Healthcare 5 4.95 
15 Hotel and Tourism 3 2.97 
16 Industrial/Domestic Products 5 4.95 
17 Information Comm. & Telecomm 2 1.98 
18 Machinery 1 0.99 
19 Maritime 1 0.99 
20 Media 1 0.99 
21 Packaging 8 7.92 
22 Petroleum 8 7.92 
23 Printing and Publishing 3 2.97 
24 Real Estate 1 0.99 
25 Road Transportation 1 0.99 
26 Textiles 1 0.99 
Total   101 
                             
              
100.0 
Source: Author‟s computation from the Nigerian Stock Exchange (NSE) Factbook (2008) 
 
3.5.3 Data Collection and Instrument 
Secondary data were used for this study. The data were sourced from the Factbook of the 
Nigerian Stock Exchange (NSE) and included the traded companies from the period 2003 to 
2007. All companies were required to deliver their financial statements for each year to the 
NSE. Hence, the data set contains detailed information about each firm.  
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CHAPTER FOUR 
DATA ANALYSIS AND INTERPRETATION OF RESULTS 
4.1 Introduction 
This chapter examines the data analysis and interpretation of results. The descriptive analysis 
results for the dependent variables and explanatory variables reveal various issues that are 
fully expatiated under subsection 4.2. The correlation matrix for the variables is reported in 
table 4.2; subsection 4.3 in order to examine the correlation that exists among variables. The 
regression results for the panel data for each of the performance measures and for the full 
sample of observations for the period 2003 to 2007 are displayed in Table 4.3 to Table 4.11 
and fully discussed so that meaningful conclusions are drawn. The analyses are used to test 
the earlier formulated hypotheses to establish the relationship which exists among the 
variables expressed. 
 
4.2  Descriptive Statistics 
Table 4.1 reports summary statistics for the variables used in the study. A critical examination 
of the descriptive statistics for the dependent and explanatory variables reveals several issues. 
The average return to assets (ROA) for the sample as a whole is 8.04%, while the average 
return to equity (ROE) is high at 459%. The first accounting measure of performance (ROA) 
shows that Nigerian companies have a very low accounting performance. The very high ratio 
of ROE of 459% recorded may reflect the impact of a relatively small number of very large 
corporate conglomerates that control a large percentage of the Nigerian‟s public corporations. 
Some of these conglomerates maintain tight control by selecting boards of directors that are 
dominated by insiders. The high average return to equity may also reflect the lower corporate 
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income tax rate to which Nigerian firms are subject, compared to the corporate tax rate paid in 
other economies. For instance, the corporate tax rate for large firms in Nigeria is 30 percent 
(Chartered Institute of Taxation of Nigeria), compared with 35 percent for large firms in U.S. 
(Don Moyer, 2009)
4
. This is further confirmed by the mean value of tax from the table which 
is 23% and median of 24%. This shows that the average corporation tax for Nigerian firms 
fall between 23% and 24%.  The measure of market performance (Tobin‟s Q) also shows high 
percentage of performance when compared with the accounting measure. The average value 
for Tobin‟s Q is 93.32%. This high ratio for the market performance measure could be as a 
result of the increase in firms‟ share prices and equity without any increase in the real 
activities performance of the firms. The disparity in returns (ROA) ranged from profitability 
of 317% (maximum value) for some firms to a loss of over 602% (minimum value) for others. 
This presents a great disparity between firms in profitability. This result therefore reveals that 
the companies under review will most likely prefer less debts and more equity, and this is 
evidenced by the high percentage value of ROE and Tobin‟s Q. 
 
A quick review of the measures of leverage shows that the first measure of leverage - total 
debt to total assets (TDTA) has a high mean ratio of 73.5%. This implies that the total 
liabilities of the firms reviewed on average amount to about 74 percent of total assets value. 
Examining the second measure of leverage – long term debt to total assets (LTDTA), the 
reported mean value of 27.6% for Nigerian firms is low when compared to firms in developed 
countries. U.S. companies have about ¾ of their debt in long term while the ratio for Germany 
firms is 55% (Claessens et al, 1998). Based on the low mean value of the long term debt to 
                                                 
4
 Don Moyer, Rjan J. (2009), “Obama Seeks end to Corporate Tax Break to Raise $190 Billion”, Worldwide 
News on Bloomberg.com 
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assets (27.6%), it can be stated that quoted companies in Nigeria do not use much long-term 
debt in their respective capital structure choice.  This supports earlier studies that have been 
conducted on Nigerian firms (see Salawu, 2007). The result also suggests that large and small 
firms have particular difficulty in accessing long-term finance with low and declining 
leverage ratios. This could also be attributed to the low return on assets recorded because 
long-term finance is needed for capital projects. However, in contrast to Salawu (2007) results 
that showed a very close standard deviations between TDTA and LTDTA values, this study 
revealed that the standard deviation of the second measure of leverage – LTDTA of 0.4704 is 
different from the standard deviation of TDTA of 0.9195. This observation predicts that 
companies in every stock market do reflect large differences in their long-term debt holding 
contrary to the earlier observation by Salawu (2007) that companies in every stock market do 
not reflect large difference in their long-term debt holding.  The mean value of the short-term 
debt to total assets (STDTA) of 45.92% as compared to 27.57% mean value of the long term 
debt shows that debt financing for listed companies in the sample corresponds mainly to a 
short term nature. This reveals a salient fact that Nigerian firms are either financed by equity 
capital or a mix of equity capital and short term financing. This short-term leverage mean 
value of 45.92% is however lower than the mean value of 60% reported by Salawu (2007). 
 
The mean value of the size of the companies examined is high at 617%. The companies 
experienced high growth in size up to 8.13% maximum value and there was no decrease in 
size growth for the period studied. It could however be noted that this growth in size did not 
really translate to higher returns as the companies recorded low average returns (ROA) for the 
period. Looking through the standard deviation (SD) which measures the level of variation of 
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the variables from their mean value, reveals that the most volatile of the variables examined is 
return on equity (ROE) with a S.D of 77.3 followed by size with 1.299. The least volatile i.e. 
most stable variable is return on asset with a S.D of 0.448, followed by LTDTA (0.4704), 
TAX (0.8095) and the Tobin‟s Q with 0.9872. 
 
Table 4.1: Descriptive Statistics for Dependent and Explanatory Variables (2003 – 2007)  
Variables Obs Mean Median 
Std 
Dev. Minimum Maximum 
ROA 505 0.0804 0.0927 0.448 -6.0208 3.7104 
ROE 505 4.5907 0.7069 77.3011 -696.34 1558.61 
TOB Q 505 0.9332 0.7038 0.9872 0.0871 7.1684 
TDTA 505 0.7349 0.5209 0.9195 0.0143 6.8064 
LTDTA 505 0.2757 0.1377 0.4704 0.0000 6.5521 
STDTA 505 0.4592 0.2642 0.6929 0.0000 5.5809 
SIZE 505 6.1719 6.3017 1.2999 0.0000 8.1378 
TAX 505 0.2307 0.2456 0.8095 -2.5859 14.9367 
Note: ROA = the return on assets (EBIT/ total assets); ROE = return on equity (EBIT/total equity); Tob Q 
(Tobin‟s Q) = Market value of equity + book value of debt/book value of assets; TDTA = total debt divided by 
total assets; LTDTA = long-term debt divided by total assets; STDTA = short term debt divided by total assets; 
Size = log of turnover, Tax = total tax to earnings before interest and tax (EBIT)  
Source: Results obtained from data analysis using the E-Views statistical software package 
 
4.3 Correlation Matrix 
The correlation matrix for the variables is reported in Table 4.2 below in order to examine the 
correlation that exists among variables. The results show that there is a negative relationship 
between ROA and three of the explanatory variables i.e. the three measures of leverage – total 
leverage, long term leverage and short term leverage, which ranges from 15.48% to 49.49%. 
However, it is positively correlated with size of the firms at 22.18% and tax at 7.76%. The 
return on equity (ROE) is also negatively correlated with all the explanatory variables except 
with size and tax but at a lower percentage of 1.55% and 0.18% respectively. These results 
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show the same correlation trend for the accounting performance measures except that the 
degree of associations are very weak in the case of ROE with lower ratios that ranges from 
6.23% to 0.18% when compared with ROA. These results imply that leverage has a negative 
influence on the accounting performance of Nigerian firms while size and tax tend to have a 
positive influence on the accounting performance of Nigerian firms. 
 
The market performance measure Tobin‟s Q is positively correlated with the three leverage 
measures and size with high coefficients ranging from 96.62% to 33.6% but negatively 
correlated with tax at 5.53%. This result implies that leverage has a positive strong degree of 
association with the market performance of Nigerian firms while tax impact negatively on the 
market performance of the firms. 
 
The results also show that size has a positive relationship with the two accounting 
performance measures (ROA and ROE) as well as the market performance measure (Tobin‟s 
Q). This implies that larger companies tend to have a higher leverage ratio with lower growth 
opportunities. It also implies that Nigerian firms (which are small relative to firms in 
developed economy) have high opportunity of growth in size which is consistent with Myers 
(1977). Size however has a negative relationship with all leverage ratios. This is contrary to 
the findings of Tian and Zeitun (2007) that reported positive relationship between size and all 
leverage ratios except short term leverage STDTA and also in line with the findings of Salawu 
(2007) who reported a negative relationship between size and short term leverage in his study 
of the capital structure of selected quoted companies in Nigeria. This implies that Nigerian 
companies tend to have a lower leverage ratio when they get larger in size.  
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The results further show that tax has a positive relationship with the two accounting 
performance measures (ROA and ROE) but a negative  relationship with the market 
performance measure (Tobin‟s Q). This implies that Nigerian firms enjoy tax benefits which 
increase their operating earnings though not reflected on the market performance. It also 
implies that there could be an increase in the firms‟ operating earnings even if the profitability 
of the companies‟ basic business has not changed. Tax also has a negative relationship with 
all leverage ratios which undermines the expected present value of tax savings derivable from 
debts.  
 
It is however important to point out that the descriptive statistics and correlation analysis only 
indicate the associate link between variables. They do not necessarily establish a causal 
relationship even with high coefficients. Consequently, a more rigorous and advanced 
econometric techniques are required to adequately capture definite significant relationship 
between the corporate performance measures and the explanatory variables. These are 
addressed in the subsequent sections of this chapter. It can also be seen from Table 4.2, that 
most cross-correlation terms for the independent variables are fairly small, thus, giving little 
cause for concern about the problem of multicolinearity among the independent variables. 
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Table 4.2: Correlation Matrix of the Variables (2003 -2007) 
  ROA ROE TOB  TDTA LTDTA STDTA SIZE TAX 
ROA 1.0000        
ROE 0.0639 1.0000       
TOB Q -0.3665 -0.0688 1.0000      
TDTA -0.3721 -0.0623 0.9663 1.0000     
LTDTA -0.4994 -0.0584 0.6705 0.6781 1.0000    
STDTA -0.1548 -0.0429 0.8271 0.8666 0.2209 1.0000   
SIZE 0.2218 0.0155 0.3359 -0.2697 -0.2521 -0.1867 1.0000  
TAX 0.0776 0.0018 -0.0553 -0.0427 -0.0719 -0.0079 0.04345 1.0000 
Note: ROA = the return on assets (EBIT/ total assets); ROE = return on equity (EBIT/total equity); Tob Q 
(Tobin‟s Q) = Market value of equity + book value of debt/book value of assets; TDTA = total debt divided by 
total assets; LTDTA = long-term debt divided by total assets; STDTA = short term debt divided by total assets; 
Size = log of turnover, Tax = total tax to earnings before interest and tax (EBIT) 
Source: Results obtained from data analysis using the E-Views statistical software package 
 
4.4 Regression Results 
The results of the Pooled Ordinary Least Square (OLS), Fixed Effects and the Random 
Effects estimation models for the panel data for each of the performance measures and for the 
full sample of observations for the period 2003 to 2007 are displayed in Table 4.3 to Table 
4.11. The regression model results using return on equity (ROE) though presented in Table 
4.9 to Table 4.11 is not significant using any measure of capital structure and hence is not 
fully discussed. These results make the ROA and the Tobin‟s Q, the most useful and powerful 
measures of performance in the Nigerian case. Therefore, the discussion of results is more 
concentrated and centered on these two measures of performance. The estimation was done 
using the White Standard Error for robustness in order to tackle any instantaneous effect of 
auto-correlation which could bias the results. 
 
From the results in Table 4.3, the total leverage measure TDTA has a positive and significant 
relationship with the market performance measure Tobin‟s Q. It is interesting to note that the 
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results of the three different estimators of the Tobin‟s Q equation i.e. the fixed effects model, 
random effect model and pooled OLS give consistent results that are all significant at 1% 
level. Size also has a positive relationship with the performance measure and the results as 
given by the random effects and pooled OLS models are significant at 1% level with the 
exception of the fixed effects model which showed a non-significant positive relationship. 
Tax shows a non-significant negative relationship with the performance measure as given by 
the random effects and pooled OLS models with the exception of the fixed effects model 
which showed a non-significant positive relationship. However, if we are to go by the 
identification test i.e. the Hausman‟s Chi-square statistics, the fixed effect result is more 
reliable as the P-value of the test is significant at 5% level while the P-values for the other two 
estimators are not significant. 
 
The adjusted R
2
 is also satisfactory in all cases. The adjusted R
2
 is 0.9856 for the fixed effects 
model, while it is 0.9668 and 0.9397 for the random effects and pooled OLS models 
respectively. This indicates that more than 90% of the variation in Tobin‟s Q as a 
measurement of performance of Nigerian firms is explained by the variations in their total 
leverage, size and tax. The F-statistics and Durbin-Watson (DW) statistics also indicate that 
the regression equations are significant. The DW statistics of 1.7661 further indicates that the 
regression equation is free from the problem of autocorrelation. The implication of this is that 
the estimated equation can be relied upon in making valid inference about the influence of the 
explanatory variables on the market performance of Nigerian firms. 
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Table 4.3: Estimation Results for Tobin’s Q using TDTA for the 101 sample firms for 
the period 2003 – 2007  
Dependent Variable: TOB     
Independent Variables 
Fixed 
Effects 
Random 
Effects 
Pooled 
OLS 
Constant 0.2632 0.3563 0.5709 
 
      
(3.9103)*** 
            
(5.704)*** 
           
(9.9482)*** 
TDTA 1.0008 1.0014 1.0135 
 
        
(5.869)*** 
            
(6.204)*** 
             
(6.058)*** 
SIZE 0.0106 0.0257 0.0615 
  (1.0034) (2.8001)*** 
            
(7.118)*** 
TAX 0.00024 -0.0011 
                -
0.01403 
 (0.0033) (-0.1451) 
               (-
1.0501) 
No of Observations 505 505 505 
Adjusted R
2
 0.9856 0.9668 0.9397 
F-Statistics 336.00 736.98 393.03 
Prob. (F-Statistics) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) 
D-Watson Statistics  1.7661 1.4078 1.3616 
Hausman X
2
 Test
 
 6.114 3.2433 3.2212 
P-Value (X
2
) 
          
(0.047)** (0.1976) (0.1998) 
Note: *** Significant at 1% level; ** Significant at 5% level and * Significant at 10% level. Numbers in 
parentheses are the asymptotic t-values of the co-efficient. TOB (Tobin‟s Q) = Market value of equity + book 
value of debt/book value of assets; TDTA = total debt divided by total assets; Size = log of turnover, Tax = total 
tax to earnings before interest and tax (EBIT) 
Source: Results obtained from data analysis using the E-Views statistical software package 
 
 
The empirical evidence obtained from Table 4.4 below suggests that the coefficients of the 
long term leverage (LTDTA) are positive and significant for the Tobin‟s Q regression all at 
1% significant level. The coefficients of size are also positive. The table shows that the three 
different estimation models offer quite similar results for size but slightly different levels of 
significance. The significant exception is that while the coefficients of size are highly 
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significant at 1% level for the random effects and pooled OLS models, it is only significant at 
5% level under the fixed effect model.  The table further shows that tax has no significant 
relationship with the market performance of Nigerian firms. Both the fixed effects and 
random effects models show a non-significant positive relationship while the pooled OLS 
model shows a non-significant relationship between tax and Tobin‟s Q. The adjusted R2 
which ranges from 0.4277 and 0.6939 is satisfactory in all cases. This indicates that on the 
average about 43% to 69% of the variation in the market performance measure Tobin‟s Q has 
been explained by the variation in the long term leverage (LTDTA), size and tax of Nigerian 
firms. The F-statistics and DW statistics also indicate that the regression equation and 
estimates are significant. The DW obtained i.e. 1.5904 and 1.7499 further indicate that the 
regression equation is free from the problem of auto correlation. Hence, the results can be 
used to make valid inference. 
 
Table 4.4: Estimation Results for Tobin’s Q using LTDTA for the period 2003 – 2007  
Dependent Variable: TOB     
Independent Variables Fixed Effects 
Random 
Effects Pooled OLS 
Constant 1.3532 1.4012 1.407 
 
          
(4.3940)*** 
            
(6.4592)*** 
          
(8.5156)*** 
LTDTA 1.2315 1.2622 1.3127 
 
        
(15.0797)*** 
          
(17.5453)*** 
          
(18.734)*** 
SIZE 0.1237 0.1326 0.1354 
  
              
(2.537)** 
           
(3.9955)*** 
           
(5.3482)*** 
TAX 
                
0.01648 
                    
0.0112 
               -
0.00323 
 
                
(0.4896) 
                  
(0.3412) 
               (-
0.0820) 
No of Observations 505 505 505 
Adjusted R
2
 0.6939 0.4277 0.4762 
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F-Statistics 12.092 126.58 153.03 
Prob. (F-Statistics) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) 
D-Watson Statistics  1.5904 1.2804 1.7499 
Hausman X
2
 Test
 
 
                  
0.3966 
                    
0.4996     
                   
0.4979 
P-Value (X
2
) 
                
(0.8301)  
                  
(0.7790)     
                 
(0.7796) 
Note: *** Significant at 1% level; ** Significant at 5% level and * Significant at 10% level. Numbers in 
parentheses are the asymptotic t-values of the co-efficient. TOB (Tobin‟s Q) = Market value of equity + book 
value of debt/book value of assets; LTDTA = long-term debt divided by total assets; Size = log of turnover, Tax 
= total tax to earnings before interest and tax (EBIT) 
Source: Results obtained from data analysis using the E-Views statistical software package 
From the result in Table 4.5, the short term leverage measure STDTA has a positive and 
highly significant relationship with the market performance measure. The results of the three 
different estimators also give consistent results that are all significant at 1% level. Size also 
has a positive and significant relationship with the market performance measure Tobin‟s Q. 
The table shows that the three estimation models also offer similar results and same levels of 
significance for the size coefficients. The size coefficient is significant at 1% level under the 
random effects, fixed effects and pooled OLS estimation models. Tax still shows a negative 
non-significance relationship with the market performance measure Tobin Q using STDTA as 
shown by the fixed effects and random effects models but it is significant at 10% level under 
the Panel Least Square regression model.  The adjusted R
2
 is satisfactory and ranges from 
0.7183 and 0.8768 which indicates that more than 71% of the variations in the performance 
measure have been explained by the variation in the short term leverage, size and tax of the 
Nigerian firms. The F-statistics and D-W statistics also showed significant values. The value 
of the DW statistics which ranges from 1.81 to 2.32 further indicates that the regression 
equation is free from the problem of auto correlation. Hence, the results can be relied upon to 
make meaningful inferences. 
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Table 4.5: Estimation Results for Tobin’s Q using STDTA for the 101 sample firms for 
the period 2003 – 2007  
Dependent Variable: TOB     
Independent Variables Fixed Effects Random Effects Pooled OLS 
Constant 1.2815 1.2966 1.2999 
      (6.7053)***       (8.5308)*** (10.915)*** 
STDTA 1.1004 1.1070 1.1283 
      (34.063)***       (36.569)*** (32.9094)*** 
SIZE 0.1379 0.1406 0.1415 
       (4.5359)***       (6.0613)***   (7.7344)*** 
TAX      -0.00981     -0.01638      -0.04996 
      (-0.4592)    (-0.7802)   (-1.7313)* 
No of Observations 505 505 505 
Adjusted R
2
 0.8768 0.7764 0.7183 
F-Statistics 35.83 494.26 429.30 
Prob. (F-Statistics) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) 
D-Watson Statistics  2.3243 1.8608 1.8098 
Hausman X
2
 Test
 
              0.8158                0.3493              0.0839 
P-Value (X
2
)            (0.6650)                (0.8397)                          (0.9589)  
Note: *** Significant at 1% level; ** Significant at 5% level and * Significant at 10% level. Numbers in 
parentheses are the asymptotic t-values of the co-efficient. TOB (Tobin‟s Q) = Market value of equity + book 
value of debt/book value of assets; STDTA = short-term debt divided by total assets; Size = log of turnover, Tax 
= total tax to earnings before interest and tax (EBIT) 
Source: Results obtained from data analysis using the E-Views statistical software package 
     Having further corroborated the relationships between the significant explanatory variables 
and the dependent variable Tobin‟s Q, it is found that: 
1. There is a highly significant positive relationship between leverage of Nigerian firms 
and their market performance as measured by Tobin‟s Q. 
 98 
2. A high positive relationship exists between size and the market performance measure 
(Tobin‟s Q) for Nigerian firms.  
3. There is no significant relationship between tax of Nigerian firms and their market 
performance. 
 
The empirical evidence obtained from Table 4.6 suggests that the coefficients of total 
leverage (TDTA) are negative for the ROA regression while the size coefficients are positive. 
It should be noted that the three different estimation models give consistent results with same 
levels of significance. TDTA has significant negative relationship with ROA under the fixed 
effect, random effect and pooled OLS models and all at 1% significant level. The result also 
shows a non-significant positive relationship between tax and ROA under the three regression 
models. The pooled OLS regression model and random effect model shows that size is 
significant at 5% while it is not significant under the fixed effect model. The Hausman‟s Chi-
square statistics however shows that the result of the random effect model is more reliable. 
The adjusted R
2
s are however low with only the fixed effect model showing 0.4037 which 
indicates that only about 40% of the variation in ROA is explained by the variation in the total 
leverage, size and tax of Nigerian firms. The F-statistics and DW statistics are satisfactory 
though, which indicates that the regression equation and estimates are significant and can be 
relied upon to make valid and meaningful inferences.  
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Table 4.6: Estimation Results for ROA using TDTA for the 101 sample firms for the 
period 2003 – 2007  
Dependent Variable: ROA     
Independent 
Variables 
Fixed 
Effects 
Random 
Effects 
Pooled 
OLS 
Constant 0.2047 -0.0444 -0.08145 
 (0.9289) (-0.4011) (-0.8346) 
TDTA -0.2259 -0.1764 -0.1631 
 (-7.852)*** (-8.0403)*** 
   (-
7.861)*** 
SIZE 0.00586 0.0414 0.0445 
  (0.1691) (2.4002)** (3.028)** 
TAX 0.02445 0.0291 0.0319 
 (0.3069) (1.3046) (1.4062) 
No of Observations 505 505 505 
Adjusted R
2
 0.4037 0.1458 0.1527 
F-Statistics 2.6359 29.6745 31.271 
Prob. (F-Statistics) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) 
D-Watson Statistics  2.4198 1.9528 1.7574 
Hausman X
2
 Test
 
 
               
0.6185 63.8499 
            
0.4077 
P-Value (X
2
) 
              
(0.600)                     (0.00)*** 
          
(0.8931) 
Note: *** Significant at 1% level; ** Significant at 5% level and * Significant at 10% level. Numbers in 
parentheses are the asymptotic t-val ues of the co-efficient. ROA = the return on assets (EBIT/ total assets); 
TDTA = total debt divided by total assets; Size = log of turnover, Tax = total tax to earnings before interest and 
tax (EBIT) 
Source: Results obtained from data analysis using the E-Views statistical software package 
 
From the results in Table 4.7, the long term leverage (LTDTA) has a negative significant 
relationship with return on assets (ROA). The three different estimation models show similar 
results and same levels of significance. The coefficient of the explanatory variable LTDTA is 
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significant at 1% as shown for the three regression models. The fixed effects model also 
shows a non- significant negative relationship between size and ROA while the random effect 
and pooled OLS models show positive relationship. The size coefficient is only significant 
under the pooled regression model at 5% significant level. The Hausman‟s Chi-square 
statistics however shows that the results of the random effect and pooled regression models 
which are consistent are more reliable. The coefficient tax is also found to have a positive 
relationship with ROA under the three regression models but it is not significant at any level. 
The adjusted R
2
s are also low with the highest value of 0.4039 recorded under the fixed 
effects model. This indicates that about 41% of the variation in ROA has been explained by 
the variation in the long term leverage, size and tax of the Nigerian firms studied. The F-
statistics and DW statistics are also significant, hence the estimated equation can be relied 
upon in making valid inference about the influence of the explanatory variables on the 
accounting performance of Nigerian firms.  
 
 
Table 4.7: Estimation Results for ROA using LTDTA for the 101 sample firms for the 
period 2003 – 2007  
Dependent Variable: ROA     
Independent 
Variables Fixed Effects 
Random 
Effects Pooled OLS 
Constant 0.4391 0.0632 -0.0166 
 (2.2517)** (0.6002) (-0.1859) 
LTDTA -0.6951 -0.5156 -0.4485 
 (-13.442)*** (-12.687)*** (-11.841)*** 
SIZE -0.02771 0.0251 0.0349 
  (-0.8977) (1.5534) (2.553)** 
TAX 0.01722 0.01916 0.0218 
 (0.8078) (0.9311) (1.0228) 
No of Observations 505 505 505 
Adjusted R
2
 0.4039 0.2672 0.2563 
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F-Statistics 4.3158 62.2543 58.9017 
Prob. (F-Statistics) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) 
D-Watson Statistics  2.2026 1.7951 1.5752 
Hausman X
2
 Test
 
                 0.7085 
             
25.5321 
             
25.3484 
P-Value (X
2
)              (0.1116) 
          
(0.00)*** 
           
(0.00)*** 
Note: *** Significant at 1% level; ** Significant at 5% level and * Significant at 10% level. Numbers in 
parentheses are the asymptotic t-values of the co-efficient. ROA = the return on assets (EBIT/ total assets); 
LTDTA = long term debt divided by total assets; Size = log of turnover, Tax = total tax to earnings before 
interest and tax (EBIT) 
Source: Results obtained from data analysis using the E-Views statistical software package 
 
From the results presented in Table 4.8 below, the short term leverage (STDTA) has a 
significant negative relationship with return on assets (ROA). The three different estimation 
models show similar and very close results. The coefficient of the explanatory variable 
STDTA is significant at 1% level under the random effect and pooled regression models but 
at 5% significant level for the fixed effect model. The empirical results obtained also show a 
highly significant positive relationship between size and the accounting performance measure 
ROA. The size coefficient is significant at 1% level under the random effects and pooled OLS 
estimation models but at 10% level under the fixed effects model. The results obtained also 
show a non-significant positive relationship between tax and the accounting measure.  The 
highest adjusted R
2
 i.e. 0.6157 is recorded under the Pooled OLS which indicates that more 
than 61% of the variation in ROA has been explained by the variations in the short term 
leverage, size and tax of Nigerian firms. The F-statistics and DW statistics are also 
satisfactory and significant enough for use in making useful inference. 
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Table 4.8: Estimation Results for ROA using STDTA for the 101 sample firms for the 
period 2003 – 2007  
Dependent Variable: ROA     
Independent 
Variables 
Fixed 
Effects 
Random 
Effects 
Pooled 
OLS 
Constant -0.2449 -0.3057 -0.03122 
 (-1.0725) (-2.7469)*** 
(-
3.1658)*** 
STDTA -0.08635 -0.0780 -0.0759 
 (-2.2373)** (-2.6192)*** 
(-
2.6753)*** 
SIZE 0.0582 0.06711 0.06786 
  (1.6025)* (3.9177)*** (4.4791)*** 
TAX 0.0243 0.03373 0.0377 
 (0.9533) (1.4272) (1.5780) 
No of Observations 505 505 505 
Adjusted R
2
 0.3205 0.4971 0.6157 
F-Statistics 1.8365 9.7872 12.0236 
Prob. (F-Statistics) (0.000016) (0.000003) (0.0000) 
D-Watson Statistics  2.4609 1.9800 1.7969 
Hausman X
2
 Test
 
 
                
0.8032 
                 
1.0254 
                  
0.2011 
P-Value (X
2
) 
             
(0.6692)  
              
(0.5989) 
                
(0.9044) 
Note: *** Significant at 1% level; ** Significant at 5% level and * Significant at 10% level. Numbers in 
parentheses are the asymptotic t-values of the co-efficient. ROA = the return on assets (EBIT/ total assets); 
STDTA = short term debt divided by total assets; Size = log of turnover, Tax = total tax to earnings before 
interest and tax (EBIT) 
Source: Results obtained from data analysis using the E-Views statistical software package 
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Having further corroborated the relationships between the significant explanatory variables 
and the dependent variable ROA, it is found that: 
1. There is a highly significant negative relationship between the leverage of Nigerian 
firms and their accounting performance as measured by return on assets. 
2. There is a significant positive relationship between size and the accounting 
performance of Nigerian firms. 
3. There is a non-significant positive relationship between tax and the accounting 
performance of Nigerian firms. 
 
As shown in the results presented in Table 4.9 to Table 4.11, it is observed that the ROE 
measure does not have any significant variable in the estimation and the R
2
 value using this 
measure in most cases for the random effects estimation is less than 0.1%.
5
 Hence, it is not 
discussed. This result is consistent with Tian and Zeitun (2007) findings on Jordanian firms. 
 
Table 4.9: Estimation Results for ROE using TDTA for the 101 sample firms for the 
period 2003 – 2007  
                                                 
5
 It is worth noting that some few firms in the sample used have zero equity for one year or two years in some  
cases during the period studied which may affect the validity of ROE as a measure of performance.  
Dependent Variable: ROE     
Independent 
Variables Fixed Effects 
Random 
Effects 
Pooled 
OLS 
Constant 33.2287 8.9723 8.9628 
 (0.7101) (0.4899) (0.5832) 
TDTA -11.8731 -5.2664 -5.2641 
 (-1.9425) (-1.3522) (-1.1750) 
SIZE -3.2416 -0.0795 -0.0815 
  (-0.4409) (-0.0289) (-0.1486) 
TAX 0.4119 -0.0794 -0.0795 
 (0.0812) (-0.0186) (-0.01864) 
No of Observations 505 505 505 
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Note: *** Significant at 1% level; ** Significant at 5% level and * Significant at 10% level. Numbers in 
parentheses are the asymptotic t-values of the co-efficient. ROE = the return on equity (EBIT/ total equity); 
TDTA = total debt divided by total assets; Size = log of turnover, Tax = total tax to earnings before interest and 
tax (EBIT) 
Source: Results obtained from data analysis using the E-Views statistical software package 
 
 
 
 
Table 4.10: Estimation Results for ROE using LTDTA for the 101 sample firms for the 
period 2003 – 2007  
Dependent Variable: ROE     
Independent 
Variables 
Fixed 
Effects 
Random 
Effects Pooled OLS 
Constant 22.4586 6.9571 6.9571 
 (0.4825) (0.3885) (0.3886) 
LTDTA -16.4863 -9.5928 -9.5928 
 (-0.9668) (-1.3356) (-1.2642) 
SIZE -2.1659 0.0539 0.0539 
  (-0.2939) (0.0196) (0.0197) 
TAX 0.2009 -0.2338 -0.2338 
 (0.0395) (-0.0548) (-0.0548) 
No of Observations 505 505 505 
Adjusted R
2
 -0.1406 0.0025 0.0025 
F-Statistics 0.3970 0.5733 0.5733 
Prob. (F-Statistics) (1.0000) (0.6328) (0.6328) 
D-Watson Statistics  3.1369 2.858 2.858 
Note: *** Significant at 1% level; ** Significant at 5% level and * Significant at 10% level. Numbers in 
parentheses are the asymptotic t-values of the co-efficient. ROE = the return on equity (EBIT/ equity); LTDTA = 
long term debt divided by total assets; Size = log of turnover, Tax = total tax to earnings before interest and tax 
(EBIT) 
Source: Results obtained from data analysis using the E-Views statistical software package 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Adjusted R
2
 -0.1349 0.0021 0.0021 
F-Statistics 0.4182 0.6501 0.6501 
Prob. (F-Statistics) (1.0000) (0.5832) (0.5832) 
D-Watson Statistics  3.1256 2.8491 2.8491 
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Table 4.11: Estimation Results for ROE using STDTA for the 101 sample firms for the 
period 2003 – 2007  
Dependent Variable: ROE     
Independent 
Variables Fixed Effects Random Effects Pooled OLS 
Constant 20.1597 3.3977 3.8580 
 (0.4432) (0.1880) (0.2192) 
STDTA -12.3249 -4.5095 -4.6279 
 (-1.6029) (-0.8913) (-0.9131) 
SIZE -1.6249 0.5246 0.4591 
  (-0.2245) (0.1936) (0.1697) 
TAX 0.5180 0.1131 0.1069 
 (0.1019) (0.0265) (0.0251) 
No of Observations 505 505 505 
Adjusted R
2
 -0.1384 -0.0041 -0.0041 
F-Statistics 0.4053 0.3105 0.3184 
Prob. (F-Statistics) (1.0000) (0.8178) (0..8121) 
D-Watson Statistics  3.1254 2.8496 2.8507 
Note: *** Significant at 1% level; ** Significant at 5% level and * Significant at 10% level. Numbers in 
parentheses are the asymptotic t-values of the co-efficient. ROE = the return on equity (EBIT/ equity); STDTA = 
short term debt divided by total assets; Size = log of turnover, Tax = total tax to earnings before interest and tax 
(EBIT) 
Source: Results obtained from data analysis using the E-Views statistical software package 
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From the regression results in Table 4.12, it is interesting to note that the coefficient of the 
leverage measures and size still remain significant for both the ROA estimation and the 
Tobin‟s Q estimation. However, the result shows that none of the industrial sector dummy 
variables are significantly related to the accounting measure of performance ROA using TDTA, 
LTDTA or STDTA as a measure of capital structure6. The insignificant impact of these dummy 
variables indicates that a higher level of investment in these sectors may not be associated with 
a higher level of ROA. 
Table 4.12: Estimation Results for Panel Data Model including Variables for Industrial Sector 
for the 101 sample firms for the period 2003 – 2007  
Dependent Variables  ROA & Tob Q 
 Independent Variab               TDTA         LTDTA          STDTA   
         ROA      TOB Q        ROA       TOB Q            ROA       TOB Q 
Constant 
-0.5058 
(-1.1388) 
      0.4349 
(2.6330)*** 
 
    -0.0819 
     (-0.2032) 
       0.8937 
      (1.2850) 
 
      -0.9221  
(-1.9731)** 
        1.9251 
(4.1897)***  
Leverage 
-0.1802 
(-7.6307)*** 
      1.0057 
(118.85)***  
 
     -0.5416 
 (-12.915)*** 
       1.2471 
 (16.776)*** 
 
      -0.0645 
(-2.0356)** 
       1.1057 
(35.851)*** 
Size 
0.0448 
(2.2494)** 
     -0.0226 
(-2.4671)** 
 
       0.0292 
      (1.5888) 
      -0.1394 
 (-3.754)*** 
 
       0.0786 
(3.867)*** 
      -0.1365 
(-5.416)*** 
Tax 
0.0276 
(1.2114) 
     -0.0011 
    (-0.1625) 
 
       0.0177 
      (0.8668) 
       0.0122 
      (0.3680) 
 
       0.0319 
     (1.3179) 
      -0.0153 
    (-0.7218) 
Dum-Agric 
0.5494 
(1.2476) 
     -0.1902 
    (-1.1015) 
 
       0.2056 
      (0.5156) 
       0.7455 
      (1.0667) 
 
       0.6095 
     (1.3045) 
      -0.7308 
    (-1.5364) 
Dum-Airline 
0.4895 
(1.0623) 
     -0.1872 
    (-0.9374) 
 
       0.2776 
      (0.6633) 
       0.1439 
      (0.1874) 
 
       0.6058 
     (0.6437) 
      -0.5868 
    (-1.0916) 
Dum-Auto 
0.3578 
(0.7929) 
     -0.1396 
    (-0.7476) 
 
       0.0282 
      (0.0687) 
       0.4321 
      (0.5874) 
 
       0.4950 
     (1.0369) 
      -0.7950 
    (-1.5664) 
Dum-Breweries 
0.2788 
(0.6242) 
    -0.0669 
    (-0.3710) 
 
      -0.0507 
      (-0.1254) 
       0.9919 
      (1.3806) 
 
       0.3049 
     (0.6438) 
      -0.4938 
    (-1.0002) 
Dum-Building 
0.4451 
(1.0088) 
    -0.1808 
    (-1.0461) 
 
       0.1006 
      (0.2518) 
       0.4528 
      (0.1874) 
 
       0.5778 
     (1.2359) 
      -0.8525 
  (-1.7916)* 
Dum-Chemicals 
0.4802 
(1.0891) 
    -0.0798 
    (-0.4621) 
 
       0.2226 
      (0.5580) 
       0.4173 
      (0.5968) 
 
       0.5866 
     (1.2554) 
      -0.5513 
    (-1.1594) 
Dum-Computer 
0.2324 
(0.5604) 
    -0.1020 
    (-0.7752) 
 
       0.0719 
      (0.1932) 
       0.4426 
      (0.7358) 
 
       0.2634 
     (0.5966) 
      -0.2545 
    (-0.6623) 
Dum-Conglomerate 
0.5230 
(1.1872) 
     0.0438 
     (0.2560) 
 
       0.2103 
      (0.5272) 
       0.5453 
      (0.7828) 
 
       0.6670 
     (1.4291) 
      -0.5860 
    (-1.2420) 
Dum-Construction 
0.4694 
(1.0512) 
   -0.2427 
    (-1.3458) 
 
       0.0448 
      (0.1107) 
       1.1513 
      (1.6022) 
 
       0.4790 
     (1.0104) 
      -0.8160 
  (-1.6516)* 
Dum-Emergmkt 
0.3737 
(0.8384) 
    0.1660 
     (0.9232) 
 
      -0.0030 
      (-0.0074) 
       0.6166 
      (0.8583) 
 
       0.5650 
     (1.1983) 
      -0.7063 
    (-1.4380) 
                                                 
6
 It is worth noting that we have used each industrial dummy separately in each regression which provided 
similar results to the one shown in Table 4.12 below.  
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Dum-Engtech 
0.3322 
(0.7221) 
    0.7316 
(3.6671)*** 
 
      -0.0275 
      (-0.0657) 
       1.2894 
     (1.6784)* 
 
       0.4892 
     (1.0062) 
      -0.0340 
    (-0.0633) 
Dum-Foodbev 
0.4528 
(1.0345)  
   -0.1523 
    (-0.9107) 
 
       0.1767 
      (0.4467) 
       0.5377 
     (0.7834) 
 
       0.5294 
     (1.1401) 
      -0.5821 
    (-1.2559) 
Dum-Healthcare 
0.4253 
(0.9592) 
   -0.1732 
    (-0.9857) 
 
       0.1086 
       (0.2702) 
       0.2673 
     (0.3776) 
 
       0.5842 
     (1.2445)  
      -0.8501 
  (-1.7628)* 
Dum-Hotel 
0.3963 
(0.8786) 
   -0.0963 
    (-0.5156) 
 
       0.0808 
       (0.1972) 
       0.5470 
     (0.7439) 
 
       0.5082 
    (1.0644) 
      -0.6738 
    (-1.3265) 
Dum-Industprod 
0.4758 
(1.0733) 
   -0.0445 
   (-.0.2529) 
 
       0.2051 
       (0.5110) 
       0.4851 
     (0.6859) 
 
       0.5845 
    (1.2447) 
      -0.5361 
    (-1,1112) 
Dum-Infotech 
0.4061 
(0.8817) 
   -0.2458 
   (-1.2304) 
 
       0.1411 
       (0.3375) 
       0.5597 
     (0.7290) 
 
       0.4470 
    (0.9176) 
      -0.5931 
   (-1.1025) 
Dum-Machinery 
0.4992 
(1.0177) 
   -0.3397 
    (-1.4421)     
       0.1241 
       (0.2763) 
      -0.0490 
    (-0.0565) 
 
       0.7179 
    (1.3912) 
      -1.3094 
(-2.1051)** 
Dum-Maritime 
0.4516 
(0.9246) 
   -0.0563 
   (-0.2402) 
 
       0.1541 
       (0.3450) 
       0.2680 
     (0.3113) 
 
       0.6242 
    (1.2136) 
      -0.7283 
    (-1.1776) 
Dum-Media 
0.2543 
(0.5200) 
   -0.1394 
   (-0.5947) 
 
      -0.1049 
       (-0.2343) 
       0.2607 
     (0.3025)  
 
       0.4508 
    (0.8758) 
      -0.9570 
    (-1.5466) 
Dum-Packaging 
0.3561 
(0.8111) 
   -0.1918 
   (-1.1329) 
 
       0.0549 
       (0.1381) 
       0.4076 
     (0.5893) 
 
       0.4681 
    (1.0059) 
      -0.7509 
    (-1.6049) 
Dum-Petroleum 
0.4633 
(1.0547) 
   -0.1693 
   (-0.9988) 
 
       0.1297 
      (0.3262) 
       0.6551 
     (0.9462) 
 
       0.5463 
    (1.1725) 
      -0.7155 
    (-1.5263) 
Dum-Printing 
0.5365 
(1.1895) 
    -0.1113 
   (-0.5962)   
 
        0.2001 
       (0.4884) 
       0.3339 
      (0.4540) 
 
      0.7065 
     (1.4811) 
    -0.8498 
  (-1.6752)* 
Dum-Realest 
0.3141 
(0.6423) 
   -0.2682 
   (-1.1437) 
 
      -0.0728 
      (-0.1625) 
       0.4556 
      (0.5283) 
 
       0.4548 
     (0.8827) 
     -1.0258 
  (-1.6558)* 
Dum-Roadtrans 
0.4272 
(0.8742) 
   -0.1822 
   (-0.7775) 
 
       0.1254 
       (0.2808) 
       0.3324 
      (0.3861) 
 
       0.5596 
     (1.0870) 
     -0.7770 
    (-1.2553) 
Dum- Services 
0.6631 
(1.5614) 
     0.1199 
   (0.6641) 
 
       0.4560 
       (1.1837) 
       0.7570 
      (0.0803) 
 
       0.6957 
     (1.5478) 
     -0.1549 
    (-0.3171) 
Dum-Textiles 
0.1951 
(0.3981) 
   -0.2375 
    (-1.0113)   
      -0.1379 
       (-0.3076)  
       0.3654 
      (0.4230)   
       0.3315 
     (0.6421) 
    -0.8703 
    (-1.4023) 
No. of  Observations             505            505 
 
            505             505 
 
           505           505 
R-Square        0.1782          0.9697 
 
       0.3048        0.5367 
 
       0.0908        0.7589 
F-Statics        3.5539      525.13 
 
       7.1825      13.5146 
 
       1.6375      51.5730 
Durbin-Watson stat        2.0550      1.4510 
 
       1.8759        1.3542 
 
       2.0836        1.9587 
Hausman Chi-
Square        9.3804    17.3630        27.3391        1.0217          2.4994        3.2838 
P-Value (Chi-
Square)      (0.0520)* (0.0016)*** 
 
(0.000)***     (0.9065) 
 
    (0.6447)     (0.0511)* 
Note: *** Significant at 1% level; ** Significant at 5% level and * Significant at 10% level. Numbers in parentheses are the asymptotic t-
values of the co-efficient. ROA = the return on assets (EBIT/ total assets); Tob Q (Tobin‟s Q) = Market value of equity + book value of 
debt/book value of assets; TDTA = total debt divided by total assets; LTDTA = long-term debt divided by total assets; STDTA = short term 
debt divided by total assets; Size = log of turnover, Tax = total tax to earnings before interest and tax (EBIT), Dum refers to the dummy 
variables for industry, Leverage refers to TDTA, LTDTA or STDTA. 
 
Source: Results obtained from data analysis using the E-Views statistical software package 
  
 
 
 
4.5 Discussion on Findings 
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From hypothesis 1, a firm‟s capital structure is predicted not to have any significant influence 
on its accounting performance. However, from the regression results in Table 4.6, Table 4.7 
and Table 4.8, the coefficients of the leverage measures TDTA and LTDTA as expected are 
highly significant and negatively related to the accounting measure ROA. These results show 
that higher level of leverage lead to lower return on assets (ROA). Furthermore, it may 
provide support for the proposition that due to agency conflicts, companies over-leverage 
themselves, thus affecting their performance negatively. This findings are consistent with the 
finding of previous studies such as Tian and Zeitun (2007), Salawu (2007), Chen (2004), 
Tzelepsis and Skuras  (2004), Gleason et al (2000), Krishnan and Moyer (1997) and Rajan 
and Zingales (1995) among others. The negative and significant coefficient of LTDTA does 
not support Brick and Ravid‟s (1985) argument that long term debt increases a firm‟s value, 
which could however be due to the lower ratio of long term debt in the capital structure of 
Nigerian companies. This findings support the pecking order theory of capital structure which 
suggests that profitable firms initially rely on less costly internally generated funds before 
looking out for external finances. It is therefore, expected that highly profitable Nigerian firms 
will require less debt finance. The negative relationship between leverage and ROA also 
suggests that there might be agency issues which may lead Nigerian firms to use higher than 
appropriate levels of debt in their capital structure thereby producing lower performance. The 
significant negative relationship further reflects that the bond market in the Nigerian economy 
is underdeveloped and is consistent with signs of underdeveloped bond market in all markets. 
Intuitively, upon taking a closer look at the results, there may be other reasons for this 
negative relationship rather than the propositions of the pecking order hypothesis. It could be 
due to decisions by the firms to avoid underinvestment problems and mispricing of new 
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projects. More so, listed firms in Nigeria are most times attracted by equity finance due to the 
substantial capital gains in the secondary market. Hence, there could be a little deviation from 
the reasons proposed by the pecking order theory.  
 
Hypothesis 2 predicts no significant relationship between Nigerian firms‟ capital structure and 
their market performance. It is however interesting to note that there is empirical evidence of 
a highly positive relationship between the firms‟ leverage and their Market performance 
measure Tobin‟s Q indicating that higher levels of debt in the capital structure of Nigerian 
firms are associated with a higher level of market performance as measured by Tobin‟s Q. 
This empirical evidence shows that the impact of leverage varies among different 
performance measurements for Nigerian firms. The positive relationship further suggests that 
debt improves the market performance of Nigerian firms which may not reflect on their 
profitability. It could also be that this positive impact is not reflected because of the 
underdeveloped nature of the market or due to market imperfections. This empirical evidence 
of a significant relationship between firms‟ leverage and Tobin‟s Q as a market performance 
supports the static tradeoff theory of capital structure. These findings indicate that leverage 
negatively affects the accounting performance measure but positively affect the market 
performance measure. Based on this discussion therefore, we come to two conclusions: 
i. We accept the alternative hypothesis that a firm‟s capital structure has a significant 
negative influence on its accounting performance ROA. 
ii. We accept the alternative hypothesis that a firm‟s capital structure has a significant 
influence on its market performance Tobin‟s Q.      
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Hypothesis 3 predicts that firms with high short term debt in their capital structure tend to 
have lower performance i.e. short term debt has no significant influence on a firm‟s 
performance. From the regression results in Table 4.5 and Table 4.8, the coefficients of the 
short term leverage STDTA are consistent with the prediction under the different regression 
models. Though the STDTA shows a negative relationship as expected, the relationship is not 
significant with the accounting measure ROA. The insignificant relationship with the 
performance measure ROA indicates that short term debt has no significant impact on returns 
of Nigerian companies. However, while STDTA is found to have an insignificant negative 
effect on ROA, it has a highly significant positive relationship with Tobin‟s Q using the 
different estimation models. These findings show that the STDTA ratio has no significant 
effects on the accounting performance of Nigerian companies which suggests that short term 
debt may not necessarily expose these firms to the risk of refinancing as it does for firms in 
developed economy. This supports the arguments of Myers (1977) that firms with high short-
term debt to total assets have a high growth rate and high performance. This finding is 
contrary to the findings of Pandey (2001), and Stohs and Mauer (1996). Interestingly, the 
highly significant positive relationship between STDTA and Tobin‟s Q indicates that higher 
level of short-term debt in the capital structure of Nigerian firms is associated with a higher 
market performance. This result also supports the findings of Tian and Zeitun (2007). 
Therefore, the hypothesis that short term debt has no significant effect on firm performance is 
rejected and we conclude that short term debt increases the market performance of Nigerian 
firms.  
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Hypothesis 4 predicts that a firm‟s size has no significance influence on a firm‟s performance. 
Interestingly, as expected the coefficient of firm‟s size is found to be positive and highly 
significant for both the accounting performance measure and the market performance 
measure. The significance of firm‟s size on performance indicates that large firms can earn 
higher returns compared to smaller firms, presumably as a result of diversification of 
investment and economies of scale. The result also suggests that firm size is positively related 
to the borrowing capacity because potential bankruptcy costs make up a smaller portion for 
large firms. This result is consistent with previous findings such as Tian and Zeitun (2007), 
Gleason et al. (2000) and Krishnan and Moyer (1997). The significant positive relationship 
does not support the findings of Tzelepsis and Skuras (2004), Durand and Coeuderoy (2001), 
Lauterebach and Vaninsky (1999) and Mudambi and Nicosis (1998). It can also be observed 
from Table 4.5 and Table 4.8 that the best significant results for size under the Tobin‟s Q and 
ROA models are recorded where the short term leverage (STDTA) is used. This may suggest 
the fact that larger firms are more able to access short term debts from banks and also extract 
trade credits from suppliers and/or suppliers are more willing to extend trade credit to larger 
firms. This could also indicate that larger firms are being perceived to have lower default risk. 
Going by this discussion, the null hypothesis of no significance influence of size on firm‟s 
performance is therefore rejected and we conclude that the size of Nigerian firms has a 
positive impact on their performance.         
 
Hypothesis 5 predicts that there is no significant relationship between tax and performance of 
Nigerian firms. The results for tax under the different estimation models are mixed. Though in 
line with our apriori expectation, the coefficient of tax records a positive relationship with the 
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accounting performance, a negative relationship with the market performance was shown 
from the estimations. However, the coefficients are not significant at any significance level.  
The lack of significance of the tax rate variable suggests that the better performance of 
Nigerian firms is not related to Nigeria‟s lower marginal corporate income tax rate when 
compared to developed economy but may be attributable to other factors as explained above. 
This indicates that lower corporate tax does not necessarily translate into better performance 
i.e. firms with low tax payment may not have a higher performance rate. This result provides 
weak support for the static tradeoff model of capital structure. The null hypothesis is therefore 
accepted and we conclude that tax has no significance influence on the performance of 
Nigerian firms. 
 
From hypothesis 6, the industrial sector is predicted to have no effect on corporate 
performance of Nigerian firms. The research further investigates the effect of the Industrial 
Sector on corporate performance and whether the significance of the firm‟s performance 
measures and capital structure will be affected as the industrial dummy variables are added to 
the model. From the regression results in Table 4.12, it is interesting to note that the 
coefficient of the leverage measures and size still remain significant for both the ROA 
estimation and the Tobin‟s Q estimation. However, the result shows that none of the industry 
dummy variables are significantly related to the accounting measure of performance ROA using 
TDTA, LTDTA or STDTA as a measure of capital structure7. The insignificant impact of these 
dummy variables indicates that a higher level of investment in these sectors may not be 
associated with a higher level of ROA.                                                                                             
                                                 
7
 It is worth noting that we have used each industrial dummy separately in each regression which provided 
similar results to the one shown in Table 4.13 above.  
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The result also shows that the Engineering Technology sector has a positive and highly 
significant impact on the market performance measure Tobin‟s Q using both the TDTA and 
LTDTA measure of leverage. This implies that higher level of investment in this sector could 
yield a better market performance. It could also be a reflection of the recent wave of 
technology use in Nigeria which could lead to the presence of the industry sector. Table 4.13 
further shows that the industry dummy variables for six sectors including Building sector, 
Construction sector, Healthcare sector, Machinery sector, Printing sector and Real Estate 
sector are significantly and negatively related to the market measure of performance using 
STDTA as a measure of capital structure. This significant negative relationship may indicate 
that higher level of short term debt usage by these industrial sectors may lead to lower market 
performance for these industry sectors. Therefore we reject the null hypothesis and conclude 
that industrial sector impact on market performance of Nigerian firms.  However, the 
significance and sign of these industrial sectors changed as the performance measure changed 
which may imply the presence of the industry sector. But it should be noted that including the 
industrial dummy variables in the regression do not increase the model robustness and 
accuracy. 
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CHAPTER FIVE 
SUMMARY, CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
5.1 Summary  
Capital structure remains the most controversial issues in finance literature because of the 
dynamic nature of the mix of corporate financing, which mirrors the many events and 
exogenous shocks to firms‟ activities. 
 
This study examines the impact of capital structure on performance of Nigerian firms. The 
study combines two strands of business research: one from the international business field on 
corporate performance, and the other from corporate finance field on capital structure.  The 
study employed descriptive econometric analytical tools in studying 101 Nigerian quoted 
companies with 505 observations for the period 2003 to 2007. The analyses were performed 
using panel data. 
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This study tries to fill the gap left by other studies in this field by investigating the effect of 
capital structure on corporate performance of Nigerian quoted firms by extending the 
performance measures and leverage measures that has been hitherto employed by other 
studies. The study employed different measures of capital structure such as short term 
leverage, long term leverage and total debt leverage in order to investigate the varying effects 
of these debt structures on corporate performance. Also, three performance measures were 
employed namely the return-on-asset (ROA) and the return-on-equity (ROE) as accounting 
performance and Tobin‟s Q to see the varying relationship of these measures with the 
leverage of the firm. Moreover, investigating the effect of capital structure on corporate 
performance using market and accounting measures was quite valuable as it provides 
evidence about whether the stock market is efficient or not.  
 
A balanced panel of 101 quoted Nigerian firms was studied in this research work. Only non-
financial firms were studied. The study excluded companies from the financial and securities 
sector as their financial characteristics and use of leverage are substantially different from 
other companies. First, their leverage is strongly influenced by explicit investor insurance 
scheme such as deposit insurance and regulations such as the minimum capital requirements 
may directly affect their capital structure. Secondly, their debt-like liabilities are not strictly 
comparable to the debt issued by non-financial firms. Moreover, the balance sheets of the 
firms in the financial sectors (banks, insurance companies, mortgage companies, unit trust and 
funds, real estate investment trust and other financial institutions) have a strikingly different 
structure from those of non-financial companies. Other companies whose financial reports 
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were not up to date and that are no longer in existence as at 2007 (e.g. companies in the 
Aviation Sector) were also excluded. Also, firms with any missing reports during the period 
under investigation from 2003 to 2007 were also dropped.  
 
A firm‟s capital structure was found to have a significant and negative impact on the firm‟s 
accounting performance measure (ROA).  An interesting finding is that all the leverage 
measures have a positive and highly significant relationship with the market performance 
measure (Tobin‟s Q), which could to some extent support Myers‟s (1977) argument that firms  
with high short term debt to total  assets have a high growth rate and high performance. The 
results also interestingly showed size to have positively and highly significant relationship 
with both the accounting performance measure and the market performance measure. The 
significance of firm‟s size on performance indicates that large firms earn higher returns. Tax 
has no significant influence on firms‟ performance while some industry sector presence was 
observed. 
 
The results of this study further confirm some prior findings by other scholars and earlier 
researchers and the research work has been able to find answers to the research questions 
earlier raised in the introductory chapter in the following ways: 
i. There is a significant relationship between the capital structure of firms in Nigeria and 
their accounting and market performance. 
ii. Capital structure has positive influence on the market performance of Nigerian firms 
but negative influence on their accounting performance. 
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iii. The maturity structure of debts does affect the performance of firms in Nigeria 
significantly. 
iv. The size of the firm has a significant positive effect on the performance of firms in 
Nigeria. 
v. Corporate tax rate has no significant impact on performance of Nigeria firms. 
vi. The industrial sectors influence the performance of Nigerian firms to a little extent. 
  
5.2 Conclusion 
A remarkable difference between the capital structure of Nigerian firms and firms in 
developed economies is that Nigerian firms presumably prefer short term finance and have 
substantially lower amounts of long term debt. This reveals that Nigerian firms rely heavily 
on short term financing rather than long term finance. This difference in long-versus short-
term debt, to an extent, might limit the explanatory power of the capital structure theories in 
Nigeria. It suggests that the theoretical underpinnings of the observed correlations are still 
largely unresolved. 
 
The results of this empirical study suggest that some of the insights from modern capital 
structure theories are portable to Nigeria in that certain firm-specific factors that are relevant 
for explaining capital structure and corporate performance in the Western countries are also 
relevant in Nigeria. This is true despite profound institutional differences that exist between 
Nigeria and the Western countries. Overall, the empirical results from this study offer some 
support for the Pecking Order Theory and Static Tradeoff Theory of capital structure. 
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5.3 Recommendations 
In line with the findings of this study, the following recommendations are made: 
1. Nigerian firms should try to match their high market performance with real activities 
that can help make the market performance reflect on their internal growth and 
accounting performance. 
2. The firms should rely less on short term debt, which formed the major part of their 
leverage and focus more on developing internal strategies that can help improve more 
on their accounting performance as their accounting performance for the period 
studied was very low. 
 
3. The firms should develop a good strategy targeted at using more of equity to 
maximize their market performance in such a way that it yields growth opportunities. 
 
4. The findings show that quoted companies in Nigeria do not use much of long term 
debt in their respective capital structure choices. This may be due to the general poor 
participation of both public and private sectors in the bond market. The Nigerian Stock 
Exchange should therefore strive to remove any rigid policies which could hinder the 
effective participation of the companies. Economic policies that could help further 
develop the capital market in such a way that it can absorb increase in demand for 
funds should be formulated.   
 
5. Though there is high positive impact of leverage on market performance of the firms, 
it does not translate to better internal/accounting performance. Hence, the firms should 
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set a debt level that will maximize their performance as reflected in the high positive 
impact of leverage on their market performance.  
 
 
5.4 Contribution to Knowledge 
This study has contributed to the literature by examining firm-specific factors that influence 
the performance of Nigerian firms from the view point of their capital structure choices. This 
has helped us to understand the impact of institutional factors on Nigerian firms‟ capital 
structure choices and how it affects their performance. This study will be of help to CEOs and 
finance managers of firms in Nigeria as the output of this study will serve as a useful database 
and resource material in the area of capital structure choices and capital budgeting. 
 
The following are the specific contributions of the study:  
• The study uses a diversified range of econometric models anchored on the “received 
theories of capital structure. 
• The study establishes the significance of the relationship between capital structure and 
corporate performance in Nigerian non-financial firms. 
• The study employs a larger number of quoted firms and used an increased number of 
estimation parameters/measurement variables based on the theories of capital 
structure. The study uses various measures of performance to show the sensitivity of 
each of these performance measures to leverage. Different measures of leverage are 
also used to show the sensitivity of the determinants of capital structure to the measure 
of leverage. 
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•  This study has contributed to methodological discourse in terms of techniques used in 
the analyses of the data of Nigerian firms. 
•   The study of the influence of industrial sector in the analysis is an improvement on 
previous studies on Nigerian firms. 
• The study established that the western capital structure models exhibit robustness for 
companies in the Nigerian market to a large extent. 
 
 
5.5 Limitation of the Study 
There are many issues related to the study topic, however not all issues are touched. This 
thesis only focuses on the issues raised in the research questions. The limitations are therefore 
listed below. 
1. The analysis does not touch on other performance indicators such as growth 
opportunities, maturity, sustainability, shareholders‟ wealth maximization and 
profitability. The analysis is restricted only to the accounting performance such as 
return on asset, return on equity and market performance (Tobin‟s Q). 
2. This study does not tackle the instantaneous effect on corporate performance of any 
changes in corporate governance structure, but rather concentrates on the relation 
between capital structure and corporate performance. 
3. The study is within the agency, static tradeoff and pecking order framework given the 
increased support for these theories in the literature. Hence, no other perspectives of 
interpreting the interrelationships among corporate variables are considered. However, 
all the frameworks (theories) are reviewed. 
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4. The effects of the geographical location of the firms and ongoing global economic 
downturn on the capital structure decisions and corporate performance of Nigerian 
firms are not studied as this on its own deserves a separate study.  
 
 
5.6 Recommendations for Further Studies 
The study has laid some groundwork to explore the impact of capital structure on 
performance of Nigerian firms upon which a more detailed evaluation could be based. Further 
work is required to develop new hypotheses and design new variables to reflect the 
institutional influence. In addition, a more detailed work that studies the effects of the 
geographical location of the firms and the ongoing global economic downturn on the capital 
structure decisions and corporate performance of Nigerian firms could help in resolving some 
theoretical underpinnings of the results as obtained in this study. 
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APPENDICE 
Appendix A: Data Employed in the Study 
FIRMS YEARS ROA ROE Tob  Q TDTA LTDTA STDTA SIZE TAX 
AFPRINT 2003 -0.021 -0.263 0.3395 0.2581 0.249 0.0091 6.8423 -0.3052 
  2004 -0.066 -0.8 0.5101 0.4273 0.3089 0.1184 6.795 -0.7535 
  2005 -0.039 -0.456 0.5895 0.5036 0.2567 0.2469 6.7775 -0.487 
  2006 -0.011 -0.074 0.7139 0.5684 0.1553 0.4132 6.7967 -0.579 
  2007 -0.011 -0.077 0.8158 0.6692 0.209 0.4602 6.7945 -0.5971 
ELLAH LAKE 2003 0.0015 0.0045 0.4592 0.1232 0.0592 0.064 3.9779 0 
  2004 0.001 15.117 0.3727 0.3727 0.2265 0.1462 4.103 0.33076 
  2005 0.0022 32.183 0.4354 0.4353 0.2575 0.1778 4.3304 0.25893 
  2006 0.0055 0.0805 0.5977 0.5295 0.3026 0.2269 4.3222 0.06209 
  2007 0.0062 0.0927 0.6814 0.6141 0.3454 0.2687 4.4458 0.05394 
LIVESTOCK 2003 -0.755 -19.1 3.6928 3.6533 0.2328 3.4205 5.6122 -0.1494 
  2004 -0.731 -19.15 4.3323 4.2942 0.2111 4.083 5.7687 -0.1489 
  2005 2.2632 58.818 2.1058 2.0674 0.1833 1.8841 5.7482 0.0315 
  2006 0.023 0.7141 1.9078 1.8757 0.1681 1.7076 5.7685 2.59446 
  2007 0.0425 0.0632 1.1245 0.4518 0.0407 0.4111 5.9694 0.51904 
OKITIPUPA 2003 0.0953 0.2292 4.0404 3.6245 2.0934 1.5311 0 0.04799 
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  2004 0.0802 0.4158 2.0958 1.9029 0.7325 1.1704 5.3081 0.05371 
  2005 0.1003 0.7493 1.6553 1.5214 0.4991 1.0222 5.3393 0.04257 
  2006 0.0577 0.2991 2.3095 2.1166 0.6438 1.4728 5.2696 0.31218 
  2007 0.1103 0.2651 6.3565 5.9405 1.2776 4.663 5.3312 0.43305 
OKOMU 2003 0.1265 3.2303 0.327 0.2879 0.1717 0.1162 6.3296 0.03961 
  2004 0.149 4.2199 0.3122 0.2769 0.2071 0.0698 6.3638 0.00894 
  2005 0.1569 4.5572 0.2426 0.2082 0.1564 0.0518 6.3919 0.03205 
  2006 0.0796 2.5516 0.3775 0.3463 0.3421 0.0042 6.4379 0.02451 
  2007 0.0263 0.6323 0.4864 0.4448 0.3177 0.1271 6.4484 0.07295 
PRESCO 2003 0.1247 1.6305 0.6409 0.5644 0.4129 0.1515 6.328 0.08009 
  2004 0.197 2.689 0.5159 0.4426 0.3333 0.1093 6.3703 0.09803 
  2005 0.122 1.8145 0.5823 0.5151 0.3772 0.1378 6.3706 0.24897 
  2006 0.1362 2.0184 0.7289 0.6614 0.4181 0.2433 6.3232 0.15228 
  2007 0.1282 1.7394 0.7815 0.7078 0.4232 0.2846 6.3554 0.46605 
 
 
 
 
 
 
AIRLINE SER 2003 0.05015 1.1518 0.8262 0.7826 0.6598 0.1228 5.75788 0.0363 
  2004 0.04515 1.1359 0.7434 0.7037 0.6481 0.0555 5.95918 0.0839 
  2005 0.26098 7.9447 0.4889 0.456 0.456 0 6.21649 0.02916 
  2006 0.21214 0.6894 0.6467 0.339 0.339 0 6.26658 0 
  2007 0.24136 1.0182 0.7193 0.4823 0.0858 0.3965 6.54047 0 
NAHCO 2003 0.135 1.6318 0.7602 0.6775 0.034 0.6435 6.34596 0.22315 
  2004 0.0621 0.8653 0.7211 0.6493 0.4046 0.2447 6.36989 0.42616 
  2005 0.2362 3.0515 0.5667 0.4893 0.4827 0.0067 6.48438 0.30586 
  2006 0.2473 3.7063 0.4562 0.3894 0.3892 0.0002 6.51129 0.21914 
  2007 0.2551 2.0959 0.4637 0.342 0.3353 0.0068 6.56363 0.24941 
DUNLOP 2003 -0.0644 
-
0.91303 0.7203 0.6498 0.3911 0.2586 6.69852 -0.1122 
  2004 -0.0661 
-
1.00032 0.8454 0.7793 0.497 0.2823 6.71749 -0.2351 
  2005 -0.0158 
-
0.54351 0.6546 0.6255 0.3273 0.2982 6.71184 -0.1996 
  2006 -0.0428 
-
1.72876 0.536 0.5112 0.1498 0.3614 6.70629 -0.0103 
  2007 -0.1326 
-
0.87503 0.4233 0.2717 0.064 0.2077 6.78118 -0.0023 
INCAR 2003 -0.1051 
-
0.33961 0.7224 0.4129 0.032 0.3809 5.22249 -0.069 
  2004 -0.2575 
-
0.77705 1.174 0.8426 0.1402 0.7023 5.23551 -0.0256 
  2005 0.09176 0.54195 0.5791 0.4098 0.2021 0.2078 5.063 0.06262 
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  2006 0.01416 0.05216 0.7925 0.521 0.0788 0.4422 5.03751 1.7492 
  2007 0.01575 0.03072 2.4925 1.9798 0.135 1.8448 5.10571 1.3801 
R.T. BRISCO 2003 0.46197 6.15068 0.1598 0.0847 0.0579 0.0268 6.62346 0.09158 
  2004 0.12311 1.27992 0.1503 0.0542 0.0369 0.0172 6.74681 0.33099 
  2005 0.15359 1.67742 0.1545 0.063 0.0398 0.0232 6.88796 0.34424 
  2006 0.29911 4.15496 0.1244 0.0524 0.0486 0.0038 7.11932 0.28305 
  2007 0.29374 3.9631 0.1537 0.0796 0.0722 0.0074 7.21057 0.32176 
GUINNESS 2003 0.37104 27.9722 0.2341 0.2208 0.0812 0.1396 7.57921 0.32978 
  2004 0.32272 19.8103 0.381 0.3647 0.2141 0.1507 7.6755 0.32291 
  2005 0.16488 10.6381 0.4536 0.4381 0.2924 0.1458 7.6708 0.2258 
  2006 0.2616 19.3853 0.4305 0.417 0.2576 0.1594 7.72958 0.34946 
  2007 0.33097 20.1833 0.3189 0.3025 0.1547 0.1478 7.79425 0.28173 
INT BREW. 2003 -0.34 -0.5559 1.7607 1.1489 0 1.1489 5.65514 -0.1 
  2004 -0.533 
-
0.94514 2.2226 1.659 0 1.659 5.7743 -0.1 
  2005 -0.382 
-
0.59585 3.7088 3.0685 1.0081 2.0604 5.60358 -0.1 
  2006 -0.236 
-
0.85141 2.5613 2.2844 0.5217 1.7628 5.49561 -0.1 
  2007 -0.042 -0.1049 3.4615 3.058 0.4848 2.5732 5.74948 -0.1 
JOS IN BREW 2003 0.399 1.79295 1.1544 0.9316 0.9316 0 5.91717 0.16581 
  2004 0.085 0.46715 0.7531 0.5707 0.5707 0 5.92222 0.25881 
  2005 -0.107 -0.5515 0.6562 0.4622 0.4622 0 5.9429 -0.1207 
  2006 -2.173 -4.0416 2.3448 1.8072 1.1249 0.6823 5.85668 0 
 2007 -2.182 -5.3744 5.466 5.0599 0.7978 4.2621 5.57238 0 
NIG BREW 2003 0.2197 5.81393 0.4574 0.4196 0.0773 0.3423 7.79917 0.331127 
   2004 0.168 2.41932 0.5264 0.4569 0.076 0.3809 7.86684 0.443996 
  2005 0.246 3.41095 0.4364 0.3643 0.0826 0.2816 7.9038 0.36 
  2006 0.3231 4.34674 0.3797 0.3053 0.1326 0.1727 7.93612 0.3368 
  2007 0.458 7.37219 0.3571 0.295 0.1083 0.1867 8.04824 0.320468 
ASHAKA  2003 0.5232 7.14643 0.1929 0.1197 0.071 0.0487 6.9416 0.182039 
  2004 0.7372 11.1519 0.1766 0.1104 0.0633 0.0472 7.00855 0.206898 
  2005 0.8627 8.91521 0.1945 0.0977 0.053 0.0447 7.19908 0.231962 
  2006 0.5971 6.77123 0.1912 0.1031 0.0483 0.0548 7.22457 0.421969 
  2007 0.3492 3.43795 0.2244 0.1228 0.0497 0.0731 7.21677 0.626087 
BENUE CEM 2003 -0.473 -6.5618 1.8433 1.7712 0 1.7712 5.59217 -0.00068 
  2004 -0.121 -3.6842 1.5066 1.4736 0.028 1.4457 0 -0.00068 
  2005 0.069 5.55357 1.0811 1.0686 0.0508 1.0178 6.60261 0.048601 
  2006 0.061 1.43834 0.7555 0.713 0.1996 0.5134 6.78026 0.424497 
  2007 0.051 1.51136 0.7723 0.7387 0.0143 0.7244 6.73826 0.330466 
CEM. COY 2003 -0.026 -0.1922 0.9138 0.7802 0.0522 0.728 6.51928 -0.16068 
  2004 0.1656 1.73949 0.8867 0.7915 0.1041 0.6874 6.74276 0.0213 
  2005 0.0661 0.70137 0.9147 0.8204 0.0671 0.7533 6.77204 0.409607 
  2006 -0.002 -0.0193 1.0579 0.9767 0.0548 0.922 6.80443 -2.34722 
  2007 0.0199 0.27509 0.7602 0.6878 0.0456 0.6423 6.90542 0.197769 
LAFARGE  2003 -0.179 -3.7646 1.493 1.4453 0.7077 0.7377 7.10292 0 
  2004 -0.103 -2.7872 1.2745 1.2377 0.8872 0.3505 7.34096 0 
  2005 0.1237 2.28196 0.6127 0.5585 0.4281 0.1304 7.42265 0.095746 
 136 
  2006 0.3746 8.07542 0.259 0.2126 0.2047 0.0079 7.59679 0.015395 
  2007 0.3597 8.35317 0.1017 0.0586 0.0502 0.0084 7.58732 0.023435 
NIGROPES 2003 0.1084 0.30637 0.4818 0.1278 0.1067 0.0211 5.61549 0.117607 
  2004 0.0706 0.16556 0.5899 0.1635 0.1297 0.0338 5.54739 0.342298 
  2005 0.0743 0.18805 0.5694 0.1743 0.1203 0.0541 5.62072 0.425719 
  2006 0.1002 0.28122 0.5327 0.1763 0.1092 0.0671 5.65389 0.386255 
  2007 0.0654 0.2097 0.5442 0.2323 0.1878 0.0445 5.56482 0.203755 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
NIG. WIRE 2003 0.0804 0.33747 0.7839 0.5455 0.0842 0.4613 5.43568 0.732122 
  2004 -0.101 -4.9429 0.1439 0.1236 0.0484 0.0752 5.22419 -0.00739 
  2005 -0.106 -5.0795 0.3288 0.3078 0.1525 0.1553 5.28229 -0.04619 
  2006 -0.022 -1.0207 0.3302 0.3088 0.1451 0.1637 5.43568 -0.24206 
  2007 -0.06 -2.6845 0.3622 0.34 0.1484 0.1916 5.39167 -0.05786 
BERGER  2003 0.2971 1.54596 0.3753 0.1831 0.1107 0.0723 6.27782 0.354045 
  2004 0.2749 1.53115 0.3563 0.1767 0.1024 0.0743 6.26509 0.389812 
  2005 -0.053 -0.6289 0.3924 0.3074 0.0465 0.2609 6.282 -0.34296 
  2006 0.0882 1.01566 0.3135 0.2267 0.0541 0.1726 6.36184 0.260069 
  2007 0.1575 1.94975 0.2179 0.1371 0.0556 0.0816 6.35705 0.468545 
CHE & ALL 2003 0.3281 2.4837 0.269 0.1369 0.1308 0.0061 6.08028 0.272496 
  2004 0.3667 2.389 0.284 0.1305 0.1248 0.0057 6.16636 0.356348 
  2005 0.3469 2.8825 0.2077 0.0873 0.0828 0.0045 6.18339 0.334002 
  2006 0.4362 3.9338 0.2058 0.0949 0.0908 0.0041 6.29803 0.347785 
  2007 0.5121 5.397 0.1905 0.0956 0.0921 0.0035 6.3222 0.37968 
DN MEYER 2003 0.3335 1.6088 0.38347 0.1761 0 0.1761 6.17615 0.430243 
  2004 0.2349 0.9277 0.4371 0.1839 0 0.1839 6.24573 0.304591 
  2005 -0.825 -1.706 1.07503 0.5916 0.3166 0.275 6.13638 -0.00791 
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  2006 0.1309 0.3896 0.88412 0.5482 0.4148 0.1334 6.30294 0.284011 
  2007 0.1089 0.6861 0.37026 0.2116 0.0807 0.1309 6.32098 0.354607 
IPWA 2003 -0.171 -0.515 2.22033 1.888 1.2488 0.6392 5.35774 -0.01328 
  2004 -0.083 -0.192 2.4602 2.0264 1.4264 0.6 5.46524 -0.01173 
  2005 -0.086 -0.185 2.78628 2.3233 1.6363 0.687 5.40479 -0.03356 
  2006 -0.196 -0.274 4.16087 3.4454 2.7289 0.7165 5.48276 -0.02350 
  2007 0.1931 0.2872 2.29202 1.6194 1.6194 0 5.68634 0.069188 
NIG-GERM 2003 0.1094 1.6224 0.18008 0.1126 0.0108 0.1018 6.20502 0.506761 
  2004 0.1316 2.0795 0.19077 0.1275 0.0113 0.1162 6.3192 0.406264 
  2005 0.1528 2.7245 0.21566 0.1596 0.0362 0.1234 6.39653 0.420676 
  2006 0.1345 2.8964 0.29315 0.2467 0.144 0.1027 6.39653 0.329535 
  2007 0.0994 2.5278 0.36639 0.3271 0.248 0.0791 6.42011 0.292977 
PREMIER  2003 0.063 0.1705 0.98214 0.6124 0.0059 0.6065 5.23601 0.68506 
  2004 0.0979 0.3544 0.98598 0.7096 0.0203 0.6893 5.3943 0.063651 
  2005 0.1986 1.2565 0.20602 0.048 0.048 0 5.27658 0.089133 
  2006 0.2486 1.6713 0.57824 0.4295 0.0443 0.3852 5.30767 0.566631 
  2007 0.0738 0.3863 4.24888 4.0579 0.0341 4.0238 5.26955 3.259858 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
NAT. SPORT 2003 -0.63 -1.135 5.12917 4.5737 2.3147 2.259 0 -0.1 
  2004 -0.868 -1.749 6.39519 5.8989 2.9361 2.9628 0 -0.1 
  2005 -0.236 -0.414 7.11735 6.5462 3.2768 3.2693 0 -0.1 
  2006 -0.138 -0.18 2.50996 1.7449 0.9839 0.7611 5.02982 -0.1 
  2007 0.1963 0.3238 2.07486 1.4684 0.7189 0.7496 4.68514 -0.1 
RED STAR 2003 0.6843 6.2646 0.17786 0.0686 0 0.0686 6.21425 0.320812 
  2004 0.6094 7.2394 0.13751 0.0533 0.0004 0.0529 6.31928 0.348113 
  2005 0.3679 6.206 0.12588 0.0666 0.0226 0.044 6.35201 0.275339 
  2006 0.229 0.8618 0.43414 0.1684 0.1203 0.0481 6.42623 0.465547 
  2007 0.2295 1.0366 0.337 0.1157 0.0537 0.0619 6.49115 0.359559 
TRANS-NAT 2003 -0.147 -0.194 0.93489 0.1785 0.1695 0.009 5.07319 -0.06142 
  2004 0.128 0.1915 0.7968 0.1283 0.1166 0.0118 5.06939 0.091833 
  2005 0.3031 0.6032 0.7431 0.2405 0.1855 0.055 5.26341 0.181433 
  2006 0.3515 0.5475 1.72007 1.0781 0.3957 0.6825 5.43782 0.212374 
  2007 0.4291 0.8391 1.371 0.8596 0.1328 0.7268 5.57806 0.17804 
NCR NIG 2003 0.6535 0.7141 2.29357 1.37844 0.7317 0.6468 5.7846 0.012525 
  2004 0.6187 1.0302 1.11898 0.51842 0.4135 0.1049 5.8182 0.222386 
  2005 0.2651 0.4774 0.78853 0.2331 0.1361 0.097 5.935 0.844978 
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  2006 -6.021 -11.48 7.1684 6.6438 6.5521 0.0916 6.2016 -0.00703 
  2007 -0.121 -0.68 3.10673 2.9289 2.7814 0.1475 6.6242 -0.13349 
OMATEK 2003 0.0005 0.0222 0.76037 0.73856 0.366021 0.3725 5.63854 0.099099 
  2004 0.0824 3.0742 0.64055 0.61375 0.026802 0.587 5.81515 0.099993 
  2005 0.0036 0.1368 0.63977 0.6132 0.350952 0.2622 5.88701 0.099415 
  2006 0.0092 0.5671 0.59702 0.5808 0.119222 0.4616 6.03393 0.099982 
  2007 0.0543 4.2404 0.62718 0.61438 0.278768 0.3356 5.8798 0.099991 
TOM WYAT 2003 -0.213 -1.575 1.78324 1.64813 0.17233 1.4758 4.67356 -0.00358 
  2004 -0.457 -3.264 2.26826 2.12835 0.165972 1.9624 4.54023 -0.00130 
  2005 0.007 0.0728 1.46107 1.3682 0.221819 1.1463 4.90076 0.27375 
  2006 -0.077 -0.584 1.21112 1.0791 0.186374 0.8927 5.08583 -0.99065 
  2007 0.007 0.0289 0.72049 0.47179 0.17551 0.2963 5.21151 0.3 
TRIPP GEE 2003 0.027 0.2182 0.88073 0.75752 0.484657 0.2729 5.6122 0.134247 
  2004 0.043 0.3545 0.74978 0.62714 0.453088 0.1741 5.61351 0.218712 
  2005 0.021 0.1718 0.75868 0.6361 0.464129 0.172 5.58417 0.270129 
  2006 0.051 0.3986 1.08209 0.9542 0.433681 0.5205 5.80027 0.208074 
  2007 0.105 0.7758 0.95785 0.82273 0.361198 0.4615 5.88953 0.214078 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
A.G. LEV 2003 0.082 0.5943 0.23234 0.09378 0.035412 0.0584 6.74885 0.390898 
  2004 0.076 0.3172 0.31209 0.07341 0.024943 0.0485 6.78681 0.260364 
  2005 0.125 0.5379 0.3329 0.1002 0.046306 0.0539 6.84731 0.35569 
  2006 0.132 0.6401 0.32751 0.1218 0.068402 0.0534 6.85437 0.337335 
  2007 0.122 0.9425 0.25081 0.12147 0.044859 0.0766 6.85962 0.275824 
CHELLARAMS 2003 0.066 1.1228 0.08712 0.0286 0.023533 0.0051 6.6714 0.230795 
  2004 0.076 1.0131 0.20204 0.12685 0.086906 0.0399 6.80343 0.274966 
  2005 0.068 1.1685 0.14076 0.0824 0.039971 0.0424 6.89852 0.335502 
  2006 0.066 1.1896 0.17401 0.1186 0.057094 0.0615 6.94734 0.683256 
  2007 0.098 1.1929 0.18044 0.09852 0.05749 0.041 7.04829 0.162334 
JOHN HOLT 2003 -0.046 -0.682 0.37483 0.30683 0.050209 0.2566 4.08174 -0.63901 
  2004 0.07 1.2564 0.30765 0.25158 0.057217 0.1944 4.21445 0.714286 
  2005 0.005 0.0769 0.30561 0.2389 0.066735 0.1721 3.96251 0.666667 
  2006 -0.106 -1.928 0.40158 0.3464 0.062217 0.2842 4.07653 -0.26596 
  2007 0.023 0.4872 0.39849 0.35114 0.058524 0.2926 4.21882 0.6 
P.Z. CUSSONS 2003 0.153 3.7919 0.17354 0.13315 0.057099 0.0761 7.44708 0.371048 
  2004 0.187 4.0218 0.18046 0.13401 0.062804 0.0712 7.53319 0.260911 
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  2005 0.156 3.7808 0.16395 0.1228 0.058978 0.0638 7.62557 0.32644 
  2006 0.16 4.2154 0.12396 0.086 0.023789 0.0622 7.73413 0.344208 
  2007 0.165 3.7655 0.14217 0.0984 0.029267 0.0691 7.81918 0.339341 
SCOA 2003 0.11 0.4593 0.31743 0.0779 0.077897 0 6.68296 0.079646 
  2004 0.061 0.2642 0.60955 0.37921 0.074906 0.3043 6.70018 0.353846 
  2005 0.347 1.0708 0.49303 0.1693 0.074701 0.0946 6.65254 0.060345 
  2006 3.71 2.5231 3.8371 2.3665 0.294118 2.0724 6.57066 0.007317 
  2007 1.004 2.6123 0.4539 0.06974 0.06974 0 6.27138 0.136631 
UAC 2003 0.138 0.1955 1.18784 0.4834 0.295563 0.1878 7.31897 0.310703 
  2004 0.13 0.1706 1 0.24068 0.184568 0.0561 7.39996 0.40408 
  2005 0.164 0.2058 1 0.2007 0.149612 0.0511 7.43503 0.313734 
  2006 0.154 0.19 1 0.1906 0.125053 0.0655 7.45337 0.351306 
  2007 0.206 0.2483 1 0.17006 0.113173 0.0569 7.49802 0.304373 
UNILEVER 2003 0.494 0.7113 2.0466 1.35149 0.304888 1.0466 7.27883 0.326789 
  2004 0.364 0.4891 1.8733 1.12929 0.25599 0.8733 7.37464 0.270298 
  2005 0.268 0.4095 1.19033 0.5348 0.344493 0.1903 7.52363 0.291468 
  2006 0.273 0.5363 1 0.4914 0.329155 0.1622 7.40747 0.351787 
  2007 0.233 0.4002 1 0.41779 0.298658 0.1191 7.53136 0.355967 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
CAPPA/ D'AL 2003 0.21 3.177 1.0334 0.96721 0.154556 0.8127 6.41728 0.287644 
  2004 0.153 2.9755 1.06889 1.01735 0.209044 0.8083 6.47071 0.138854 
  2005 0.221 5.3439 5.56261 5.5212 0.193444 5.3277 6.64409 0.249592 
  2006 0.389 5.0909 5.77924 5.7028 0.274493 5.4283 6.72087 0.744691 
  2007 0.543 12.381 1.82035 1.77653 0.075281 1.7013 6.83568 0.313957 
COSTAIN  2003 -0.532 -5.862 0.96535 0.8746 0.047504 0.8271 6.10103 -0.00064 
  2004 -0.239 -3.511 0.94405 0.87598 0.834454 0.0415 6.34564 -0.00091 
  2005 -1.4 -18.62 2.34458 2.2694 0.952536 1.3169 6.04601 -0.00040 
  2006 0.062 1.429 1.31312 1.2699 0.684585 0.5853 6.47949 0 
  2007 0.033 4.7588 0.57717 0.57016 0.325265 0.2449 6.58138 0.016556 
JULIUS BERG 2003 0.118 6.4646 0.65408 0.63588 0.177278 0.4586 7.4837 0.496763 
  2004 0.095 6.1656 0.66294 0.64757 0.149566 0.498 7.46963 0.441444 
  2005 0.083 7.4408 0.78831 0.7772 0.063842 0.7132 7.60035 0.438353 
  2006 0.047 14.698 0.91508 0.9119 0.018396 0.8935 7.75487 0.492442 
  2007 0.106 21.017 0.81521 0.81015 0.029208 0.7809 7.89803 0.439093 
ROADS NIG. 2003 -0.045 -0.858 1.0573 1.00522 0.836301 0.1689 5.61747 -0.62264 
  2004 0.013 0.1421 0.84598 0.75346 0.225119 0.5283 5.42441 4.365939 
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  2005 0.101 1.1559 0.82295 0.7358 0.038281 0.6975 6.10979 0.681979 
  2006 0.153 1.8444 0.73292 0.6502 0.053243 0.5969 6.12478 0.351713 
  2007 0.244 3.3442 0.58094 0.50794 0.052002 0.4559 6.24462 0.248789 
ADSWITCH  2003 0.093 0.1408 1.24383 0.58516 0.043786 0.5414 4.55621 1.087216 
  2004 -0.396 -0.733 1.14085 0.60075 0.051265 0.5495 4.18361 -0.40948 
  2005 0.165 0.3168 1.1626 0.6433 0.024676 0.6186 4.74441 0.300088 
  2006 0.176 0.208 1.28834 0.4427 0.026179 0.4166 4.58092 0.178654 
  2007 0.257 0.316 1.41858 0.6057 0.087788 0.5179 4.7574 0.166709 
CAPITAL OIL 2003 -0.02 -0.044 1.29615 0.85057 0.094023 0.7565 4.93399 -0.56647 
  2004 -0.056 -0.122 1.38614 0.90116 0.102335 0.7988 4.99633 -0.07748 
  2005 0.009 0.0393 0.80091 0.5809 0.046424 0.5345 5.14888 0.503226 
  2006 0.024 0.1148 0.78788 0.5747 0.044983 0.5297 5.13306 0.214412 
  2007 0.018 0.0749 0.5557 0.31104 0.044249 0.2668 5.34229 0.877203 
JULI PLC 2003 -0.107 -0.25 0.70497 0.27702 0.214508 0.0625 4.96822 -0.07003 
  2004 0.012 0.0156 0.82691 0.08401 0.017604 0.0664 5.17842 0.605054 
  2005 -0.041 -0.051 0.88359 0.0623 0.017957 0.0443 5.27615 -0.84234 
  2006 -0.196 -0.215 1.09193 0.1772 0 0.1772 5.26868 -0.23081 
  2007 -0.047 -0.052 1.16429 0.25264 0 0.2526 5.42098 -0.53450 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
SMART PROD 2003 0.006 0.0296 0.90798 0.71458 0.436873 0.2777 4.94338 0.514344 
  2004 0.008 0.0441 0.90291 0.71358 0.424165 0.2894 4.99518 0.57989 
  2005 0.088 0.3988 0.48014 0.2591 0.112383 0.1468 4.41888 0.00533 
  2006 0.046 0.1938 0.48307 0.2479 0.120412 0.1275 4.0235 0.323588 
  2007 0.062 0.2644 0.68951 0.45557 0.089505 0.3661 4.09851 0.187815 
CUTIX PLC 2003 0.349 0.6942 0.67214 0.16975 0.069277 0.1005 5.6377 0.227481 
  2004 0.356 0.8372 0.5266 0.10129 0.016233 0.0851 5.75905 0.211054 
  2005 0.442 0.6122 0.87894 0.1573 0.012926 0.1443 5.8538 0.328334 
  2006 0.626 1.4198 0.64341 0.2022 0.0963 0.1059 6.02695 0.351189 
  2007 0.434 0.7402 0.73141 0.14472 0.144718 0 6.11639 0.414572 
INTERLINKED  2003 -1.151 -1.306 1.28681 0.40544 0.075949 0.3295 4.71842 -0.02963 
  2004 -2.066 -1.388 3.0573 1.56873 0.192486 1.3762 4.24199 -0.03359 
  2005 0.372 0.2132 3.22231 1.476 0.383218 1.0928 4.64839 0.486379 
  2006 0.961 0.4829 2.68144 0.6923 0.481777 0.2105 5.1086 0.115254 
  2007 -0.726 -0.422 2.77856 1.06121 0.146627 0.9146 4.88698 -0.75153 
7UP BOTT CO. 2003 0.459 9.7981 0.30748 0.2606 0.113282 0.1473 7.15296 0.311823 
  2004 0.288 8.2276 0.35818 0.32321 0.177376 0.1458 7.17427 0.3217 
 141 
  2005 0.209 7.4127 0.42275 0.3946 0.221455 0.1732 7.23922 0.371978 
  2006 0.188 8.3224 0.40869 0.3861 0.233026 0.1531 7.34384 0.315815 
  2007 0.142 7.652 0.56421 0.54568 0.419013 0.1267 7.43631 0.378082 
BIG TREAT 2003 0.007 0.1287 1.59236 1.53937 0.927255 0.6121 4.9745 0.696193 
  2004 0.006 0.1903 1.76184 1.73134 0.955489 0.7759 5.11848 0.545072 
  2005 0.008 0.2888 1.49542 1.4691 0.864045 0.6051 5.41096 0.48658 
  2006 0.064 0.1787 1.025 0.6679 0.452809 0.2151 6.20005 0.152317 
  2007 0.097 0.3532 0.85589 0.58112 0.429563 0.1516 6.47758 0.303977 
CADBURY  2003 0.429 10.105 0.09963 0.05716 0.057165 0 7.31336 0.266522 
  2004 0.365 10.256 0.09203 0.05644 0.056443 0 7.34543 0.287737 
  2005 0.22 7.6997 0.62679 0.5982 0.0621 0.5361 7.46915 0.269044 
  2006 -0.385 -11.52 1.90669 1.8732 0.463692 1.4095 7.28364 -0.19820 
  2007 -0.142 -7.625 0.9463 0.92771 0.114159 0.8136 7.29966 -0.26146 
FLOUR MILLS 2003 0.136 5.1847 0.59835 0.57221 0.33182 0.2404 7.72887 0.273806 
  2004 0.096 3.4766 0.47418 0.44645 0.325449 0.121 7.82481 0.278011 
  2005 0.227 10.831 0.43888 0.418 0.396913 0.021 7.93738 0.260016 
  2006 0.278 12.61 1.6325 1.6105 0.784559 0.8259 8.02395 0.236658 
  2007 0.223 12.721 1.81543 1.79791 0.718779 1.0791 8.10606 0.355845 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
NOR NIG FLR 2003 0.175 5.9097 0.552 0.52235 0.012975 0.5094 6.62771 0.332832 
  2004 0.127 3.6646 0.5955 0.56072 0.013949 0.5468 6.57829 0.291513 
  2005 0.11 2.8604 0.63599 0.5975 0.019344 0.5781 6.73359 0.238414 
  2006 0.044 1.1295 0.62507 0.5864 0.027354 0.559 6.68874 0.161973 
  2007 -0.048 -1.26 0.72377 0.68537 0.027144 0.6582 6.67981 -1.11554 
NAT. SALT CO 2003 -0.147 -0.29 1.48093 0.9753 0.48782 0.4871 4.12349 0 
  2004 -0.205 -0.374 1.65358 1.10448 0.529757 0.5747 3.64464 0 
  2005 -0.176 -0.289 1.98015 1.3725 0.586286 0.7862 3.79775 0 
  2006 -0.069 -0.373 1.36636 1.1819 0.190761 0.9912 4.1283 0 
  2007 0.333 1.1413 1.01082 0.71919 0.093401 0.6258 6.79606 0.390879 
NESTLE 2003 0.491 22.129 0.6662 0.64401 0.193732 0.4503 7.3915 0.349382 
  2004 0.455 23.088 0.6938 0.67408 0.239584 0.4345 7.45425 0.354867 
  2005 0.469 29.929 0.66174 0.6461 0.217423 0.4287 7.53575 0.329384 
  2006 0.434 31.027 0.67759 0.6636 0.276204 0.3874 7.58459 0.309539 
  2007 0.398 25.627 0.72209 0.70655 0.318977 0.3876 7.64372 0.357037 
NIG BOTT. CO 2003 0.179 12.407 0.85211 0.83765 0.573451 0.2642 7.64247 0.271951 
  2004 0.093 6.8358 0.8516 0.83804 0.520737 0.3173 7.67719 0.089555 
 142 
  2005 0.081 5.505 0.86348 0.8487 0.46377 0.3849 7.74386 0.349303 
  2006 0.042 2.977 0.86814 0.8542 0.431819 0.4224 7.77579 0.225962 
  2007 0.09 6.6428 0.84223 0.82862 0.475235 0.3534 7.83588 0.270211 
TANTALIZERS 2003 0.067 10.847 0.47481 0.46867 0.327359 0.1413 6.3153 0.171627 
  2004 0.133 31.109 0.52089 0.5166 0.490348 0.0263 6.49686 0.104097 
  2005 0.034 10.343 1.0473 1.044 0.609437 0.4346 6.53243 0.308936 
  2006 0.099 31.888 1.55831 1.5552 0.550733 1.0045 6.54476 0.121639 
  2007 0.112 0.2702 1.01303 0.60006 0.302804 0.2973 6.57336 0.093462 
UTC NIG. PLC 2003 -0.145 -0.57 0.89148 0.6366 0.154493 0.4821 6.17516 -0.09596 
  2004 -0.021 -0.052 1.32099 0.91325 0.105256 0.808 6.29658 -1.55199 
  2005 -0.579 -0.511 1.72429 0.5923 0.199618 0.3926 5.78716 -0.41813 
  2006 0.058 0.0969 0.86397 0.2608 0.121845 0.139 5.97843 0.032347 
  2007 0.021 0.0716 0.64358 0.3573 0.13771 0.2196 6.16585 0.064803 
FIDSON  2003 0.3 2.2728 0.77338 0.64129 0.087539 0.5538 5.88306 0.10016 
  2004 0.202 2.162 0.14912 0.05562 0.054678 0.0009 6.03352 0.005192 
  2005 0.229 2.7614 0.13397 0.051 0.049987 0.001 6.21071 0.202925 
  2006 0.254 4.1537 0.1228 0.0616 0.044942 0.0167 6.34246 0.134908 
  2007 0.24 5.666 0.10292 0.0606 0.036076 0.0245 6.51949 0 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
GLAXOSMITH 2003 0.221 2.6661 0.70062 0.61791 0.105416 0.5125 6.75375 0.356088 
  2004 0.22 3.3246 0.64811 0.58191 0.087783 0.4941 6.85425 0.279189 
  2005 0.17 2.9459 0.63658 0.5789 0.068627 0.5103 6.93398 0.307574 
  2006 0.172 3.1827 0.58117 0.5272 0.077787 0.4494 7.0166 0.289105 
  2007 0.134 2.4385 0.52706 0.4722 0.09009 0.3821 6.99631 0.282543 
MAY /BAKER 2003 0.177 1.4862 0.27955 0.16077 0.07255 0.0882 6.25053 0.41135 
  2004 0.137 1.3941 0.31985 0.22132 0.138371 0.0829 6.27895 0.27758 
  2005 0.106 1.4239 0.51271 0.438 0.380882 0.0571 6.30037 0.341881 
  2006 0.089 0.7605 0.23854 0.121 0.09826 0.0227 6.35284 0.20557 
  2007 0.139 1.1374 0.21119 0.08934 0.033714 0.0556 6.58656 0.47669 
MORRISON  2003 0.125 0.4314 0.55003 0.25921 0.082734 0.1765 5.18471 0.492308 
  2004 0.06 0.2407 0.65004 0.40064 0.106748 0.2939 5.25365 0.925666 
  2005 0.055 0.2366 0.63629 0.4023 0.097611 0.3047 5.29006 0.928175 
  2006 0.064 0.3128 0.64899 0.4451 0.105915 0.3392 5.32497 0.002941 
  2007 0.046 0.2308 0.78743 0.58667 0.123166 0.4635 5.34596 0.582289 
NEIMETH 2003 0.094 1.0859 0.64592 0.55963 0.504589 0.055 6.00088 0.336268 
  2004 0.152 1.6601 0.55616 0.46457 0.380206 0.0844 6.0941 0.359208 
 143 
  2005 0.065 0.3809 0.34656 0.1754 0.100484 0.0749 6.08046 0.340022 
  2006 0.089 0.5261 0.32826 0.159 0.04756 0.1115 6.17721 0.324371 
  2007 0.069 0.5025 0.45157 0.31414 0.175844 0.1383 6.28926 0.404911 
CAPITAL HOT 2003 0.121 0.2853 0.86067 0.43708 0.2346 0.2025 6.40099 0.319999 
  2004 0.011 0.0264 0.65383 0.23422 0.2225 0.0117 6.30172 0.319988 
  2005 0.017 0.0406 0.65716 0.2411 0.2294 0.0118 6.34819 0.325011 
  2006 0.163 0.4467 0.81354 0.4497 0.2518 0.1978 6.45502 0.319999 
  2007 0.117 0.3362 0.86231 0.51313 0.2371 0.276 6.44898 0.319999 
IKEJA HOTEL 2003 0.293 0.9714 0.33215 0.03016 0.0302 0 6.48885 0.28916 
  2004 0.036 0.6557 0.90159 0.84735 0 0.8473 6.51794 0.41439 
  2005 0.071 1.3789 0.89538 0.8441 0.1395 0.7045 6.62218 0.179055 
  2006 0.066 1.5792 0.89167 0.8501 0.1329 0.7172 6.66679 0.364107 
  2007 0.071 1.2561 0.77952 0.7229 0.1358 0.5871 6.7228 0.300388 
THE TOURIST  2003 0.024 0.1947 0.76179 0.63693 0.341 0.296 6.00137 0.129404 
  2004 -0.009 -0.083 0.86406 0.75677 0.351 0.4058 6.01793 -1.05836 
  2005 -0.036 -0.384 0.84802 0.7539 0.3226 0.4313 6.013 -0.45116 
  2006 -0.026 -0.298 0.94929 0.8617 0.3787 0.483 6.08998 -0.03663 
  2007 0.033 0.3821 1.54703 1.46035 0.4079 1.0524 6.16376 0.58475 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
ALEX IND. PLC 2003 -0.176 -0.383 1.38674 0.92805 0.9143 0.0137 5.60911 0 
  2004 -0.012 -0.029 1.38715 0.98001 0.9492 0.0308 5.81476 0 
  2005 0.032 0.0766 1.36473 0.9476 0.8452 0.1023 5.89157 0 
  2006 0.072 0.1882 1.26114 0.8805 0.4046 0.4759 5.93666 0 
  2007 0.149 0.4701 1.06859 0.75107 0.3683 0.3828 6.01803 0 
B.O.C GASES 2003 0.392 0.836 0.65323 0.18463 0.0238 0.1608 5.92997 0.320241 
  2004 0.354 0.8682 0.61428 0.20656 0.0342 0.17233 5.95509 0.348069 
  2005 0.217 0.6377 1.19478 0.8552 0.3053 0.5499 6.00178 0.108447 
  2006 0.138 0.4886 1.03867 0.7555 0.2881 0.46737 6.05254 0.368257 
  2007 0.248 0.8917 1.22372 0.94537 0.1934 0.75192 6.1203 0.166023 
FIRST ALUM 2003 0.152 0.3758 0.45121 0.0472 0 0.04717 6.68411 0.183258 
  2004 0.067 0.2086 0.58102 0.2604 0.1516 0.1088 6.80581 0.287372 
  2005 0.098 0.3153 0.54335 0.2319 0.0989 0.13304 6.9086 0.187641 
  2006 0.012 0.0497 1.19291 0.9493 0.7147 0.23459 6.93929 0.823208 
  2007 -0.092 -0.515 2.39537 2.217 0.2529 1.96411 6.94067 -0.32 
NIG. ENAMEL 2003 0.241 1.8197 0.94152 0.8089 0.6754 0.13355 6.25008 0.339338 
  2004 0.234 1.8494 0.26269 0.1363 0 0.13628 6.21475 0.445008 
 144 
  2005 0.222 2.4352 0.44012 0.349 0.2857 0.06329 6.24961 0.304018 
  2006 0.199 2.1813 0.38226 0.2909 0.2523 0.03856 6.19684 0.354048 
  2007 0.225 2.6551 0.77823 0.6934 0.3045 0.38892 6.19535 0.279026 
VITAFOAM  2003 0.189 2.2237 0.76352 0.6784 0.0858 0.59258 6.58962 0.287239 
  2004 0.195 1.8417 0.70378 0.5979 0.1392 0.45874 6.56241 0.385845 
  2005 0.089 0.5296 0.77254 0.6036 0.1794 0.42415 6.54722 1.030595 
  2006 0.192 1.9911 0.35801 0.2614 0.1015 0.15993 6.7888 0.1993 
  2007 0.221 3.0922 0.27156 0.1999 0.0724 0.12759 6.91233 0.061051 
CHAMS PLC 2003 -0.326 -696.3 3.0503 3.0498 0.7009 2.34897 5.10716 -0.02023 
  2004 0.152 1558.6 0.74644 0.7463 0.04 0.70635 5.47059 0.014057 
  2005 0.024 241.66 0.71671 0.7166 0.0479 0.66867 5.13592 0.098775 
  2006 0.4 3.9954 0.37239 0.2722 0.0585 0.21373 6.03954 0.094736 
  2007 0.431 1.2158 0.53777 0.1836 0.1016 0.082 6.65003 0.236433 
STARCOMMS 2003 -0.311 -61.47 1.19942 1.1944 0.7245 0.46988 6.49743 -0.56923 
  2004 -0.222 -51.74 1.37501 1.3707 0.5575 0.81318 6.71335 -0.07322 
  2005 -0.266 -73.22 1.5895 1.5859 1.0945 0.49139 6.80238 -0.15016 
  2006 -0.104 -50.11 1.43128 1.4292 1.086 0.34322 7.13401 -0.27724 
  2007 0.016 0.2446 0.84363 0.7793 0.4679 0.31141 7.3119 1.248866 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
STOKVIS  2003 -0.027 -0.489 1.04943 0.9939 0.3232 0.67074 3.36418 -0.1 
  2004 -0.156 -2.931 1.02137 0.9681 0.3257 0.64235 3.08493 -0.1 
  2005 -0.146 -3.311 0.88826 0.8441 0.3042 0.53993 3.01662 -0.1 
  2006 0.016 0.414 0.77672 0.7385 0.2743 0.46414 2.31387 0.1 
  2007 0.04 0.9342 0.74723 0.7045 0.2987 0.40576 0 0.1 
JAPAUL OIL 2003 0.177 92.835 0.17794 0.176 0 0.17603 5.63838 0.052114 
  2004 0.171 0.6518 0.49745 0.2356 0 0.23555 5.692 0.193024 
  2005 0.163 0.4072 0.48771 0.0877 0.0134 0.07436 5.72685 0.159679 
  2006 0.161 0.4133 0.65393 0.2655 0.2324 0.03304 6.14648 0.211873 
  2007 0.147 0.8186 0.84307 0.663 0.5272 0.13581 6.36708 0.207849 
DAAR COMM. 2003 -0.144 -0.447 0.49273 0.1698 0.0063 0.16351 5.81473 -0.04336 
  2004 -0.002 -0.013 0.34059 0.1684 0.0042 0.16422 5.8189 -1.86410 
  2005 -0.003 -0.017 0.42544 0.2642 0.0038 0.26037 6.05358 -1.43527 
  2006 0.015 0.2218 0.12851 0.0587 0.0018 0.05691 6.26258 0.117716 
  2007 0.021 0.2795 0.14164 0.0682 0.004 0.06414 6.40354 0.195274 
AVON 2003 0.043 0.4952 0.72026 0.6326 0.0285 0.60408 6.65397 0.538967 
  2004 0.043 0.709 0.79363 0.7324 0.0473 0.68514 6.71209 0.490391 
 145 
  2005 0.058 0.7911 0.72719 0.654 0.046 0.60801 6.78924 0.298207 
  2006 0.067 0.9669 0.70106 0.6321 0.0645 0.56754 6.79086 0.373486 
  2007 0.06 0.9632 0.75075 0.6886 0.0806 0.60802 6.83917 0.237677 
BETA GLASS 2003 0.396 3.4294 0.92322 0.8077 0.2033 0.60444 6.72104 0.02887 
  2004 0.114 0.9862 0.74473 0.6295 0.2708 0.35875 6.78199 0.274487 
  2005 0.073 0.6509 0.8243 0.7121 0.3639 0.34822 6.68331 0.478111 
  2006 0.108 2.1736 0.58169 0.5319 0.1499 0.38206 6.72194 0.24877 
  2007 0.155 4.6467 0.34821 0.3149 0.1218 0.19307 6.84708 0.281001 
GREIF NIG.  2003 -0.262 -4.564 0.25687 0.1995 0.0559 0.14362 5.60015 -0.07599 
  2004 -0.32 -4.782 0.41084 0.3439 0.0706 0.27323 5.66141 -0.21904 
  2005 -0.093 -1.464 0.37397 0.3106 0.0473 0.26628 5.76854 -0.85814 
  2006 0.005 0.0889 0.15037 0.0922 0.0569 0.03532 5.77239 14.93671 
  2007 -0.038 -0.642 0.17721 0.118 0.0048 0.11318 5.72642 -0.14001 
NAMPAK NIG.  2003 0.106 0.6329 0.18161 0.0143 0 0.01427 6.37014 0.032929 
  2004 0.196 1.3235 0.29165 0.1439 0.141 0.0029 6.2222 0.435035 
  2005 0.095 0.7028 0.31408 0.179 0.1473 0.03174 6.26495 0.379352 
  2006 0.203 1.8195 0.29688 0.1851 0.1188 0.06631 6.43174 0.334971 
  2007 0.094 0.88 0.24552 0.1382 0.1019 0.03628 6.45479 0.589682 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
NIG. BAG.  2003 0.012 0.2017 1.31509 1.2534 0.9052 0.34822 6.7569 0.91601 
  2004 0.02 0.7135 1.12876 1.1014 0.7193 0.38206 6.79913 0.43679 
  2005 0.157 8.5952 0.93761 0.9193 0.7277 0.1916 6.9957 0.05633 
  2006 0.148 9.6528 0.81917 0.8038 0.5275 0.27631 7.0415 0.124778 
  2007 0.078 0.2961 0.7915 0.5288 0.2072 0.32156 7.07232 0.670105 
POLY PROD. 2003 0.075 0.2569 0.71305 0.4209 0.0186 0.40226 6.05781 0.248443 
  2004 0.084 0.3177 0.77876 0.5128 0.0574 0.45538 6.12941 0.679722 
  2005 0.005 0.0187 0.74413 0.4673 0.0197 0.4476 6.14605 3.798398 
  2006 0.029 0.1032 0.74991 0.4733 0.0269 0.44647 6.17708 0.941447 
  2007 0.074 0.23014 0.69672 0.3748 0.0374 0.3374 6.22829 0.504834 
STUDIO PRESS 2003 0.041 0.6277 0.64559 0.5808 0.3858 0.195 5.30175 0.088936 
  2004 0.032 0.6891 0.7154 0.6687 0.4748 0.19388 5.80346 0.108834 
  2005 0.022 0.4032 0.6536 0.5991 0.355 0.24417 5.71335 0.31998 
  2006 0.015 0.4797 1.55216 1.5201 1.0729 0.44721 6.03427 0.45682 
  2007 0.02 1.5677 0.80644 0.7937 0.6991 0.09457 6.26247 0.121992 
WEST AFRI. 2003 0.025 0.3224 0.99166 0.9129 0.0189 0.89404 6.03673 0.0328 
  2004 0.031 0.4348 0.96112 0.8892 0.0093 0.87992 6.16484 0.074158 
 146 
  2005 -0.097 -1.349 1.05797 0.9863 0.0119 0.97438 6.07262 -0.03222 
  2006 -0.103 -1.464 1.15934 1.0892 0.0255 1.06374 6.14854 -0.09217 
  2007 -0.15 -3.441 1.99742 1.9539 1.1159 0.83793 6.1529 -0.04255 
AP PLC 2003 0.197 6.4683 6.83677 6.8064 1.2255 5.58093 7.5365 0.12557 
  2004 0.102 4.7538 1.77461 1.7531 0.2855 1.46765 7.76425 0.133123 
  2005 -0.329 -8.544 1.00982 0.9714 0.2454 0.72596 7.63105 -0.05921 
  2006 0.227 6.1807 0.80798 0.7712 0.2192 0.55206 7.91347 0.113266 
  2007 0.737 17.874 0.27054 0.2293 0.0972 0.13205 8.00871 0.191199 
AFROIL 2003 -0.107 -0.203 1.31754 0.7898 0.4992 0.29066 0 -0.10008 
  2004 -0.134 -0.223 1.52126 0.92 0.7081 0.21194 0 -0.10009 
  2005 -0.157 -0.224 1.79181 1.0929 0.9856 0.1073 0 -0.1 
  2006 -0.04 -0.411 0.41643 0.3187 0.1891 0.12957 0 -0.09995 
  2007 -0.069 -0.732 0.24162 0.1476 0.0913 0.05627 4.83448 -0.07647 
CHEVRON 2003 0.056 7.9501 0.85191 0.8449 0.0534 0.79151 7.51427 0.375464 
  2004 0.08 10.35 0.83446 0.8267 0.0455 0.7812 7.62728 0.372766 
  2005 0.125 14.016 0.79063 0.7817 0.0734 0.7083 7.71552 0.412538 
  2006 0.108 14.586 0.81023 0.8028 0.063 0.73987 7.81898 0.291362 
  2007 0.143 23.583 0.81285 0.8068 0.0653 0.74147 7.8611 0.345787 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
CONOIL 2003 0.379 10.486 0.19049 0.1544 0.0611 0.09326 7.53788 0.330684 
  2004 0.361 9.7252 0.22537 0.1883 0.0603 0.12803 7.77838 0.34414 
  2005 0.335 11.127 0.29358 0.2635 0.1446 0.11885 7.87815 0.320264 
  2006 0.29 11.854 0.22897 0.2045 0.074 0.13057 7.95676 0.317122 
  2007 0.248 10.834 0.23107 0.2081 0.0962 0.11196 7.93876 0.310111 
ETERNA OIL 2003 -1.319 -3.974 1.21372 0.8818 0.1493 0.73252 5.69974 -0.11881 
  2004 -0.418 -1.145 1.50961 1.1442 0.0765 1.06772 5.25586 -0.19593 
  2005 -0.501 -0.919 1.81682 1.271 0.0594 1.21161 6.15155 -0.025802 
  2006 0.076 0.1308 1.34311 0.7639 0.0608 0.70305 6.54558 0.286156 
  2007 -0.131 -0.521 0.78637 0.5359 0.0867 0.4492 6.69086 -0.20051 
MOBIL 2003 0.41 18.012 0.89279 0.87 0.2589 0.61113 7.56947 0.326814 
  2004 0.342 16.518 0.86874 0.848 0.2214 0.62661 7.66789 0.113824 
  2005 0.557 28.236 0.47726 0.4575 0.321 0.1365 7.70685 0.286211 
  2006 0.342 21.094 0.63446 0.6183 0.2816 0.33668 7.70595 0.323123 
  2007 0.197 14.681 0.76288 0.7495 0.2245 0.52499 7.73673 0.35902 
OANDO 2003 0.045 6.251 0.74584 0.7387 0.2383 0.50045 7.80241 0.217476 
  2004 0.044 3.4666 0.13744 0.1248 0.081 0.04384 7.93375 0.098831 
 147 
  2005 0.076 7.3748 0.24601 0.2357 0.0624 0.17335 8.0849 0.345765 
  2006 0.096 10.014 0.28125 0.2716 0.0697 0.20195 8.12188 0.175765 
  2007 0.068 9.859 0.22328 0.2164 0.1675 0.0489 8.1173 0.281318 
TOTAL  2003 0.748 29.103 0.39987 0.3742 0.2953 0.07887 7.82447 0.379068 
  2004 0.582 26.539 0.53831 0.5164 0.2931 0.22323 7.97778 0.383182 
  2005 0.535 28.391 0.56052 0.5417 0.2947 0.24695 8.10285 0.24995 
  2006 0.311 19.139 0.46403 0.4478 0.2539 0.1939 8.10234 0.225404 
  2007 0.42 28.445 0.463 0.4482 0.2477 0.2005 8.1378 0.325834 
ACADE. PRESS 2003 0.297 0.8294 0.56578 0.2077 0.0233 0.18439 5.89254 0.247883 
  2004 0.183 0.425 0.72753 0.2979 0.0846 0.21324 5.90445 0.542414 
  2005 0.159 0.6946 0.75307 0.5235 0.3584 0.16505 5.9689 0.317094 
  2006 0.186 0.8088 0.64871 0.4191 0.237 0.18209 6.04554 0.241453 
  2007 0.286 1.358 0.53843 0.3276 0.0719 0.25568 6.20559 0.183449 
LONGMAN 2003 0.166 0.707 0.38158 0.1468 0.0897 0.0571 5.9009 0.372604 
  2004 0.321 1.5224 0.3146 0.1038 0.0383 0.06544 6.02198 0.437289 
  2005 0.381 2.3592 0.29256 0.1311 0.1207 0.01043 6.11549 0.30886 
  2006 0.458 3.215 0.90576 0.7634 0.1037 0.65964 6.24152 0.281456 
  2007 0.525 5.202 0.2291 0.1281 0.0825 0.04559 6.36448 0.396722 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
UNIV. PRESS 2003 0.115 0.9725 0.50217 0.3835 0.0475 0.33598 5.52584 0.310445 
  2004 0.098 0.8478 0.44957 0.3336 0.0232 0.31037 5.56328 0.349709 
  2005 0.161 1.3977 0.45672 0.3418 0.0192 0.32262 5.7389 0.327701 
  2006 0.211 2.2436 0.52264 0.4285 0.0471 0.38138 5.83995 0.348816 
  2007 0.17 1.6069 0.45604 0.3501 0.0318 0.31832 5.98089 0.320673 
UACN PROP. 2003 0.057 1.9339 0.31887 0.2894 0.0241 0.26532 6.51675 0.136796 
  2004 0.026 1.3305 0.38013 0.3605 0.0079 0.35265 6.601 0.311419 
  2005 0.037 2.0061 0.40962 0.3912 0.0101 0.38108 6.65801 0.168294 
  2006 0.035 2.4889 0.50239 0.4885 0.0097 0.47882 6.73916 0.296956 
  2007 0.029 2.5784 0.58999 0.5788 0.0109 0.56786 6.75406 0.245629 
ASSOC. BUS 2003 0.029 1.0656 0.51694 0.4899 0.0661 0.42381 6.16106 0.351616 
  2004 0.115 3.6316 0.52778 0.496 0.1702 0.32584 6.24787 0.326976 
  2005 0.202 6.6411 0.51199 0.4816 0.0609 0.42069 6.34236 0.221004 
  2006 0.183 1.2662 0.58251 0.4379 0.4247 0.0132 6.43281 0.220731 
  2007 0.108 0.3318 0.82059 0.4949 0.2611 0.23381 6.49582 0.49159 
UNI. NIG TEXT 2003 -0.027 -0.795 0.26651 0.233 0.0474 0.18561 7.35628 -0.088736 
  2004 0.027 0.8075 0.2556 0.2218 0.0455 0.17635 7.33923 0.612051 
 148 
  2005 0.019 0.5849 0.27763 0.2452 0.0428 0.20237 7.24711 0.658673 
  2006 -0.016 -0.5 0.34301 0.3108 0.0631 0.24765 7.3072 -2.585912 
  2007 -0.201 -5.155 0.36307 0.324 0.0567 0.26729 7.26838 -0.031431 
Note: ROA = the return on assets (EBIT/ total assets); ROE = return on equity (EBIT/total equity); Tob Q 
(Tobin‟s Q) = Market value of equity + book value of debt/book value of assets; TDTA = total debt divided by 
total assets; LTDTA = long-term debt divided by total assets; STDTA = short term debt divided by total assets; 
Size = log of turnover, Tax = total tax to earnings before interest and tax (EBIT) 
 
Source: Authors computation from data extracted from the Factbook of Nigerian Stock Exchange (2008) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Appendix B: Raw Results from Panel Data Estimation 
B.1: Regression Results 
Dependent Variable: ROA   
Method: Panel Least Squares   
Date: 05/15/11   Time: 20:29   
Sample: 2003 2007   
Cross-sections included: 101   
Total panel (balanced) observations: 505  
     
     
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     
C -0.081447 0.097586 -0.834617 0.4043 
TDTA -0.163145 0.020754 -7.860720 0.0000 
SIZE 0.044457 0.014682 3.028054 0.0026 
TAX 0.031951 0.022722 1.406202 0.1603 
     
     
R-squared 0.157719     Mean dependent var 0.080404 
Adjusted R-squared 0.152675     S.D. dependent var 0.447978 
S.E. of regression 0.412365     Akaike info criterion 1.074075 
Sum squared resid 85.19263     Schwarz criterion 1.107537 
Log likelihood -267.2040     F-statistic 31.27104 
Durbin-Watson stat 1.757484     Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000 
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Dependent Variable: ROA   
Method: Panel EGLS (Two-way random effects)  
Date: 05/15/11   Time: 20:56   
Sample: 2003 2007   
Cross-sections included: 101   
Total panel (balanced) observations: 505  
Swamy and Arora estimator of component variances 
     
     
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     
C -0.044401 0.110705 -0.401077 0.6885 
TDTA -0.176387 0.021938 -8.040299 0.0000 
SIZE 0.040137 0.016722 2.400223 0.0167 
TAX 0.029132 0.022331 1.304586 0.1926 
     
     
 Effects Specification   
   S.D.   Rho   
     
     
Cross-section random 0.134039 0.1062 
Period random 0.000000 0.0000 
Dependent Variable: ROA   
Method: Panel Least Squares   
Date: 05/15/11   Time: 20:49   
Sample: 2003 2007   
Cross-sections included: 101   
Total panel (balanced) observations: 505  
     
     
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     
C 0.204719 0.220366 0.928994 0.3535 
TDTA -0.225992 0.028783 -7.851582 0.0000 
SIZE 0.005855 0.034626 0.169104 0.8658 
TAX 0.024451 0.023899 1.023083 0.3069 
     
     
 Effects Specification   
     
     
Cross-section fixed (dummy variables)  
     
     
R-squared 0.403719     Mean dependent var 0.080404 
Adjusted R-squared 0.250559     S.D. dependent var 0.447978 
S.E. of regression 0.387816     Akaike info criterion 1.124713 
Sum squared resid 60.31095     Schwarz criterion 1.994722 
Log likelihood -179.9901     F-statistic 2.635934 
Durbin-Watson stat 
2.419797 
    Prob(F-statistic) 
0.000000    
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Idiosyncratic random 0.388879 0.8938 
     
     
 Weighted Statistics   
     
     
R-squared 0.150881     Mean dependent var 0.063684 
Adjusted R-squared 0.145797     S.D. dependent var 0.421844 
S.E. of regression 0.389882     Sum squared resid 76.15581 
F-statistic 29.67447     Durbin-Watson stat 1.952804 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000    
     
     
 Unweighted Statistics   
     
     
R-squared 0.156987     Mean dependent var 0.080404 
Sum squared resid 85.26666     Durbin-Watson stat 1.744144 
     
     
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Dependent Variable: ROA   
Method: Panel Least Squares   
Date: 05/18/11   Time: 02:22   
Sample: 2003 2007   
Cross-sections included: 101   
Total panel (balanced) observations: 505  
     
     
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     
C -0.016611 0.089371 -0.185863 0.8526 
LTDTA -0.448500 0.037875 -11.84147 0.0000 
SIZE 0.034941 0.013684 2.553402 0.0110 
TAX 0.021805 0.021318 1.022830 0.3069 
     
     
R-squared 0.260741     Mean dependent var 0.080404 
Adjusted R-squared 0.256314     S.D. dependent var 0.447978 
S.E. of regression 0.386324     Akaike info criterion 0.943610 
Sum squared resid 74.77247     Schwarz criterion 0.977072 
Log likelihood -234.2615     F-statistic 58.90174 
Durbin-Watson stat 1.575206     Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000 
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Dependent Variable: ROA   
Method: Panel EGLS (Two-way random effects)  
Date: 05/15/11   Time: 21:00   
Sample: 2003 2007   
Cross-sections included: 101   
Total panel (balanced) observations: 505  
Swamy and Arora estimator of component variances 
     
     
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     
C 0.063214 0.105327 0.600173 0.5487 
LTDTA -0.515527 0.040634 -12.68709 0.0000 
SIZE 0.025101 0.016159 1.553354 0.1210 
TAX 0.019155 0.020572 0.931093 0.3523 
     
     
 Effects Specification   
   S.D.   Rho   
     
     
Cross-section random 0.145748 0.1508 
Period random 0.000000 0.0000 
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Idiosyncratic random 0.345826 0.8492 
     
     
 Weighted Statistics   
     
     
R-squared 0.271551     Mean dependent var 0.058515 
Adjusted R-squared 0.267189     S.D. dependent var 0.414719 
S.E. of regression 0.355018     Sum squared resid 63.14485 
F-statistic 62.25434     Durbin-Watson stat 1.795062 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000    
     
     
 Unweighted Statistics   
     
     
R-squared 0.255998     Mean dependent var 0.080404 
Sum squared resid 75.25218     Durbin-Watson stat 1.506255 
     
     
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Dependent Variable: ROA   
Method: Panel Least Squares   
Date: 05/15/11   Time: 21:02   
Sample: 2003 2007   
Cross-sections included: 101   
Total panel (balanced) observations: 505  
     
     
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     
C 0.439137 0.195021 2.251741 0.0249 
LTDTA -0.695149 0.051716 -13.44174 0.0000 
SIZE -0.027711 0.030870 -0.897672 0.3699 
TAX 0.017221 0.021318 0.807830 0.4197 
     
     
 Effects Specification   
     
     
Cross-section fixed (dummy variables)  
     
     
R-squared 0.525739     Mean dependent var 0.080404 
Adjusted R-squared 0.403922     S.D. dependent var 0.447978 
S.E. of regression 0.345867     Akaike info criterion 0.895758 
Sum squared resid 47.96913     Schwarz criterion 1.765766 
Log likelihood -122.1788     F-statistic 4.315794 
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Durbin-Watson stat 2.202552     Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000 
     
     
 
 
Dependent Variable: ROA   
Method: Panel Least Squares   
Date: 05/15/11   Time: 21:03   
Sample: 2003 2007   
Cross-sections included: 101   
Total panel (balanced) observations: 505  
     
     
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     
C -0.312238 0.098629 -3.165800 0.0016 
STDTA -0.075963 0.028395 -2.675268 0.0077 
SIZE 0.067860 0.015150 4.479115 0.0000 
TAX 0.037715 0.023900 1.578046 0.1152 
     
     
R-squared 0.67162     Mean dependent var 0.080404 
Adjusted R-squared 0.61576     S.D. dependent var 0.447978 
S.E. of regression 0.433967     Akaike info criterion 1.176193 
Sum squared resid 94.35201     Schwarz criterion 1.209655 
Log likelihood -292.9887     F-statistic 12.02355 
Durbin-Watson stat 1.796881     Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000 
     
     
 
 
Dependent Variable: ROA   
Method: Panel Least Squares   
Date: 05/15/11   Time: 21:04   
Sample: 2003 2007   
Cross-sections included: 101   
Total panel (balanced) observations: 505  
     
     
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     
C -0.244883 0.228334 -1.072478 0.2842 
STDTA -0.086345 0.038595 -2.237226 0.0258 
SIZE 0.058220 0.036331 1.602512 0.0798 
TAX 0.024326 0.025518 0.953318 0.3410 
     
     
 Effects Specification   
     
     
Cross-section fixed (dummy variables)  
     
     
R-squared 0.320531     Mean dependent var 0.080404 
Adjusted R-squared 0.320510     S.D. dependent var 0.447978 
S.E. of regression 0.413986     Akaike info criterion 1.255313 
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Sum squared resid 68.72498     Schwarz criterion 2.125321 
Log likelihood -212.9664     F-statistic 1.836568 
Durbin-Watson stat 2.460873     Prob(F-statistic) 0.000017 
     
     
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Dependent Variable: ROA   
Method: Panel EGLS (Cross-section random effects) 
Date: 05/15/11   Time: 21:05   
Sample: 2003 2007   
Cross-sections included: 101   
Total panel (balanced) observations: 505  
Swamy and Arora estimator of component variances 
     
     
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     
C -0.305712 0.111294 -2.746874 0.0062 
STDTA -0.078073 0.029807 -2.619249 0.0091 
SIZE 0.067109 0.017130 3.917675 0.0001 
TAX 0.033729 0.023633 1.427184 0.1541 
     
     
 Effects Specification   
   S.D.   Rho   
     
     
Cross-section random 0.134113 0.0950 
Idiosyncratic random 0.413986 0.9050 
     
     
 Weighted Statistics   
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R-squared 0.55362     Mean dependent var 0.065115 
Adjusted R-squared 0.49705     S.D. dependent var 0.423900 
S.E. of regression 0.413231     Sum squared resid 85.55063 
F-statistic 9.787277     Durbin-Watson stat 1.980002 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000003    
     
     
 Unweighted Statistics   
     
     
R-squared 0.067096     Mean dependent var 0.080404 
Sum squared resid 94.35865     Durbin-Watson stat 1.795177 
     
 
 
 
 
 
 
    
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Dependent Variable: TOB   
Method: Panel Least Squares   
Date: 05/15/11   Time: 21:08   
Sample: 2003 2007   
Cross-sections included: 101   
Total panel (balanced) observations: 505  
     
     
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     
C 1.299879 0.119090 10.91509 0.0000 
STDTA 1.128309 0.034285 32.90940 0.0000 
SIZE 0.141490 0.018294 7.734436 0.0000 
TAX -0.049962 0.028858 -1.731303 0.0840 
     
     
R-squared 0.719944     Mean dependent var 0.933247 
Adjusted R-squared 0.718267     S.D. dependent var 0.987213 
S.E. of regression 0.523998     Akaike info criterion 1.553233 
Sum squared resid 137.5617     Schwarz criterion 1.586695 
Log likelihood -388.1913     F-statistic 429.3093 
Durbin-Watson stat 1.809830     Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000 
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Dependent Variable: TOB   
Method: Panel Least Squares   
Date: 05/15/11   Time: 21:09   
Sample: 2003 2007   
Cross-sections included: 101   
Total panel (balanced) observations: 505  
     
     
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     
C 1.281494 0.191116 6.705312 0.0000 
STDTA 1.100366 0.032304 34.06310 0.0000 
SIZE 0.137933 0.030409 4.535968 0.0000 
TAX -0.009807 0.021358 -0.459155 0.6464 
     
     
 Effects Specification   
     
     
Cross-section fixed (dummy variables)  
     
     
R-squared 0.901980     Mean dependent var 0.933247 
Adjusted R-squared 0.876802     S.D. dependent var 0.987213 
S.E. of regression 0.346507     Akaike info criterion 0.899458 
Sum squared resid 48.14698     Schwarz criterion 1.769466 
Log likelihood -123.1132     F-statistic 35.82510 
Durbin-Watson stat 2.324300     Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000 
     
     
 
Dependent Variable: TOB   
Method: Panel EGLS (Cross-section random effects) 
Date: 05/15/11   Time: 21:09   
Sample: 2003 2007   
Cross-sections included: 101   
Total panel (balanced) observations: 505  
Swamy and Arora estimator of component variances 
     
     
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     
C 1.296615 0.151993 8.530761 0.0000 
STDTA 1.107034 0.030272 36.56900 0.0000 
SIZE 0.140633 0.023202 6.061342 0.0000 
TAX -0.016388 0.021006 -0.780151 0.4357 
     
     
 Effects Specification   
   S.D.   Rho   
     
     
Cross-section random 0.394672 0.5647 
Idiosyncratic random 0.346507 0.4353 
     
     
 Weighted Statistics   
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R-squared 0.747477     Mean dependent var 0.341078 
Adjusted R-squared 0.776435     S.D. dependent var 0.687590 
S.E. of regression 0.346558     Sum squared resid 60.17145 
F-statistic 494.3266     Durbin-Watson stat 1.860761 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000    
     
     
 Unweighted Statistics   
     
     
R-squared 0.718946     Mean dependent var 0.933247 
Sum squared resid 138.0518     Durbin-Watson stat 0.811034 
     
     
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Dependent Variable: TOB   
Method: Panel EGLS (Cross-section random effects) 
Date: 05/15/11   Time: 21:10   
Sample: 2003 2007   
Cross-sections included: 101   
Total panel (balanced) observations: 505  
Swamy and Arora estimator of component variances 
     
     
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     
C 0.356667 0.062530 5.703956 0.0000 
TDTA 1.001420 0.008493 117.9066 0.0000 
SIZE 0.025792 0.009211  2.800133 0.0053 
TAX -0.001052 0.007246 -0.145127 0.8847 
     
     
 Effects Specification   
   S.D.   Rho   
     
     
Cross-section random 0.211465 0.7612 
Idiosyncratic random 0.118450 0.2388 
     
     
 Weighted Statistics   
     
     
 158 
R-squared 0.967006     Mean dependent var 0.226775 
Adjusted R-squared 0.966808     S.D. dependent var 0.655452 
S.E. of regression 0.119414     Sum squared resid 7.144099 
F-statistic 736.980     Durbin-Watson stat 1.407803 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000    
     
     
 Unweighted Statistics   
     
     
R-squared 0.937245     Mean dependent var 0.933247 
Sum squared resid 30.82479     Durbin-Watson stat 0.326279 
     
     
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Dependent Variable: TOB   
Method: Panel Least Squares   
Date: 05/15/11   Time: 21:11   
Sample: 2003 2007   
Cross-sections included: 101   
Total panel (balanced) observations: 505  
     
     
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     
C 0.263185 0.067306 3.910261 0.0001 
TDTA 1.000801 0.008791 113.8418 0.0000 
SIZE 0.010612 0.010576 1.003402 0.3163 
TAX 2.40E-04 0.007300 0.003285 0.9974 
     
     
 Effects Specification   
     
     
Cross-section fixed (dummy variables)  
     
     
R-squared 0.988546     Mean dependent var 0.933247 
Adjusted R-squared 0.985604     S.D. dependent var 0.987213 
 
S.E. of regression 0.118450     Akaike info criterion -1.247362 
Sum squared resid 5.626221     Schwarz criterion -0.377354 
 159 
Log likelihood 418.9590     F-statistic 336.0004 
Durbin-Watson stat 1.766046     Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000 
     
     
 
Dependent Variable: TOB   
Method: Panel Least Squares   
Date: 05/15/11   Time: 21:11   
Sample: 2003 2007   
Cross-sections included: 101   
Total panel (balanced) observations: 505  
     
     
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     
C 0.570874 0.057384 9.948256 0.0000 
TDTA 1.013469 0.012204 83.04155 0.0000 
SIZE 0.061449 0.008633 7.117515 0.0000 
TAX -0.014031 0.013361 -1.050148 0.2942 
     
     
R-squared 0.940027     Mean dependent var 0.933247 
Adjusted R-squared 0.939668     S.D. dependent var 0.987213 
S.E. of regression 0.242486     Akaike info criterion 0.012143 
Sum squared resid 29.45852     Schwarz criterion 0.045605 
Log likelihood 0.933804     F-statistic 393.0340 
Durbin-Watson stat 1.361645     Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000 
     
     
 
 
Dependent Variable: TOB   
Method: Panel Least Squares   
Date: 05/15/11   Time: 21:12   
Sample: 2003 2007   
Cross-sections included: 101   
Total panel (balanced) observations: 505  
     
     
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     
C 1.407547 0.165290 8.515608 0.0000 
LTDTA 1.312301 0.070050 18.73377 0.0000 
SIZE 0.135358 0.025309 5.348241 0.0000 
TAX -0.003233 0.039428 -0.082003 0.9347 
     
     
R-squared 0.479295     Mean dependent var 0.933247 
Adjusted R-squared 0.476177     S.D. dependent var 0.987213 
S.E. of regression 0.714502     Akaike info criterion 2.173427 
Sum squared resid 255.7669     Schwarz criterion 2.206889 
Log likelihood -544.7903     F-statistic 153.7190 
Durbin-Watson stat 1.749905     Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000 
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Dependent Variable: TOB   
Method: Panel EGLS (Cross-section random 
effects)   
Cross-sections included: 101   
Total panel (balanced) observations: 505  
Swamy and Arora estimator of component variances 
     
     
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     
C 1.401196 0.216930 6.459213 0.0000 
LTDTA 1.262177 0.071938 17.54532 0.0000 
SIZE 0.132628 0.033194 3.995547 0.0001 
TAX 0.011192 0.032803 0.341186 0.7331 
     
     
 Effects Specification   
   S.D.   Rho   
     
     
Cross-section random 0.467766 0.4231 
Idiosyncratic random 0.546181 0.5769 
     
     
 Weighted Statistics   
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R-squared 0.431176     Mean dependent var 0.431978 
Adjusted R-squared 0.427770     S.D. dependent var 0.720770 
S.E. of regression 0.545233     Sum squared resid 148.9368 
F-statistic 126.5881     Durbin-Watson stat 1.280363 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000    
     
     
 Unweighted Statistics   
     
     
R-squared 0.478484     Mean dependent var 0.933247 
Sum squared resid 256.1652     Durbin-Watson stat 0.744414 
     
     
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Dependent Variable: TOB   
Method: Panel Least Squares   
Date: 05/15/11   Time: 21:16   
Sample: 2003 2007   
Cross-sections included: 101   
Total panel (balanced) observations: 505  
     
     
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     
C 1.353227 0.307971 4.394011 0.0000 
LTDTA 1.231530 0.081668 15.07977 0.0000 
SIZE 0.123685 0.048748 2.537218 0.0116 
TAX 0.016481 0.033665 0.489565 0.6247 
     
     
 Effects Specification   
     
     
Cross-section fixed (dummy variables)  
     
     
R-squared 0.756463     Mean dependent var 0.933247 
Adjusted R-squared 0.693908     S.D. dependent var 0.987213 
S.E. of regression 0.546181     Akaike info criterion 1.809553 
Sum squared resid 119.6240     Schwarz criterion 2.679561 
Log likelihood -352.9122     F-statistic 12.09286 
Durbin-Watson stat 1.590479     Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000 
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Dependent Variable: ROE   
Method: Panel Least Squares   
Date: 05/16/11   Time: 10:54   
Sample: 2003 2007   
Cross-sections included: 101   
Total panel (balanced) observations: 505  
     
     
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     
C 3.858014 17.60411 0.219154 0.8266 
STDTA -4.627923 5.068112 -0.913145 0.3616 
SIZE 0.459072 2.704180 0.169764 0.8653 
TAX 0.106990 4.265810 0.025081 0.9800 
     
     
R-squared 0.001903     Mean dependent var 4.590750 
Adjusted R-squared -0.004074     S.D. dependent var 77.30105 
S.E. of regression 77.45833     Akaike info criterion 11.54525 
Sum squared resid 3005897.     Schwarz criterion 11.57871 
Log likelihood -2911.175     F-statistic 0.318427 
Durbin-Watson stat 2.850718     Prob(F-statistic) 0.812061 
     
     
 
Dependent Variable: ROE   
Method: Panel EGLS (Two-way random effects)  
Date: 05/16/11   Time: 10:55   
Sample: 2003 2007   
Cross-sections included: 101   
Total panel (balanced) observations: 505  
Swamy and Arora estimator of component variances 
     
     
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     
C 3.397701 18.07084 0.188021 0.8509 
STDTA -4.509529 5.059130 -0.891365 0.3732 
SIZE 0.524615 2.709891 0.193593 0.8466 
TAX 0.113142 4.260677 0.026555 0.9788 
     
     
 Effects Specification   
   S.D.   Rho   
     
     
Cross-section random 0.000000 0.0000 
Period random 9.342980 0.0127 
Idiosyncratic random 82.52336 0.9873 
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 Weighted Statistics   
     
     
R-squared 0.001856     Mean dependent var 3.030605 
Adjusted R-squared -0.004121     S.D. dependent var 77.11859 
S.E. of regression 77.27732     Sum squared resid 2991864. 
F-statistic 0.310531     Durbin-Watson stat 2.849612 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.817783    
     
     
 Unweighted Statistics   
     
     
R-squared 0.001901     Mean dependent var 4.590750 
Sum squared resid 3005902.     Durbin-Watson stat 2.850966 
     
     
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Dependent Variable: ROE   
Method: Panel Least Squares   
Date: 05/16/11   Time: 10:56   
Sample: 2003 2007   
Cross-sections included: 101   
Total panel (balanced) observations: 505  
     
     
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     
C 20.15973 45.48900 0.443178 0.6579 
STDTA -12.32487 7.688857 -1.602952 0.1097 
SIZE -1.624884 7.237816 -0.224499 0.8225 
TAX 0.518001 5.083637 0.101896 0.9189 
     
     
 Effects Specification   
     
     
Cross-section fixed (dummy variables)  
     
     
R-squared 0.094298     Mean dependent var 4.590750 
Adjusted R-squared -0.138338     S.D. dependent var 77.30105 
S.E. of regression 82.47476     Akaike info criterion 11.84415 
Sum squared resid 2727636.     Schwarz criterion 12.71415 
Log likelihood -2886.647     F-statistic 0.405347 
Durbin-Watson stat 3.125434     Prob(F-statistic) 1.000000 
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Dependent Variable: ROE   
Method: Panel Least Squares   
Date: 05/16/11   Time: 10:56   
Sample: 2003 2007   
Cross-sections included: 101   
Total panel (balanced) observations: 505  
     
     
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     
C 8.962801 18.31239 0.583248 0.6244 
TDTA -5.264110 3.894635 -1.175022 0.1769 
SIZE -0.081513 2.755091 -0.148569 0.9769 
TAX -0.079478 4.263798 -0.018640 0.9851 
     
     
R-squared 0.003878     Mean dependent var 4.590750 
Adjusted R-squared 0.002087     S.D. dependent var 77.30105 
S.E. of regression 77.38168     Akaike info criterion 11.54327 
Sum squared resid 2999950.     Schwarz criterion 11.57673 
Log likelihood -2910.675     F-statistic 0.650064 
Durbin-Watson stat 2.849068     Prob(F-statistic) 0.583197 
     
     
 
 
    
 
Dependent Variable: ROE   
Method: Panel EGLS (Two-way random effects)  
Date: 05/16/11   Time: 10:59   
Sample: 2003 2007   
Cross-sections included: 101   
Total panel (balanced) observations: 505  
Swamy and Arora estimator of component variances 
     
     
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     
C 8.972301 18.31239 0.489958 0.6244 
TDTA -5.266411 3.894635 -1.352222 0.1769 
SIZE -0.079813 2.755091 -0.028969 0.9769 
TAX -0.079478 4.263798 -0.018640 0.9851 
     
     
 Effects Specification   
   S.D.   Rho   
     
     
Cross-section random 0.000000 0.0000 
Period random 0.000000 0.0000 
Idiosyncratic random 82.41386 1.0000 
     
     
 Weighted Statistics   
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R-squared 0.003878     Mean dependent var 4.590750 
Adjusted R-squared 0.002087     S.D. dependent var 77.30105 
S.E. of regression 77.38168     Sum squared resid 2999950. 
F-statistic 0.650064     Durbin-Watson stat 2.849068 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.583197    
     
     
 Unweighted Statistics   
     
     
R-squared 0.003878     Mean dependent var 4.590750 
Sum squared resid 2999950.     Durbin-Watson stat 2.849068 
     
     
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Dependent Variable: ROE   
Method: Panel Least Squares   
Date: 05/16/11   Time: 11:00   
Sample: 2003 2007   
Cross-sections included: 101   
Total panel (balanced) observations: 505  
     
     
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     
C 33.22873 46.79432 0.710102 0.4781 
TDTA -11.87308 6.112007 -1.942582 0.5280 
SIZE -3.241608 7.352854 -0.440864 0.6595 
TAX 0.411921 5.074991 0.081167 0.9353 
     
     
 Effects Specification   
     
     
Cross-section fixed (dummy variables)  
     
     
R-squared 0.096993     Mean dependent var 4.590750 
Adjusted R-squared 0.134952     S.D. dependent var 77.30105 
S.E. of regression 82.35199     Akaike info criterion 11.84117 
Sum squared resid 2719522.     Schwarz criterion 12.71117 
Log likelihood -2885.895     F-statistic 0.418173 
Durbin-Watson stat 3.125627     Prob(F-statistic) 1.000000 
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Dependent Variable: ROE   
Method: Panel Least Squares   
Date: 05/16/11   Time: 11:04   
Sample: 2003 2007   
Cross-sections included: 101   
Total panel (balanced) observations: 505  
     
     
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     
C 6.957116 17.90531 0.388551 0.6978 
LTDTA -9.592864 7.588268 -1.264170 0.2068 
SIZE 0.053911 2.741612 0.019664 0.9843 
TAX -0.233887 4.271041 -0.054761 0.9564 
     
     
R-squared 0.003421     Mean dependent var 4.590750 
Adjusted R-squared 0.002547     S.D. dependent var 77.30105 
S.E. of regression 77.39942     Akaike info criterion 11.54372 
Sum squared resid 3001325.     Schwarz criterion 11.57719 
Log likelihood -2910.791     F-statistic 0.573253 
Durbin-Watson stat 2.858275     Prob(F-statistic) 0.632823 
     
     
 
Dependent Variable: ROE   
Method: Panel EGLS (Two-way random effects)  
Date: 05/16/11   Time: 11:05   
Sample: 2003 2007   
Cross-sections included: 101   
Total panel (balanced) observations: 505  
Swamy and Arora estimator of component variances 
     
     
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     
C 6.957116 17.90531 0.388551 0.6978 
LTDTA -9.592864 7.588268 -1.264170 0.2068 
SIZE 0.053911 2.741612 0.019664 0.9843 
TAX -0.233887 4.271041 -0.054761 0.9564 
     
     
 Effects Specification   
   S.D.   Rho   
     
     
Cross-section random 0.000000 0.0000 
Period random 0.000000 0.0000 
Idiosyncratic random 82.60729 1.0000 
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 Weighted Statistics   
     
     
R-squared 0.003421     Mean dependent var 4.590750 
Adjusted R-squared 0.002547     S.D. dependent var 77.30105 
S.E. of regression 77.39942     Sum squared resid 3001325. 
F-statistic 0.573253     Durbin-Watson stat 2.858275 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.632823    
     
     
 Unweighted Statistics   
     
     
R-squared 0.003421     Mean dependent var 4.590750 
Sum squared resid 3001325.     Durbin-Watson stat 2.858275 
     
     
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Dependent Variable: ROE   
Method: Panel Least Squares   
Date: 05/16/11   Time: 11:05   
Sample: 2003 2007   
Cross-sections included: 101   
Total panel (balanced) observations: 505  
     
     
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     
C 22.45856 46.54970 0.482464 0.6297 
LTDTA -16.48633 12.34405 -1.335568 0.1824 
SIZE -2.165996 7.368270 -0.293963 0.7689 
TAX 0.200877 5.088438 0.039477 0.9685 
     
     
 Effects Specification   
     
     
Cross-section fixed (dummy variables)  
     
     
R-squared 0.092532     Mean dependent var 4.590750 
Adjusted R-squared -0.140559     S.D. dependent var 77.30105 
S.E. of regression 82.55516     Akaike info criterion 11.84609 
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Sum squared resid 2732957.     Schwarz criterion 12.71610 
Log likelihood -2887.139     F-statistic 0.396978 
Durbin-Watson stat 3.136986     Prob(F-statistic) 1.000000 
    
     
     
 
Dependent Variable: ROA   
Method: Panel EGLS (Cross-section random effects) 
Date: 05/18/11   Time: 10:05   
Sample: 2003 2007   
Cross-sections included: 101   
Total panel (balanced) observations: 505  
Swamy and Arora estimator of component variances 
     
     
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     
C -0.505810 0.444143 -1.138843 0.2553 
TDTA -0.180165 0.023611 -7.630670 0.0000 
SIZE 0.044787 0.019911 2.249371 0.0249 
TAX 0.027571 0.022759 1.211412 0.2263 
AGRIC 0.549448 0.440396 1.247621 0.2128 
AIRLINE 0.489469 0.460757 1.062317 0.2886 
AUTO 0.357735 0.451145 0.792949 0.4282 
BREWERIES 0.278823 0.446663 0.624237 0.5328 
BUILDING 0.445137 0.441221 1.008875 0.3135 
CHEMICALS 0.480187 0.440914 1.089072 0.2767 
COMPUTER 0.232403 0.414744 0.560353 0.5755 
CONGLOMERATE 0.523042 0.440569 1.187196 0.2357 
CONSTRUCTN 0.469422 0.446551 1.051218 0.2937 
EMERGMKT 0.373724 0.445756 0.838406 0.4022 
ENGTECH 0.332245 0.460105 0.722106 0.4706 
FOODBEV 0.452828 0.437698 1.034566 0.3014 
HEALTHCARE 0.425302 0.443392 0.959202 0.3379 
HOTEL 0.396330 0.451109 0.878569 0.3801 
INDUSTPROD 0.475761 0.443256 1.073333 0.2837 
INFOTECH 0.406008 0.460474 0.881717 0.3784 
MACHINERY 0.499183 0.490509 1.017684 0.3093 
MARITIME 0.451570 0.488412 0.924569 0.3557 
MEDIA 0.254258 0.488926 0.520034 0.6033 
PACKAGING 0.356072 0.438996 0.811104 0.4177 
PETROLEUM 0.463299 0.439265 1.054714 0.2921 
PRINTING 0.536542 0.451080 1.189462 0.2349 
REALEST 0.314072 0.488948 0.642343 0.5210 
ROADTRANS 0.427108 0.488575 0.874192 0.3825 
SERVICES 0.663123 0.424687 1.561438 0.1191 
TEXTILES 0.195125 0.490081 0.398149 0.6907 
     
     
 Effects Specification   
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   S.D.   Rho   
     
     
Cross-section random 0.150072 0.1302 
Idiosyncratic random 0.387950 0.8698 
     
     
 Weighted Statistics   
     
     
R-squared 0.178293     Mean dependent var 0.060811 
Adjusted R-squared 0.128126     S.D. dependent var 0.417825 
S.E. of regression 0.390141     Sum squared resid 72.29959 
F-statistic 3.553960     Durbin-Watson stat 2.055040 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000    
     
     
 Unweighted Statistics   
     
     
R-squared 0.199409     Mean dependent var 0.080404 
Sum squared resid 80.97587     Durbin-Watson stat 1.834850 
     
 
 
    
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Correlated Random Effects - Hausman Test  
Equation: Untitled   
Test cross-section random effects  
     
     
Test Summary 
Chi-Sq. 
Statistic Chi-Sq. d.f. Prob.  
     
     
Cross-section random 9.380362 4 0.0523 
     
     
     
 
 
 
Dependent Variable: ROA   
Method: Panel EGLS (Cross-section random effects) 
Date: 05/18/11   Time: 10:14   
Sample: 2003 2007   
Cross-sections included: 101   
Total panel (balanced) observations: 505  
Swamy and Arora estimator of component variances 
     
     
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     
C -0.081866 0.402914 -0.203185 0.8391 
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LTDTA -0.541639 0.041939 -12.91498 0.0000 
SIZE 0.029150 0.018347 1.588844 0.1128 
TAX 0.017717 0.020440 0.866760 0.3865 
AGRIC 0.205596 0.398729 0.515628 0.6064 
AIRLINE 0.277619 0.418516 0.663342 0.5074 
AUTO 0.028155 0.409638 0.068732 0.9452 
BREWERIES -0.050732 0.404603 -0.125387 0.9003 
BUILDING 0.100683 0.399841 0.251807 0.8013 
CHEMICALS 0.222632 0.398978 0.558007 0.5771 
COMPUTER 0.071897 0.372220 0.193158 0.8469 
CONGLOMERATE 0.210331 0.398966 0.527191 0.5983 
CONSTRUCTN 0.044786 0.404746 0.110651 0.9119 
EMERGMKT -0.003013 0.404810 -0.007442 0.9941 
ENGTECH -0.027521 0.418854 -0.065705 0.9476 
FOODBEV 0.176751 0.395707 0.446672 0.6553 
HEALTHCARE 0.108623 0.401877 0.270290 0.7871 
HOTEL 0.080751 0.409440 0.197223 0.8437 
INDUSTPROD 0.205111 0.401362 0.511037 0.6096 
INFOTECH 0.141149 0.418258 0.337469 0.7359 
MACHINERY 0.124098 0.449129 0.276308 0.7824 
MARITIME 0.154025 0.446455 0.344995 0.7303 
MEDIA -0.104826 0.447357 -0.234324 0.8148 
PACKAGING 0.054859 0.397267 0.138091 0.8902 
PETROLEUM 0.129682 0.397580 0.326177 0.7444 
PRINTING 0.200085 0.409703 0.488367 0.6255 
REALEST -0.072718 0.447442 -0.162520 0.8710 
ROADTRANS 0.125414 0.446568 0.280839 0.7790 
SERVICES 0.456039 0.385252 1.183742 0.2371 
TEXTILES -0.137851 0.448143 -0.307605 0.7585 
     
     
 Effects Specification   
   S.D.   Rho   
     
     
Cross-section random 0.153544 0.1644 
Idiosyncratic random 0.346158 0.8356 
     
     
 Weighted Statistics   
     
     
R-squared 0.304837     Mean dependent var 0.057086 
Adjusted R-squared 0.262396     S.D. dependent var 0.412837 
S.E. of regression 0.354560     Sum squared resid 59.71365 
F-statistic 7.182533     Durbin-Watson stat 1.875891 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000    
     
     
 Unweighted Statistics   
     
     
R-squared 0.307044     Mean dependent var 0.080404 
Sum squared resid 70.08914     Durbin-Watson stat 1.598198 
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Correlated Random Effects - Hausman Test  
Equation: Untitled   
Test cross-section random effects  
     
     
Test Summary 
Chi-Sq. 
Statistic Chi-Sq. d.f. Prob.  
     
     
Cross-section random 27.339122 4 0.0000 
     
      
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
     
 
Dependent Variable: ROA   
Method: Panel EGLS (Cross-section random effects) 
Date: 05/18/11   Time: 10:30   
Sample: 2003 2007   
Cross-sections included: 101   
Total panel (balanced) observations: 505  
Swamy and Arora estimator of component variances 
     
     
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     
C -0.922063 0.467322 -1.973078 0.0491 
STDTA -0.064506 0.031690 -2.035557 0.0423 
SIZE 0.078593 0.020324 3.866994 0.0001 
TAX 0.031906 0.024209 1.317933 0.1882 
AGRIC 0.609491 0.467208 1.304541 0.1927 
AIRLINE 0.605846 0.486960 1.244139 0.2141 
AUTO 0.494956 0.477343 1.036899 0.3003 
BREWERIES 0.304904 0.473691 0.643677 0.5201 
BUILDING 0.577772 0.467506 1.235859 0.2171 
CHEMICALS 0.586564 0.467248 1.255360 0.2100 
COMPUTER 0.263387 0.441452 0.596637 0.5510 
CONGLOMERATE 0.667031 0.466746 1.429111 0.1536 
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CONSTRUCTN 0.479019 0.474079 1.010420 0.3128 
EMERGMKT 0.565001 0.471494 1.198319 0.2314 
ENGTECH 0.489162 0.486129 1.006239 0.3148 
FOODBEV 0.529360 0.464303 1.140117 0.2548 
HEALTHCARE 0.584177 0.469414 1.244480 0.2139 
HOTEL 0.508212 0.477480 1.064364 0.2877 
INDUSTPROD 0.584511 0.469600 1.244699 0.2139 
INFOTECH 0.446993 0.487155 0.917559 0.3593 
MACHINERY 0.717902 0.516032 1.391197 0.1648 
MARITIME 0.624174 0.514304 1.213630 0.2255 
MEDIA 0.450786 0.514697 0.875828 0.3816 
PACKAGING 0.468134 0.465393 1.005889 0.3150 
PETROLEUM 0.546347 0.465953 1.172537 0.2416 
PRINTING 0.706467 0.477003 1.481054 0.1393 
REALEST 0.454801 0.515239 0.882700 0.3778 
ROADTRANS 0.559564 0.514777 1.087004 0.2776 
SERVICES 0.695701 0.449471 1.547820 0.1223 
TEXTILES 0.331544 0.516365 0.642072 0.5211 
     
     
 Effects Specification   
   S.D.   Rho   
     
     
Cross-section random 0.145711 0.1101 
Idiosyncratic random 0.414294 0.8899 
     
     
 Weighted Statistics   
     
     
R-squared 0.090889     Mean dependent var 0.063200 
Adjusted R-squared 0.035385     S.D. dependent var 0.421158 
S.E. of regression 0.413639     Sum squared resid 81.27128 
F-statistic 1.637526     Durbin-Watson stat 2.083635 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.020764    
     
     
 Unweighted Statistics   
     
     
R-squared 0.120085     Mean dependent var 0.080404 
Sum squared resid 88.99914     Durbin-Watson stat 1.902712 
     
     
 
Correlated Random Effects - Hausman Test  
Equation: Untitled   
Test cross-section random effects  
     
     
Test Summary 
Chi-Sq. 
Statistic Chi-Sq. d.f. Prob.  
     
     
Cross-section random 2.499413 4 0.6447 
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Dependent Variable: TOB   
Method: Panel EGLS (Cross-section random effects) 
Date: 05/18/11   Time: 11:04   
Sample: 2003 2007   
Cross-sections included: 101   
Total panel (balanced) observations: 505  
Swamy and Arora estimator of component variances 
     
     
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     
C 0.434866 0.165158 2.633030 0.0087 
TDTA 1.005679 0.008462 118.8493 0.0000 
SIZE -0.022587 0.009155 -2.467120 0.0140 
TAX -0.001177 0.007239 -0.162527 0.8710 
AGRIC -0.190188 0.172663 -1.101498 0.2712 
AIRLINE -0.187243 0.199739 -0.937438 0.3490 
AUTO -0.139635 0.186777 -0.747600 0.4551 
BREWERIES -0.066896 0.180333 -0.370959 0.7108 
BUILDING -0.180800 0.172837 -1.046072 0.2961 
CHEMICALS -0.079826 0.172744 -0.462105 0.6442 
COMPUTER -0.101969 0.131539 -0.775198 0.4386 
CONGLOMERATE 0.043785 0.171045 0.255986 0.7981 
CONSTRUCTN -0.242664 0.180308 -1.345827 0.1790 
EMERGMKT 0.165973 0.179776 0.923223 0.3564 
ENGTECH 0.731609 0.199508 3.667059 0.0003 
FOODBEV -0.152311 0.167254 -0.910657 0.3629 
HEALTHCARE -0.173200 0.175716 -0.985681 0.3248 
HOTEL -0.096321 0.186812 -0.515607 0.6064 
INDUSTPROD -0.044456 0.175759 -0.252938 0.8004 
INFOTECH -0.245806 0.199771 -1.230435 0.2191 
MACHINERY -0.339706 0.235559 -1.442124 0.1499 
MARITIME -0.056253 0.234241 -0.240152 0.8103 
MEDIA -0.139359 0.234345 -0.594675 0.5523 
PACKAGING -0.191785 0.169288 -1.132894 0.2578 
PETROLEUM -0.169306 0.169513 -0.998774 0.3184 
PRINTING -0.111309 0.186691 -0.596222 0.5513 
REALEST -0.268185 0.234487 -1.143712 0.2533 
ROADTRANS -0.182208 0.234352 -0.777496 0.4373 
SERVICES 0.119934 0.180588 0.664129 0.5069 
TEXTILES -0.237549 0.234890 -1.011320 0.3124 
     
     
 Effects Specification   
   S.D.   Rho   
     
     
Cross-section random 0.164996 0.6599 
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Idiosyncratic random 0.118461 0.3401 
     
     
 Weighted Statistics   
     
     
R-squared 0.969753     Mean dependent var 0.285303 
Adjusted R-squared 0.967906     S.D. dependent var 0.670483 
S.E. of regression 0.120116     Sum squared resid 6.853204 
F-statistic 525.1334     Durbin-Watson stat 1.451020 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000    
     
     
 Unweighted Statistics   
     
     
R-squared 0.962144     Mean dependent var 0.933247 
Sum squared resid 18.59483     Durbin-Watson stat 0.534780 
     
     
 
Correlated Random Effects - Hausman Test  
Equation: Untitled   
Test cross-section random effects  
     
     
Test Summary 
Chi-Sq. 
Statistic Chi-Sq. d.f. Prob.  
     
     
Cross-section random 17.363094 4 0.0016 
     
 
Dependent Variable: TOB   
Method: Panel EGLS (Cross-section random effects) 
Date: 05/18/11   Time: 11:09   
Sample: 2003 2007   
Cross-sections included: 101   
Total panel (balanced) observations: 505  
Swamy and Arora estimator of component variances 
     
     
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     
C 0.893664 0.695466 1.284986 0.1994 
LTDTA 1.247052 0.074334 16.77643 0.0000 
SIZE -0.139397 0.037131 -3.754229 0.0002 
TAX 0.012182 0.033101 0.368011 0.7130 
AGRIC 0.745504 0.698889 1.066699 0.2866 
AIRLINE 0.143900 0.768009 0.187367 0.8515 
AUTO 0.432056 0.735555 0.587388 0.5572 
BREWERIES 0.991948 0.718500 1.380581 0.1681 
BUILDING 0.452848 0.700616 0.646357 0.5184 
CHEMICALS 0.417348 0.699332 0.596781 0.5509 
COMPUTER 0.442591 0.601515 0.735794 0.4622 
CONGLOMERATE 0.545317 0.696583 0.782847 0.4341 
CONSTRUCTN 1.151270 0.718544 1.602225 0.1098 
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EMERGMKT 0.616646 0.718422 0.858333 0.3911 
ENGTECH 1.289439 0.768273 1.678360 0.0939 
FOODBEV 0.537664 0.686336 0.783384 0.4338 
HEALTHCARE 0.267267 0.707809 0.377598 0.7059 
HOTEL 0.547003 0.735330 0.743889 0.4573 
INDUSTPROD 0.485078 0.707173 0.685940 0.4931 
INFOTECH 0.559655 0.767693 0.729009 0.4664 
MACHINERY -0.049037 0.867336 -0.056537 0.9549 
MARITIME 0.267967 0.860767 0.311311 0.7557 
MEDIA 0.260720 0.861966 0.302471 0.7624 
PACKAGING 0.407559 0.691595 0.589303 0.5559 
PETROLEUM 0.655092 0.692327 0.946218 0.3445 
PRINTING 0.333901 0.735544 0.453951 0.6501 
REALEST 0.455592 0.862365 0.528306 0.5975 
ROADTRANS 0.332421 0.861065 0.386058 0.6996 
SERVICES 0.756962 0.700724 1.080258 0.2806 
TEXTILES 0.365370 0.863798 0.422981 0.6725 
     
     
 Effects Specification   
   S.D.   Rho   
     
     
Cross-section random 0.490954 0.4466 
Idiosyncratic random 0.546459 0.5534 
     
     
 Weighted Statistics   
     
     
R-squared 0.452087     Mean dependent var 0.415872 
Adjusted R-squared 0.418635     S.D. dependent var 0.714443 
S.E. of regression 0.544743     Sum squared resid 140.9541 
F-statistic 13.51467     Durbin-Watson stat 1.354215 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000    
     
     
 Unweighted Statistics   
     
     
R-squared 0.536776     Mean dependent var 0.933247 
Sum squared resid 227.5325     Durbin-Watson stat 0.838923 
     
     
 
 
Correlated Random Effects - Hausman Test  
Equation: Untitled   
Test cross-section random effects  
     
     
Test Summary 
Chi-Sq. 
Statistic Chi-Sq. d.f. Prob.  
     
     
Cross-section random 1.021737 4 0.9065 
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Dependent Variable: TOB   
Method: Panel EGLS (Cross-section random effects) 
Date: 05/18/11   Time: 11:15   
Sample: 2003 2007   
Cross-sections included: 101   
Total panel (balanced) observations: 505  
Swamy and Arora estimator of component variances 
     
     
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     
C 1.925054 0.459470 4.189725 0.0000 
STDTA 1.105673 0.030841 35.85045 0.0000 
SIZE -0.136452 0.025194 -5.416013 0.0000 
TAX -0.015251 0.021131 -0.721755 0.4708 
AGRIC -0.730845 0.475699 -1.536360 0.1251 
AIRLINE -0.586829 0.537610 -1.091552 0.2756 
AUTO -0.794996 0.507708 -1.565853 0.1180 
BREWERIES -0.493757 0.493639 -1.000239 0.3177 
BUILDING -0.852536 0.475856 -1.791585 0.0738 
CHEMICALS -0.551317 0.475515 -1.159409 0.2469 
COMPUTER -0.254454 0.384181 -0.662329 0.5081 
CONGLOMERATE -0.586039 0.471843 -1.242020 0.2148 
CONSTRUCTN -0.816008 0.494060 -1.651638 0.0993 
EMERGMKT -0.706346 0.491210 -1.437971 0.1511 
ENGTECH -0.033977 0.536942 -0.063279 0.9496 
FOODBEV -0.582091 0.463488 -1.255893 0.2098 
HEALTHCARE -0.850050 0.482209 -1.762827 0.0786 
HOTEL -0.673757 0.507903 -1.326548 0.1853 
INDUSTPROD -0.536138 0.482492 -1.111186 0.2671 
INFOTECH -0.593147 0.538006 -1.102491 0.2708 
MACHINERY -1.309420 0.622037 -2.105051 0.0358 
MARITIME -0.728321 0.618472 -1.177613 0.2395 
MEDIA -0.956981 0.618767 -1.546593 0.1226 
PACKAGING -0.750892 0.467883 -1.604872 0.1092 
PETROLEUM -0.715458 0.468755 -1.526292 0.1276 
PRINTING -0.849792 0.507278 -1.675201 0.0946 
REALEST -1.025776 0.619518 -1.655765 0.0984 
ROADTRANS -0.777045 0.618988 -1.255348 0.2100 
SERVICES -0.154860 0.488314 -0.317132 0.7513 
TEXTILES -0.870336 0.620665 -1.402264 0.1615 
     
     
 Effects Specification   
   S.D.   Rho   
     
     
Cross-section random 0.404818 0.5767 
Idiosyncratic random 0.346803 0.4233 
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 Weighted Statistics   
     
     
R-squared 0.758959     Mean dependent var 0.333883 
Adjusted R-squared 0.744243     S.D. dependent var 0.685238 
S.E. of regression 0.346542     Sum squared resid 57.04328 
F-statistic 51.57299     Durbin-Watson stat 1.958659 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000    
     
     
 Unweighted Statistics   
     
     
R-squared 0.760101     Mean dependent var 0.933247 
Sum squared resid 117.8367     Durbin-Watson stat 0.948162 
     
     
 
 
Correlated Random Effects - Hausman Test  
Equation: Untitled   
Test cross-section random effects  
     
     
Test Summary 
Chi-Sq. 
Statistic Chi-Sq. d.f. Prob.  
     
     
Cross-section random 3.283800 4 0.05115 
     
     
 
B.2:  Descriptive Statistics 
 
 ROA ROE TOB STDTA LTDTA TDTA SIZE TAX 
 Mean  0.080404  4.590750  0.933247  0.459229  0.275740  0.734964  6.171858  0.230722 
 Median  0.092650  0.706993  0.703784  0.264201  0.137710  0.520988  6.301720  0.245629 
 Maximum  3.710407  1558.610  7.168396  5.580930  6.552142  6.806386  8.137795  14.93671 
 Minimum -6.020781 -696.3400  0.087124  0.000000  0.000000  0.014265  0.000000 -2.585912 
 Std. Dev.  0.447978  77.30105  0.987213  0.692967  0.470431  0.919548  1.299929  0.809584 
 Skewness -4.630140  14.71276  3.470651  4.245704  6.741749  3.823898 -2.163101  12.24031 
 Kurtosis  82.64679  338.3479  18.00951  25.83175  73.24879  20.97887  11.13895  219.8928 
         
 Jarque-Bera  135284.5  2384527.  5754.202  12485.98  107663.8  8032.203  1787.670  1002463. 
 Probability  0.000000  0.000000  0.000000  0.000000  0.000000  0.000000  0.000000  0.000000 
         
 Sum  40.60382  2318.329  471.2899  231.9105  139.2486  371.1566  3116.788  116.5145 
 Sum Sq. Dev.  101.1451  3011628.  491.1935  242.0221  111.5379  426.1667  851.6675  330.3345 
         
 Observations  505  505  505  505  505  505  505  505 
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B.3: Correlation Matrix 
 
 ROA ROE TOB STDTA LTDTA TDTA SIZE TAX 
ROA  1.000000  0.063939 -0.366523 -0.154810 -0.499366 -0.372132  0.221817  0.077640 
ROE  0.063939  1.000000 -0.068880 -0.042937 -0.058432 -0.062250  0.015515  0.001783 
TOB -0.366523 -0.068880  1.000000  0.827118  0.670459  0.966315 -0.335971 -0.055313 
STDTA -0.154810 -0.042937  0.827118  1.000000  0.220949  0.866632 -0.186717 -0.007886 
LTDTA -0.499366 -0.058432  0.670459  0.220949  1.000000  0.678098 -0.252056 -0.071828 
TDTA -0.372132 -0.062250  0.966315  0.866632  0.678098  1.000000 -0.269657 -0.042680 
SIZE  0.221817  0.015515 -0.335971 -0.186717 -0.252056 -0.269657  1.000000  0.043450 
TAX  0.077640  0.001783 -0.055313 -0.007886 -0.071828 -0.042680  0.043450  1.000000 
   
 
 
 
 
 
 
